AI-assisted translation

This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.

Connessioni · Epistemology

The systemic unconscious

Does the unconscious belong to psychoanalysis alone? Luca Casadio sets the classical Freudian model, mechanistic and closed, against the reading Gregory Bateson offers in his essay on style, grace and information in primitive art: habit, perceptual premises, the metaphors of primary process. From it he draws a relational unconscious, a mute and emotional knowledge, and follows its consequences for paradox, circular questions and therapeutic dialogue.

Authors Luca CasadioFirst published Connessioni, 24 November 2018Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of L’inconscio sistemico, by Luca Casadio, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 4 (2018), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; quotations from Bateson are translated from the Italian edition cited in the article, not taken from his English text; Freud’s motto is given in Strachey’s English wording; titles of works are given as the article cites them, in their Italian editions, except Bateson’s essay “Style, Grace, and Information in Primitive Art,” given under its original English title; an editorial note corrects the date of L’Io e l’Es; a few typographical errors (including the names of Greenberg and Bertrando) have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

Gregory Bateson has shown us that the unconscious is too precious a concept to be excluded from the systemic perspective.

Luca Casadio

Introduction

Is the unconscious a concept that belongs exclusively to psychoanalysis, or can it also be useful and fruitful for other forms of psychotherapy? And how can it be framed from a systemic perspective? And, more specifically, can those who work with families, or who practise so-called individual systemic psychotherapy, make use of this concept, or does it rather belong to a different epistemology?

To answer these questions, and to show the importance of the unconscious from a systemic perspective too, we need to summarize the classical Freudian model and make its epistemological assumptions explicit, and then compare them with the original ideas of Gregory Bateson, the father of the systemic perspective. This comparison will bring out reflections that are particularly interesting, even today, for systemic theory and therapy.

The Freudian unconscious and its theoretical assumptions

According to Laplanche and Pontalis’s Enciclopedia della psicoanalisi (1967), the unconscious can be described from several points of view (topographical, economic, dynamic). In a general sense, as a simple adjective, the term unconscious is used to designate the set of contents that are not present (at a given moment) in the field of consciousness. From the topographical point of view, that is, the point of view Freud used until the publication of L’Io e l’Es in 1920 [actually published in 1923. Ed.], the mind can be divided into two different portions, two psychical provinces: the conscious one (which also includes the preconscious system) and the unconscious one. The unconscious, in other words, would be the result of a specific mental process, repression, which, precisely, banishes certain unacceptable contents far from consciousness, above all sexual and aggressive strivings. According to the father of psychoanalysis, these contents, although located in the unconscious, would nonetheless seek a path of discharge and access to consciousness, albeit in disguised form (through condensation and displacement, characteristic of the so-called primary process). Access to consciousness will thus be possible only by overcoming all the resistances, which, for Freud, also characterizes the process of cure, as in the motto: Where id was, there ego shall be. From this perspective, the contents of the unconscious are above all representatives of the drives, that is, of all those impulses whose source is a somatic excitation and whose aim is the discharge of that energy.

With the introduction of Freud’s second topography and the tripartite structure of the mind, things change. This is because every psychical structure shows an unconscious aspect (the ego and the superego too), even if the salient features of the unconscious are in fact attributed to the id.

From the economic point of view (a point of view Freud would never abandon), the unconscious derives from a form of investment of psychical energy (a blurred concept, never accurately defined; see Holt, 1989). The energetic investment of certain memory traces, linked to repressed infantile wishes, thus makes a mental content inaccessible to consciousness. But this is a reversible process.

Beyond all this, Freud maintains that the drives as a whole (for him the fundamental impulses of human beings, the true human motivational system) are by their nature unconscious. The unconscious would therefore also be a sort of archaic residue of the mind, made up of all the biological and instinctual forces handed down from generation to generation.

