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Connessioni · Diagnosis

Diagnosis in clinical psychology between subjective understanding and reductionist objectivity

An adolescent who is handed the MMPI-2 straight away, a child on antipsychotics whose co-occurring disorders are sought without ever suspending the treatment: two scenes open this case against diagnosis by questionnaire. Drawing on phenomenology, Bion and the epistemology of complexity, Marco Nicastro argues for a “clinical-subjective” approach, in which the therapist’s own subjectivity becomes the very instrument of diagnosis.

Author Marco NicastroFirst published Connessioni, 28 December 2020Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of La diagnosi in psicologia clinica tra comprensione soggettiva e oggettività riduzionista, by Marco Nicastro, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 8 (2020), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and headings are those of the journal; the two lines of the opening dialogue, indented in the journal, are given as ordinary paragraphs; quotations are translated from the Italian; a few typographical errors, including in proper names (Binswanger, Von Wright, Stolorow, Von Foerster), have been silently corrected; the references are reproduced as the journal gives them. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

No act of the carer is neutral for the patient.

Marco Nicastro

Introduction: two clinical situations

I want to open this contribution with a brief account of two clinical situations, which I witnessed or took part in personally, and which are fairly emblematic of a certain way of understanding diagnosis in clinical psychology, before going on to a theoretical discussion of what seems to emerge from them. For obvious reasons, some details of the events reported have been changed, while trying to preserve the substance of the facts.

In the first situation, two psychotherapists of cognitive-behavioural orientation (referred to as T1 and T2) discuss an adolescent patient:

T1: “You know, I’ve been seeing this girl (an adolescent) for a few weeks, and it seems to me that at times her mood swings a lot, and her view of things too. I’d like to assess her personality better, to understand better… also because of her father’s past…” (implying a possible link, or a fear of one, between the girl’s mood swings and her father’s severe depressive episodes).

T2 (more experienced in therapy): “Well, to assess her personality better you can give her the MMPI-2, which lets you detect the presence of neurotic or psychotic traits. Then, depending on what comes out, you can give her some of the SCID-II scales, and that way you identify her personality profile, or the one closest to it.”1

In the second situation, which I will describe indirectly, a therapist, at a meeting with other colleagues of a psychiatric service, was analysing for teaching purposes the video recording of a child who had been referred for further diagnostic assessment – but with a previous diagnosis of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) – and asked those present to try to identify the typical signs and symptoms of that disorder or of other co-occurring ones. Specifically, he suggested considering the possible comorbidity of ODD with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), given the patient’s constant motor restlessness. For some time, moreover, the child had been taking an antipsychotic because of his agitation (this treatment had produced a slight improvement in symptoms).

In the consulting room, filmed for teaching and research purposes, the little patient never kept still; he went from one activity to another in a disorganised way, sometimes did not respond when the therapist called him, often asked for his parents, tended to leave the room for all sorts of reasons and then come back and start the same behaviour again. Another habit that had settled in for some time was his tendency to be called – and to call himself – by a name other than his own, without his parents or anyone else being able to explain this oddity. Finally, the child also showed a tendency to oppose the clinician’s requests, as well as a certain sinister satisfaction in doing so, which could be guessed from some of his facial expressions.

There is no doubt that in the clinical situation under examination some symptoms attributable to a picture of inattention, hyperactivity and oppositionality were present, even though something about the whole never quite added up (or so it seemed to me): a sort of anxious substrate in the patient’s attitudes, so much so that the professional presenting the case ended up hypothesising the presence of a further disorder, of an anxious type. Hypothetically, then, in his view it was possible to diagnose three comorbid disorders: ADHD (Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder), ODD (Oppositional Defiant Disorder), and Overanxious Disorder (or Generalised Anxiety Disorder).

To obtain a kind of indirect confirmation of the presence of an attention disorder, the team following the case decided, in agreement with the referring neuropsychiatrist (and with the parents), to administer a medium-to-low dose of Ritalin2 and to monitor its effect: indeed, before long the little patient appeared calmer, but also rather dazed. This effect was not exactly the one hoped for, and so, given the essentially exploratory aims of that diagnostic assessment, the clinicians decided to stop it.

After viewing the video, the group’s clinical discussion began.

