AI-assisted translation

This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.

Connessioni · History of systemic therapy

Family therapy: fragments of history, between psychoanalysis and systemic thinking

The Milan school was born of psychoanalysts. Massimo Martucci traces this genealogy, from Nathan Ackerman to the first group of Selvini Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin and Prata, up to the 1980 split. The article follows what becomes of transference and countertransference in family therapy and what the one-way mirror changes, and argues with Boscolo for an “epigenetic perspective” between purism and eclecticism.

Authors Massimo MartucciFirst published Connessioni, 30 June 2019Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Terapia della famiglia: frammenti di storia, tra psicoanalisi e sistemica, by Massimo Martucci, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 5 (2019), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; long quotations, which the journal sets as ordinary paragraphs, are presented as block quotations; quotations are translated from the Italian, except for the sentence from the Ackerman Institute website, which is in English in the original; titles of works are given as the article cites them, mostly in their Italian editions; a few misspelt proper names have been silently corrected, and Franz Alexander’s first name is corrected in square brackets. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

Theoretical purism is valuable only if it serves the training of therapists, but over time experience leads one to feel “at ease” within one’s own model.

Massimo Martucci

Genealogy

For anyone wishing to explore the links, boundaries and margins between psychoanalysis and systemic thinking, there seems to me to be, first of all, a historical and factual level, where a sure guide is offered by a long tradition of thought – the very concept of contingency – which in essence tells us: if something happens, it means that it is also possible. The first thing that becomes evident to anyone who begins to reconstruct something of the history of systemic thinking, for instance by rewinding the tape of the encounters, intuitions and undertakings that led to the Milan Approach, is that this movement was born of psychoanalysts, who sometimes sowed important seeds, breaking with the hesitations and prohibitions of tradition, as in the case of Nathan Ackerman, and at other times allowed psychoanalysis to coexist in their clinical practice, at least for a while, with a new approach linked to family therapy. Here we try to retrace the history of the first period of the Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia – that of Mara Selvini Palazzoli, Luigi Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin and Giuliana Prata – and, in part, of the second period, with the developments brought by Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco Cecchin, paying particular attention to the work of the former.

Reassured in this way, on the historical and genealogical front, that we will not be exploring an impossible dialogue – or perhaps more, an impossible integration – between psychoanalysis and systemic thinking, we can raise once more the question of the meaning of this dialogue and of its clinical, educational and therapeutic implications.

We will then, of course, ask ourselves – and it was the very protagonists of this story who asked it – what happens when psychoanalytic theory is brought together with the theory that has developed over the decades around the systemic approach: juxtaposition, integration, hybridisation? This is the more “theoretical” level; but we will be able to follow this reflection and theoretical production while being guided, once again, by the wisdom of those who have truly understood the value of modern science: as Galileo teaches us – and as Lakatos and much twentieth-century epistemology have confirmed – theory and experience chase each other, and experience is always “innervated” by theory. In this sense, I do not believe that the clinical work of a systemic therapist can “suspend” everything that their history, training and previous experience have left in their gaze; this does not of course mean that there is no tension or conflict, as can be glimpsed in Boscolo’s words when he recalls the period in which he spent half his time doing traditional analytic therapy in his consulting room and the other half seeing families with Selvini Palazzoli’s team. He tells it simply: “After months of work in the two different contexts, operating with two theories so dissimilar and in some respects antithetical, both as regards the conception of the human person and of the nature of the problems presented, and as regards the goals of change and the ways of achieving it, it had become very difficult to work while remaining faithful to the theoretical premises and the resulting tactical precepts of each of the two theories” (Boscolo, Bertrando, 1996, p. 4). What prevails here is the awareness of a dialectical tension, which should not be swept under the carpet: but as Boscolo himself discusses in the Afterword to Clinica sistemica (Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, Penn, 2004), the reference actually becomes explicit when he tackles the issue of theoretical purism: the influences that enter into a therapist’s history, training and culture cannot be resolutely set aside.