The classical Freudian model therefore appears to be a mechanistic model, based on a monological (a-relational) conception of the human mind, which considers the subject exclusively within a closed system (Holt, 1989, Greenberg, Mitchell, 1986). Indeed, the main task of this subject is precisely to govern its own sexual and aggressive drives. In this framework, intersubjective relationships would be secondary, the object of the drive itself, as if to reaffirm that what determines the subject, and its mental dynamics, are its drives and certainly not the exchange between different subjects.

Bateson and the unconscious

If the systemic approach as a whole draws, more or less directly, on the thought of Gregory Bateson, then it may be interesting to recall the English anthropologist’s ideas about the unconscious, and about the emotions, which are closely linked to it. Only on the surface does Bateson, in his wide-ranging field of study, leave these themes unexplored. In truth, digging just a little deeper into his writings, it is easy to see how the English epistemologist offers us, even today, a valuable reflection on the unconscious, the emotions, and the role these instances play in human relationships and in the process of care. Still today, a guide for clinical intervention.

Bateson’s articles dealing with these themes are many: from those that try to describe national character, to those that explore the ways of learning (and deutero-learning) on the island of Bali, above all through traditional dance, to those that take Freudian models into consideration (so-called primary thought) and all the analogical or metaphorical communications that individuals exchange in relationships.

Among all these texts, let us try to analyse in detail the one that is, in my view, richest in references to the unconscious and the emotions. It is Style, Grace, and Information in Primitive Art (Bateson, 1972).

Style, grace, and information in primitive art

This article is so dense and so rich in suggestions that it would deserve a careful rereading, even sentence by sentence. Here, for obvious reasons of space, I shall limit myself to highlighting and commenting on a few salient passages, and invite readers to take up this fundamental text again.

The English anthropologist begins his reflection by stressing that grace represents a fundamental aspect for humanity. And immediately afterwards he adds that grace must be considered as “a problem of integration.” In practice, what the subject can integrate are the different parts of its own mind; in particular those levels that are generically called consciousness and the unconscious. In my view, this text is particularly useful because it intersects the theme of the emotions, and of tacit knowledge (as we would call it today), with an epistemological discussion of the dynamic unconscious and of the models of mind and of care.

Grace, then, can be experienced when the reasons of the heart, as Bateson says, are integrated with the reasons of reason, that is, with consciousness. The English epistemologist does not seek a method for decoding the unconscious, the artistic message, or even the dream, nor a symbolic interpretation; that is, he does not want to create what Bateson calls an interpretative mythology (as Freud did, using infantile sexuality as the key to understanding every mental content), but intends to understand more deeply the value of certain unconscious messages, beyond the words and the message expressed. In this way, Bateson sets out several levels of which the mind is composed (obviously a mind “immanent in the ongoing system of communication,” as he always recalled in his articles).

Let us try to describe these levels one by one, from those furthest from language and conscious purpose to those closest to them:

1) The first level of the mind concerns habit, as Samuel Butler had already pointed out in his time (see Bateson’s text itself). In practice, the more an organism knows something, the less conscious it becomes of that content. Habit, as can be inferred, makes certain knowledge sink in the mind to ever deeper, ever less conscious levels. Obviously, this unawareness has nothing whatsoever to do with repression, or any other active form of barring from consciousness, as Freud hypothesized. Today we would say that it concerns tacit, procedural knowledge, muscular and aesthetic information that we cannot in any way translate into words (except through metaphors, and always with a great effort of translation).

2) The second level of the mind is the one concerning perceptual premises, those that allow us to see, to grasp an object, following, for example, the mathematical laws of perspective. Clearly, we are not aware of all the operations that allow us to perceive any object, but only of the final result. And this, according to Bateson, besides being useful, is also the general way human consciousness works: it shows us a percept, but obscures everything that lies behind it, that is, all the processes carried out by the subject itself to obtain that result.

3) A further level then concerns all metaphors, the images of the mind, such as dreams, which are defined through primary thought, hypothesized by Freud in the early 1900s. In practice, Bateson, carrying out a sophisticated epistemological analysis, rejects Freud’s economic point of view in order to study, instead, mental processes and the underlying metaphorical logic. A logic which, in his view, characterizes all living systems.