Faced with my doubt as to whether the central problem was really attentional and behavioural rather than one of the whole personality structure (because of the disorganisation of some behaviours, the occasional – or so it seemed to me – fatuity of affect, and the oddity of that unexplained tendency to call himself and be called by another name, which I took to be the sign of an incipient impairment of reality testing), the therapist at first mistook my hypothesis of an ongoing psychotic process for the suggestion of a possible autistic picture (as if psychosis and autism were the same thing); then he ignored my remark altogether, and went on asking his colleagues to continue instead looking for the symptoms of the various disorders mentioned above (that is, generalised anxiety disorder and ADHD), which evidently seemed to him far more relevant.

I insisted: I asked him whether it might not be worth trying to suspend the antipsychotic temporarily – which the patient was taking at a dose that would have “knocked out” a normal adult (in the clinician’s own words) – just to assess the child’s psychological condition in a “purer” way, that is, without the changes caused by psychotropic drugs. How could a precise diagnosis be made, I wondered, if two different drugs were being administered from the outset, one of which, the antipsychotic, had rather heavy effects3? If one wanted to understand the alterations of the pathological picture under way, was it not necessary to observe them in their most essential manifestation, given that there was not yet any in-depth knowledge of the patient – “field” knowledge, we might say – but only some indirect, if important, information about what he had been like before (the history, the parents’ accounts and the previous diagnoses)?

It was no use. The therapist said that it had already been hard enough, for him and his team, to deal with that child in that condition (that is, while he was taking the antipsychotic) and that he therefore had no intention of interacting with him without the “containment” provided by the drug.

Our discussion ended there, while I reflected silently and somewhat bitterly that, if certain drugs were called antipsychotics, there must be a reason.

Theoretical reflections

After the clinical experiences described in the preceding vignettes, I could not help reflecting at length on the meaning of diagnostic assessment in psychology and on how it is understood in the various theoretical orientations of clinical psychology.

Some of these orientations seem to attach little importance to the meaning that the therapist’s acts may have for the patient, concerned as they are, from the consultation phase onwards, with finding the right personality profile or the symptom configuration into which to fit the existential condition of a suffering person. To this end they often make use of a plethora of questionnaires, tests and structured interviews (deemed objective) to which the patient must submit so that the clinician can better understand their condition, as happens for example in the traditional cognitive-behavioural approach (Sanavio, 1991).

One may ask, first of all, whether therapists could not make a diagnosis simply by talking with the patient, rather than making them spend time filling in questionnaires that are often long and tedious. For those who uphold the usefulness of tests, these should serve to make the therapist’s task more objective, to give them more reliable information, less distorted by the fluctuations of memory or by the more or less intense emotional reactions that occur in any interview, as well as being able to simplify the complexity of an interview (McWilliams, 1999; Casement 1985). And yet, if a patient does not want to say certain things, or cannot say them (often not even to themselves), how will they be able to say them within a very short time to the therapist, at a still early stage of acquaintance and before solid trust has been established, through the very concise questions of a questionnaire? And how may a patient react to a therapist who, from the very start, tries to obtain certain information about their experience of suffering through a questionnaire (information that is often rather intimate and delicate), instead of talking with them directly and looking them in the eye, listening carefully and trying to interact with them, as well as listening carefully to their own emotions during the meeting?

The result of all this will be that the patient answers the questions absent-mindedly or haphazardly, or avoids telling the truth. And even if some questionnaires include so-called “validity scales” to check for these falsifying tendencies in the answers (for example the MMPI-2), knowing that the patient has been defensive or has deliberately lied will not help the clinician in the arduous task of working out how to talk with the patient about certain experiences that are difficult for them, or perhaps even impossible to put into words. Moreover, an opportunity will have been lost to build a relationship of trust by showing tact and respect for the patient’s reluctance rather than pushing them to reveal themselves prematurely. Indeed, the patient is likely to perceive the therapist as more concerned with obtaining certain information about them than with sharing, through respectful dialogue, their present suffering and what they have to say – or want to avoid saying – about it. No questionnaire, in fact, can probe with its long string of questions (always rather reductive, of the “yes / no”, “true / false / don’t know” kind and the like) the many nuances of emotional experiences, intentions and more or less conscious human behaviours.