4) The last level, about which Bateson expresses several doubts, concerns precisely the Freudian unconscious, the one dominated by repression.

The English epistemologist pictures this mental process as a cellar or a hiding place in which traumas and memories unpleasant for the subject would be locked away. While not understanding the usefulness of this process, and above all the idea of being able to make conscious what is unconscious, Bateson considers all these conceptions part of the subject’s unconscious, or rather unaware, processes.

The mind at work

By drawing sophisticated distinctions between the different mental processes (which would thus follow different algorithms), Bateson sheds light on the way consciousness works and on everything that, on the contrary, cannot be conscious for the subject itself. In this way, much information proves inaccessible to conscious introspection, including most of the foundations of interaction between mammals, and certainly not because of repression, but rather because of a structural feature: the untranslatability between the different languages of the mind, the ones we have just described.

In today’s language, we could argue that several mental processes can be discerned in Bateson’s theories: a tacit one, dominated by actions (such as habits) and by muscular feedback with respect to any relationship or intersubjective field; another, dominated by images and by a kind of metaphorical thinking; and the last, dominated by verbal language, with a quite specific semantics and grammar, belonging to conscious thought. These different mental levels, which all work together in forming ideas, must not, however, be confused with one another, precisely because each of them obeys specific laws (“The heart has laws that reason cannot understand”). As Bateson writes again: “As we have seen, however, many other kinds of information are inaccessible to conscious inspection, including most of the foundations of interaction between mammals. It seems reasonable to me to think that these elements exist primarily in the idiom of primary process, only that they are hard to translate into rational terms. In other words, I believe that a good part of early Freudian theory was upside down. At that time, many thinkers regarded conscious reason as normal and self-evident, while the unconscious was regarded as mysterious, in need of proof and explanation. The explanation was provided by repression, and the unconscious was filled with thoughts that could have been conscious but that repression and dreamwork had distorted. Today we regard consciousness as mysterious, while the methods of computation used by the unconscious, for example primary process, we regard as continually active, necessary, and all-embracing” (1967, 169).

As is evident, Bateson does not accept Freudian theories wholesale, and considers the attempt to bring it about that where id was, there ego shall be1 a legacy of a “totally distorted epistemology of what sort of thing a man, or any other organism, may be” (ibidem, 170).

What Bateson finds unacceptable is precisely the passage of ideas of one and the same make between the unconscious and consciousness. Between these different instances, on the contrary, he hypothesizes, with extraordinary modernity, a barrier, a form of untranslatability, based on the difference between the different formats in use. For Bateson, that is, these formats represent different ways of processing information, and not two (or more) psychical provinces. As the English scholar stresses again: “In reality, our life is such that its unconscious components are continually present in all their multiple forms” (ibid.).

Bateson thus tries to move beyond Freud’s idea of the repressed, in order to grasp all the different levels of meaning present together in every communicative act, the “different modes of being of the mind,” as the Chilean psychoanalyst Matte Blanco (1981) would say. As Bateson writes again, in interactions we continually exchange messages about these unconscious aspects, above all those concerning relationships, state signals, emotions first and foremost, which offer a comment on the current relationship. Bateson thus rereads primary process as something purely metaphorical, and states: “Consciousness speaks of things or persons and attaches predicates to the specific things or persons that have been mentioned. In primary process the things or persons are usually not identified, and the discourse is focused on the relationships that are asserted to exist between them. In reality, this is only another way of saying that the discourse of primary process is metaphorical: a metaphor keeps unchanged the relationships that it ‘illustrates,’ while substituting other things or persons for the terms of the relationship. In a simile, the use of a certain metaphor is marked by the phrases ‘as if’ or ‘like.’ In primary process (as in art) there are no signs to indicate to the conscious mind that the material of the message is metaphorical. (…) The subject matter of dream and other primary-process material is, in reality, relationship in the narrower sense of relationship between self and other persons, between self and the environment. (…) The relationships between self and others and between self and the environment are, in reality, the contents of what are called ‘feelings’: love, hate, fear, trust, anxiety, hostility, etc. These abstractions, which refer to patterns of relationship, have unfortunately received a name whose use usually assumes that ‘feelings’ are characterized mainly by intensity rather than by a precise pattern” (1967, 174).