The clinical orientation that favours the administration of test material (or of semi-structured interviews such as the SCID) in order to reach a diagnosis of the patient’s condition during the consultation phase – what we might call the “clinical-objective approach” – is an orientation that aims to collect information useful for guiding the therapist in choosing predefined diagnostic categories in which to place the patient, categories on the basis of which those very tests were often constructed, according to a basic reasoning that is in some way tautological, similar to that of some intelligence theorists who, for want of anything better, define intelligence as “what an intelligence test measures” (cited in Cornoldi, 2007). In essence, the clinician seeks to detect in the patient the aspects that the personality test or interview is able to detect, that is, aspects that have been agreed upon without serious doubt within the scientific community because they correspond to sets of easily observable signs and symptoms, according to the classic scientistic-positivist outlook (Castiglioni, Corradini, 2011). These symptoms correspond, that is, to the most conspicuous phenomenology of the phenomenon, to the set of elements present in the subject’s consciousness and everyday behaviour, and for this reason they have the advantage of being observable and describable by other subjects external to the patient, who can then share them. This is a modus operandi based on that sharp subject/object division of knowledge typical of the paradigm of some scientific disciplines, and in general of a specific idea of knowledge to which, over the course of their history, clinical psychology and psychiatry too (with some exceptions within them) have sought to conform for reasons of credibility and social and institutional accreditation (Rossi Monti, Stanghellini, 2009). This idea of knowledge assumes that the observed phenomenon can be traced back to a theoretical schema of it, that other observed phenomena can then be explained on the basis of their similarities with it, and that the knowing subject who develops that schema is separate from, and neutral with respect to, the object they wish to know (Galimberti, 1979). Obviously, if one follows this paradigm, which seeks to reduce the object of knowledge to the schemas already held by the knowing subject, one loses both the complexity of the object, because important aspects that do not fit well within the initial cognitive schemas will not be considered, and the complexity of the very process of knowing, understood as one-directional (from subject to object). For example, the quality and specific dynamics of the clinician-patient relationship at the time of the consultation, the former’s impressions and intuitions, the transmission of information that can take place in it through disparate channels (including bodily and non-verbal ones), as well as everything the patient does not know about their distress or knows only confusedly – and that for this reason cannot be clearly put into words – fade into the background, since these elements are not easily objectifiable with traditional standardised test instruments. In addition, it should be noted that the administration of these tests, in which those who use them often place great diagnostic trust because of their statistical properties, takes place while underestimating the impact their use has both on what the clinician would like to know (the patient), reduced to a mere object to be assessed, and on the relationship between clinician and patient, with a view, for example, to a possible continuation of the meetings with a therapeutic aim. No act of the carer is neutral for the patient, because we are never faced with an inert object (as in other disciplines) or with a body (as in medicine) before which the clinician can carry out their observation in a controlled and neutral way, or in which (as is the case in medicine) doctor and patient can more easily talk about the body in a detached and sufficiently shared, that is, objective, way (Rossi Monti, Stanghellini 2009; Stanghellini, 2017). In psychiatry and clinical psychology, by contrast, we are faced with a mind, which reacts with its intentionality, its desires, its fears and its defence mechanisms to what the clinician does, that is, with an object of study that reacts (Jaspers, 1913-1959). We are not in a setting akin to a biology laboratory in which the object of study can be observed through a microscope without it reacting or arousing emotional reactions in the observer, but before a human being who thinks, feels and continuously interacts with whoever is observing them, subjectively interpreting the cognitive actions that the observer carries out (Lombardo, Malagoli Togliatti, 1995).

An alternative diagnostic approach to the objectifying psychiatric one, which we might more properly call “clinical-subjective”, relies instead on theoretical knowledge, concrete experience, relational competence, careful analysis of the dynamics of each clinical encounter and also the therapist’s intuition, in order to reach a specific understanding of the individual patient, beyond what can be detected by using the most widely shared diagnostic categories. From this perspective, the possibility of fitting the patient’s subjective experience into predefined diagnostic categories may certainly be considered and deemed important, since it ensures quick communication and understanding with other colleagues, including those of different theoretical orientations; however, this path to knowledge will never be the preferred way of understanding the patient, understanding being meant here as a process both of description and of interpretation of the internal links of coherence and meaning as the clinician grasps them through prolonged and meaningful interaction with the patient (Jaspers, 1913-1959; Von Wright, 1971; Stanghellini, 2017).