It follows that images and metaphors too are products of the unconscious (or rather of primary thought), that is, emotional elaborations of the subject, based on sensory and relational knowledge. But relationships themselves can be metaphorical; according to Bateson, in fact, the hungry cat does not say to its mistress: “Give me milk,” but: “Be a mother to me,” behave towards me as a mother cat does with her kitten (see Bateson, 1960).

Consciousness, then, for Bateson, represents only a partial arc of a far more complex process, and certainly not complete information. In this way, art (as an example of emotional knowledge, or the dream) constitutes a corrective, as Bateson writes, which helps the subject to understand, to experience at first hand “the systemic nature of mind.” A modulation, by the subject, of its own way of living relationships with others within different contexts.

Bateson and the unconscious: conclusions

To conclude this brief summary of Bateson’s reflections on the unconscious, we can say that his gaze was, as usual, complex, but at the same time also able to look beyond an obscure phenomenology, such as that of primary thought, intuiting a veritable universe of meanings. The unconscious, then, would concern several things: muscular knowledge, that is, something akin to the subject’s sensibility, to its capacity to experience; but also mute, procedural knowledge, “something felt in the bones, in the muscles” (as he says about dance in Bali); as well as something based on a metaphorical, basically relational logic, typical, in his view, of mammals. Indeed, the images of the mind are structured on and through specific metaphors, and above all thanks to the relational structure of the metaphors themselves; a structure that allows stories to be born and thought to be articulated. But this also happens thanks to the “Metaphor that we are” (Bateson, 1977), since we ourselves are part of a more complex ecology. We are a character among other characters, defined only within the whole set of relationships and of the ongoing “relational scenes” (Casadio, 2015).

From this point of view we can identify two different logics: a Pleromatic one, dealing with non-living forces and structures, and a Creatural one, concerning instead the relationships between living beings, based on metaphorical relationships, sensitive to context, strongly emotional.2 According to Bateson: “It is interesting to note that the metaphorical language of dreams stands halfway between the relational language of the cat (which we have recalled) and the objective language that men believe they would be able to use if only they could stop dreaming. In the dream we define relationships with sovereign indifference to the terms of the relationship. The contingencies of the relationship between me and my mother appear to me comparable to the contingencies that would exist between a little man of the desert and a spring at the top of a granite mountain. In the dream the mountain appears to us, and interpretation becomes possible when we realize that the mountain relates to one of the two terms of the original relationship” (1960, in Bateson, 1977, 216). Thereby describing a thoroughly relational unconscious.

To conclude, we can maintain that, for Bateson, the unconscious, like emotion, is something that can be described through language, without coinciding with the format of language itself. It is rather something that seeps through, that can be inferred from a relationship, from a subject who acts, who is speaking, who relates, something that is part of the way of building relationships and bonds without necessarily being part of the subject’s own narrative. Something that seeps through from a subject who superimposes a semantic content on a series of movements, gestures, postures, on concrete ways of relating to others and of creating with others a complex weave, a dance of interacting parts. As Bateson writes, many terms such as Love, Trust and Anger can (or rather should) be translated into sequences of relationships, into exchanges, into stories or genealogies and the lived experiences of the characters who meet and who tell their stories.