In this approach to diagnosis, the specific relationship established between therapist and patient, the information the patient spontaneously reports and the information they do not, their resistance to talking about certain aspects of their life, their particular history, the way they organise their thoughts, their capacity to trust the other, the way they describe themselves and perceive others, the way they relate to their own mental condition, the affects they feel, as well as the reactions they tend to arouse in the clinician during the sessions, will all be important elements in making a diagnosis (Gabbard, 2000; McWilliams, 1994). According to this approach, moreover, at the end of the consultation process, which usually consists of a few meetings, the clinician might not even have a complete or precise diagnosis of the patient in mind. Of course, it will always be possible to give a broad indication of their condition, perhaps referring precisely to the international classification systems of mental disorders; but this will stem more from a practical need to communicate than from a genuine objectification of the patient’s suffering. Indeed, the main objective of the consultation will above all be to create a sufficiently solid relationship with the patient in order to address gradually the more central and delicate aspects of their subjective experience, and perhaps to identify some less conscious aspects of their distress, often as relevant as all the hidden or hard-to-define elements of lived experience (Bion, 1983). Diagnosis, then, as a possible point of arrival of a more or less lengthy course of care, or in any case as a process to be carried out along the way, rather than as a defined result to be achieved within the narrow circle of the first consultation meetings (Rossi Monti, Stanghellini 2009).

The preferred instrument the therapist will use in this process will obviously not be tests or questionnaires, but their capacity for thought and empathy, that is, the set of cognitive and affective resources needed to genuinely welcome the person of the patient in their wholeness and complexity, in their unique way of suffering. For precisely these reasons, the central aspect of the diagnostic process so understood is, on the one hand, the therapist as an individual with their inner world, that is, their capacity to fantasise, to intuit, to contain the tension of the unknown and to identify with the other, their emotional richness, their intelligence, their cultural background and experience, their personality traits, their values, their very personal history, their curiosity towards the patient; and on the other, the patient, placed in the best conditions to express themselves and an active co-protagonist of the process of knowledge as a subject (not an object) of knowledge endowed with intentionality (Casement, 1985; Gill, 1994; Stolorow, Atwood, 1992). This is why those who try their hand at such a method run the risk, at the end of the diagnostic interviews, of not managing to form a view of the patient that fits certain rigidly defined diagnostic categories, of becoming confused (especially with certain patients), of drifting for a while, of getting lost in the complexity of the interview, precisely because they lack strings of questions or predefined reference grids into which to slot – thereby reducing their complexity – the patient’s verbalisations, symptoms and subjective experience. In this sense, the widest possible openness to what is other than oneself, as a fundamental way of being in the psychological-clinical field, seems to me the attitude best suited to the task of knowing/understanding the experience of another human being, as understood for example by phenomenology (Binswanger, 1973; Galimberti, 1979; Jaspers; Stanghellini, 2017). And yet, thanks to this, the possibility will open up at the same time for the clinician to grasp latent and unexpected aspects of the patient’s experience, perhaps unsuspected on the basis of the predominant symptoms they show, had these been framed from the outset in a pre-established diagnosis. Moreover, it will be easier to grasp and value personality traits that are incongruent with the initially hypothesised symptom picture, considering them an integral and meaningful part of a whole endowed with meaning: that unique configuration which is the patient’s irreducible subjectivity. On the basis of my clinical experience I can say that such hidden or minimised elements often make the difference in the quality of the diagnostic understanding of a patient, also with a view to possibly taking them into care: this is why diagnosing on the basis of standardised and uniform pictures, and then working on symptoms already described and foreseen by the various classification systems, makes little sense from the perspective outlined here. It is an increasingly marked tendency, due to the inclusion of clinical psychology and psychiatry within a health, social and legal system that in the Western world is becoming more and more corporate in its management, that is, based essentially on criteria of effectiveness and efficiency, and therefore on the time factor. In my view, this tendency poses a serious problem for the long-term survival of the authentically human character that belongs to these disciplines, which must deal with the complexity of the psyche – an activity that requires long periods of observation and inquiry – while at the same time meeting ever stricter criteria of control and efficiency aimed at simplifying and speeding up processes of knowledge and their outcomes.