The contents of a clinical interview, the descriptions given by people in therapy, would therefore always and in any case be metaphorical, because they would constitute a signalling of the ongoing intersubjective field, using interchangeable terms that are nonetheless able to colour (and make evident) the relationship being lived at that moment, the emotion of the field. If all this is plausible, dwelling on emotional communication, and doing so in a warm and safe relationship such as the therapeutic one, creating thought about the emotions (an unfolding of emotions into stories) and about the tacit premises of the ongoing relationships, makes it possible to integrate the different parts of the mind, experiencing precisely grace and, at the same time, the systemic nature of mind, that is, the interweaving of meaning, relationship and emotion in a fullness of expression and sense.

Unconscious contents, like emotions, would thus be poetic, because they give rise to words and complex stories, precisely in the attempt to describe (to embody) and recount a lived experience, the subjective and idiosyncratic way of taking part in the context, in a specific relationship.

Concluding remarks

Gregory Bateson has shown us that the unconscious is too precious a concept to be excluded from the systemic perspective. Even if, to make it fully systemic, some epistemological adjustments are needed. First of all, it is necessary to move beyond the intrapsychic point of view of classical psychoanalysis and consider the unconscious as a thoroughly relational, transitional structure, we might say in homage to Winnicott (1980): a mute, emotional, metaphorical knowledge, which is structured exclusively in the zone of exchange between the subject, others and the contexts to which it belongs. A knowledge that characterizes our very humanity.

And rather than a cupboard, or a sack full of repressed ideas, or worse still a series of unacceptable contents that can exist only in disguised form, we can think of the unconscious as a process that contributes to forming representations, indeed, that constitutes the basis on which representations themselves rest. The unconscious, from this point of view, would in fact represent the level of shared feeling, the subjectivity experienced in every interpersonal or family context. In every family, indeed, a shared knowledge is defined and settles, a set of stories and experiences that define the attitudes and representations of its members. With the introduction of the systemic unconscious, many technical aspects of systemic family therapy cannot but change. Let us say that by giving this concept a new role, the shift is definitively made from the strategic conception, typical of first-order cybernetics (see Telfener, Casadio, 2002), based on control of the subject, to a participatory point of view, able to immerse itself in the emotional and tacit processes of the family. Processes that therapists themselves help to narrate, and to transform, creating grace, an integration of emotions, ideas and stories.

Clinical intervention, then, cannot be based on deciphering an inner world, private and unknown to the subject itself, which only the analyst knows, but must be based on the way of creating bonds and contexts and of telling about oneself and one’s family.

Here we certainly cannot list all the possible clinical changes that the concept of the systemic unconscious entails, but it may be interesting to show how the theme of paradox can be reconsidered. From this point of view, paradox (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1975) would represent precisely the multidimensionality of unconscious communication, the hypertextual link (Casadio, 2010b) of tacit aspects with family and personal stories, all the reflexive circuits that can be established between the different levels of the mind. And if the unconscious can be thought of as tacit knowledge, on a par with the emotions and with everything visceral and sensitive, then we can consider the idea that care consists in an emotional dialogue (Bertrando, 2014), strongly metaphorical in character, where the therapeutic exchange can each time be filled with new words, new images and metaphors, useful for describing the ongoing relationship and in fact transforming it. Because it is precisely from this emotional substratum that the key words, the reframings, and all the interventions and techniques of systemic therapists should emerge.

A special case is that of so-called circular questions (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980), which could immediately prove therapeutic because they modify precisely that procedural knowledge which binds the subject to the family and to the contexts most relevant to it. In this way, it makes no sense to look for repressed ideas, but rather for unspeakable aspects that arise precisely at the intersection of relationships, emotions and narratives. For the subject, or for the family, it may be important to transform a mental set, a legacy of personal and family history, through the creation of new connections and the introduction of new metaphors into the therapeutic dialogue. Metaphors that say and that allow saying, saying by connecting emotions and relationships, personal stories and sensory knowledge. All this is essential for experiencing that grace Bateson spoke of, which represents precisely the integration of conscious and unconscious, but also for sensing the systemic nature of mind, that is, the creation of a new affective interdependence with the other. A rich, precious exchange, poetic by its very definition. In this way, narratives would not constitute a whole in themselves, as they have often been considered from a systemic perspective, but would represent one of the two pillars on which the narrative mind (Casadio, 2016) rests, because emotions and tacit contents constitute the multidimensional spaces from which narratives come to life.