Conclusions

If one works essentially on the most evident aspects of psychological distress, on those most easily recognisable, describable and understandable by the clinician, one runs the risk of colluding with the tendency of the patient (and perhaps also of their environment, not to mention society) to focus only on certain elements of their mental suffering – perhaps the most acceptable, or the most easily understood – while avoiding others that are unclear, hard to categorise, sometimes only dimly sensed, but just as important. On the clinician’s side, meanwhile, work aimed at identifying specific symptoms is likely to fall easily into the classic confirmation-bias processes I have tried to highlight in the opening vignettes; one tends to think, in fact, that a given disorder always has a specific configuration, as described by the shared diagnostic categories, and other elements of the picture that are less congruent with those diagnostic categories are not given due weight.

The alternative approach defended here, centred instead on the patient’s singularity and on their irreducibility to punctiform syndromic pictures, although more respectful of human complexity, is not, however, easily reconciled with the increasingly medicalised orientation of many institutions dealing with wellbeing and mental health, with their tendency to turn the clinical work of consultation into a bureaucratic practice of filling in diagnostic forms, losing sight of the person in their uniqueness and at times unfathomable complexity.

It is not a matter here, let it be clear, of necessarily looking for unconscious motives in the patient’s most evident symptoms by embracing a broadly psychoanalytic perspective (Etchegoyen, 1986; McWilliams, 1994), although psychoanalysis must be given credit for having been the first to value the specificity of the patient and of their history, deepening and broadening the meaning of symptoms and of psychopathology precisely by drawing on elements pertaining to the unconscious that were harder to define and observe outside the clinician-patient relationship. Nor is it a matter of resorting to abstruse sophistries and reasoning, in opposition to the clarity and simplification of psychiatric diagnostic language, in order to grasp what is most specific in the patient. It is rather a matter of valuing the patient’s inner experience, its complexity, their subjective description of it, the latent fantasies connected with behaviours, their history – all elements that certainly play a part in the current psychopathological condition but cannot easily be included in the concise symptom descriptions on which questionnaires, structured interviews and the various diagnostic manuals are based.

A “clinical-subjective” approach does not seek merely to diagnose a patient’s condition as though taking an exact photograph of their mental state, along the lines of a paradigm that considers it important to adopt an objective attitude, and therefore one tending to be detached from the person in care, regarded like the classic neutral object of study of the natural sciences. This approach instead aims to remain aware of the complexity of the human phenomena studied (Ceruti, 1986) and of the significance of the interpersonal relationship, both when developing a diagnosis and when starting any psychotherapeutic and transformative process connected with it. Following this orientation, the clinician is always aware of the significance that each of their interpretations of data and each of their actions during the diagnostic assessment – whether it be verbal exchanges, a drug prescription or the administration of a test makes little difference – may have in a context as charged with emotions and expectations as that of a psychological consultation requested by a suffering person or by others around them. Indeed, because of the emotionality and the expectations/fantasies of the patient and/or of their environment (especially in the case of children and adolescents), which pervade the diagnostic assessment phase, the clinician’s actions will never be neutral but will take on a specific meaning for the other, in turn generating overt or latent ideational and behavioural responses that may have a retroactive effect on the whole assessment process (Von Foerster, 1981). Such interactive processes may, for example, modify along the way the patient’s self-expression and their way of relating in the clinical situation, or influence the therapist’s own emotionality and thus their mental clarity and capacity for understanding, giving rise to different diagnostic impressions.

According to this model, a diagnostic procedure understood in the traditional sense, as the detection and precise description of a series of signs and symptoms presented by the patient, is not to be ruled out; but it must absolutely be backed up by an attitude of acceptance and openness on the clinician’s part towards the mass of communications, often highly contradictory, coming from the patient, avoiding any tendency to describe and define what one sees in a pre-established way on the basis of prevailing diagnostic categories. It is a process that takes time, is subject to change, involves in its cognitive-affective dimension not only the patient but also the clinician – profoundly altering the model of scientific knowledge as commonly understood – and that often stands as the starting point of a process of self-awareness and change for the patient, and not as the point of arrival and objectification of a person’s condition (Aliprandi, Pelanda, Senise, 2004).