We can thus think of the unconscious, the emotions, and narratives as communicating vessels, always able to give life to new autopoietic circles. Narratives able to give birth to new images, new metaphors and new assumptions with which to read (and build) the world and ourselves, on a potentially endless and seamless path.

Complexe Systémique: key points

Casadio offers a line of inquiry rather than a finished theory, and it should be read as such. The Freud he discusses is the textbook Freud, reduced to economics and repression; relational and intersubjective psychoanalysis, which has long travelled a neighbouring path, stays out of view, and the argument rests almost entirely on a single essay by Bateson. But the central idea is valuable for clinical work: what escapes consciousness is not necessarily hidden; it is often knowledge in another format, tacit, bodily, metaphorical, that does not translate into words as it is. The task, then, is not to decipher a content on the family’s behalf, but to listen to the metaphors that speak of the ongoing relationship, to welcome the emotions of the field, and to look for new images with the family to tell it. Circular questions, reframing and paradox change status: less techniques of control than ways of reaching the procedural knowledge that ties each member to the system. Read alongside the comparison of Freudian and systemic readings of the Dora case, and Juan Balbi’s theory of the narrative mind.

Notes from the original

1 “Id” in Bateson’s text.

2 A distinction Freud never made, which created considerable confusion between forces and ideas.

References

Bateson G. (1972), Verso un’ecologia della mente, Milano, Adelphi, 1976.

Bateson G. (1942), Morale e carattere nazionale, in Bateson (1972).

Bateson G. (1967), Stile, grazia e informazione nell’arte primitiva, in Bateson (1972).

Bateson G. (1960), Le emozioni esaminate da un sociologo, in Bateson (1991).

Bateson G. (1991), Una sacra unità. Altri passi verso un’ecologia della mente, Milano, Adelphi, 1997.

Bateson G. (1977), La metafora che noi siamo, in Bateson (1991).

Casadio L. (2016), L’arte della psicoterapia e la psicologia dell’arte, Udine, Mimesis.

Casadio L. (2010b), “La mente ipertestuale: radici e futuro di una metafora”, Connessioni, n.25, Novembre 2010.

Freud S. (1920), L’Io e L’Es, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Greenberg J., Mitchell S. (1986), Le relazioni oggettuali nella teoria psicoanalitica, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Holt R. (1989), Ripensare Freud, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Laplanche J., Pontalis J-B. (1967), Enciclopedia della psicoanalisi, Bari, Laterza.

Matte Blanco I. (1975), L’inconscio come sistemi infiniti, Torino, Einaudi, 1981.

Selvini Palazzoli M., Boscolo L., Cecchin G., Prata G. (1975), Paradosso e controparadosso, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Selvini Palazzoli M., Boscolo L., Cecchin G., Prata G. (1980), Ipotizzazione-circolarità-neutralità. Tre direttive per la conduzione della seduta, in Selvini M. (a cura di) (1985), Cronaca di una ricerca, Firenze, La nuova Italia. pp.212-225.

Telfener U., Casadio L. (2002), Sistemica: voci e percorsi nella complessità, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Winnicott D. (1980), Gioco e realtà, Roma, Armando.

Winnicott D. (1980), Gioco e realtà, Roma, Armando.

Unofficial English translation of L’inconscio sistemico, by Luca Casadio, Connessioni, new series, no. 4 (2018), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “L’inconscio sistemico”, published in Connessioni (2018) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

Read the original article

How to cite this article

Casadio, L. (2018). The systemic unconscious (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/the-systemic-unconscious (Original work published in 2018 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 4 (2018); republished in 2018 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/linconscio-sistemico/)

Discussion

Comments 0

Log in to join the discussion. Log in

  1. No comment yet. Start the discussion.

Cart

Your cart is empty.