A process of knowledge understood in this way, able to bear even a long wait before reaching a fuller understanding of the patient – thus avoiding the premature administration of standardised questionnaires that reduce the complexity at stake – is also an expression of the clinician’s willingness and capacity for psychic containment, that is, of their ability to tolerate the difficulty and responsibility of not being able to reach, in a short time, a definitive and sufficiently clear conclusion about the patient’s psychic experience. For us as clinicians, this implies accepting for a certain time, sometimes a long one, our own “ignorance” of the human phenomena observed (Ceruti, 2016; Von Foerster, 1981), contrary to the parameters of efficiency and objectivity that are ever more pompously reaffirmed by today’s mental health institutions (or rather, corporations). A diagnostic process that comes close to the etymological sense of the word “diagnosis”, which denotes knowledge gained through something. In this case, through the mind or subjectivity of the therapist, which is of the same nature as the mind or subjectivity of the patient, and therefore better suited to it than a test.

This containing capacity of the therapist, their capacity to identify with another person’s experiences, their emotional sensitivity, their intuition, their linguistic and imaginative richness – aspects that, taken together, I would call an elaborative-creative capacity (Bion, 1970) – constitute the founding conditions of a diagnostic and cognitive attitude that truly respects the complexity of human psychic experience. An attitude that is difficult to maintain in a cultural climate dominated, as I have said, by the institutional myth of efficiency and by the collective anxiety to find the answer to every question (the diagnostic one is a question too) in the shortest possible time. A courageous attitude, then, open to complexity and to the unknown, that keeps away from the propensity for labelling and from reductionism of a scientistic kind.

Complexe Systémique: key points

The text defends something institutions quickly forget: a diagnosis is not a photograph but a relational process, and the very act of assessing (a questionnaire, a drug given “to see what happens”) changes what it claims to measure. Here one finds von Foerster’s second-order cybernetics, which the article cites: whoever observes is part of the system observed. The two vignettes are powerful, but the argument stays centred on the individual: the family, present in the second case (parents who consent, a child who insists on another name), is never questioned as the context of the symptom. A systemic reading would add the question: what purpose does the name the child chooses serve in this system? The contrast between tests and understanding is also a little too sharp: a standardised tool can serve the relationship when it is discussed with the person rather than imposed. What remains is a useful lesson for supervision: tolerating a period of not-knowing, against the managerial urgency of the label. Read alongside the presentation of a systemic assessment clinic in adult psychiatry, and the article on borderline personality beyond the diagnosis.

Notes from the original

1 MMPI-2: a well-known personality questionnaire consisting of 567 true-false items (Butcher, Williams, 1996); SCID-II: a semi-structured diagnostic interview (now SCID-5) based on the DSM-IV classification of personality disorders (now DSM-5).

2 The best-known drug (a psychostimulant of the amphetamine class) used to treat the symptoms of ADHD. The effect of this drug is paradoxical in the sense that, although it is a stimulant, in children it calms the agitation typical of the disorder.

3 After all, strange as it may seem, it is not uncommon in psychiatric practice for a differential diagnosis to be made by administering one drug rather than another. That is, if a drug usually used to “treat” a certain psychiatric disorder is effective in relieving the symptoms present in an uncertain clinical picture, this would indicate the presence of that disorder; if it is not effective, that disorder would not be present.

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Unofficial English translation of La diagnosi in psicologia clinica tra comprensione soggettiva e oggettività riduzionista, by Marco Nicastro, Connessioni, new series, no. 8 (2020), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “La diagnosi in psicologia clinica tra comprensione soggettiva e oggettività riduzionista”, published in Connessioni (2020) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Nicastro, M. (2020). Diagnosis in clinical psychology between subjective understanding and reductionist objectivity (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/diagnosis-in-clinical-psychology-between-subjective-understanding-and-reductionist (Original work published in 2020 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 8 (2020); republished in 2020 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/la-diagnosi-in-psicologia-clinica-tra-comprensione-soggettiva-e-oggettivita-riduzionista/)

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