The “unsaid” of one’s own past

It is precisely this aspect that I found fascinating in trying to reconstruct the threads – or rather the weave – of the history of the Milan Approach: I was able to meet, unfortunately only through their texts, people who embodied in concrete clinical practice and – we can easily imagine – in their personal lives as well, attempts, doubts, moments of insight, hypotheses for moving the work forward, moments of clarity.

Naturally, however, a question arises: if, historically, the link between a psychoanalytic past and a systemic choice was “enacted” before it was theorised, in the figures of the therapists who, for reasons of training and personal history, embodied it, how can the same question be raised today in the training of therapists, when psychoanalysis appears only very occasionally, and is often devalued, in university training? The question is of course passed on to those who work in therapist training, but, again through a passionate reading of the texts, I found this concern once more in the words of Boscolo, who, unlike Selvini Palazzoli, made the training of therapists a firm choice, as well as one of the reasons for the separation from Selvini’s original team.

The reasoning goes more or less like this (Boscolo et al., 2004): in the early years of the training school, the trainees were psychoanalysts interested in the systemic approach, and so they came from a training and an experience that gave them skills in the therapeutic relationship and the emotional world; more recently, by contrast, the direct move from university training to the systemic approach requires “recovering” a clinical depth that used to be the legacy of analytic training. Following this logic – which is, after all, simply a trainer’s observation, with no value judgement attached – psychoanalysis is portrayed somewhat as the trunk onto which the systemic approach is grafted, or at least has historically been grafted. Barbetta (2012) sums up the idea by recalling that the four founders of the Milan systemic school were psychoanalysts, and that “at least in this respect, systemic family therapy is a psychoanalytic derivation just as much as Jungian analytical psychology, or other more or less heretical forms such as Kleinism, psychodrama or Lacanism” (p. 69-70).

From the pioneers to the Milan Approach

But how does one arrive, even from a purely historical standpoint, at this confluence of a psychoanalytic derivation on the one hand and an interest in systemic family therapy on the other? An indisputable starting point is certainly Nathan Ackerman.

Ackerman was born in 1908 in southern Russia, into a Jewish family forced to emigrate to the United States in 1912. As Loriedo (2002) aptly reconstructs, his childhood and youth were not without great hardship: his mother had lost three children and was caring for the remaining five, Nathan among them; when Nathan was 13, his father opened a pharmacy, which he later had to close because of health problems, with the economic difficulties that followed. Nathan’s own health was poor, and in addition his brother Harry, after the failure of their father’s business, suffered a serious nervous breakdown. Nathan looked after him, and this is probably one of the reasons that led him, after qualifying in medicine, to specialise in psychiatry.

In 1937 he became chief psychiatrist of a Child Guidance Clinic: these were institutions which, in the United States after the First World War, set out to identify children considered at risk from the point of view of mental health, in order to prevent the development of psychopathology in adulthood. Treatment was individual, but the whole family was nonetheless taken into care in some way, its pathogenic role being assumed and the child who showed the suffering being regarded as the victim of a dysfunctional family context.

Others in those years, starting from Freud’s teaching, were taking an interest in the role of family relationships, seeking to broaden and develop reflection on the Oedipal triangle – one of Lacan’s first fundamental texts, I complessi familiari (Lacan, 2005), dates from 1938, for example. What characterises Ackerman’s new position, however, is the choice to bring the whole family into therapy, overriding Freud’s prohibition regarding the exclusivity of the analyst-analysand relationship, which alone, by respecting the classical setting, can make room for the unconscious to emerge. A third person in the therapy room would irreparably compromise the workings of analysis at its very foundations, transference for example. Which makes it legitimate to ask, for instance: is transference possible in family therapy? As we shall see, Selvini Palazzoli would address this question, if only in passing; in any case the question is already present, albeit not explicitly or in these terms, in Ackerman’s texts.

And yet Freud himself had already, in a way, cracked his own prohibition: as is well known, he took a couple into analysis, the spouses James and Alix Strachey, who went on to become his English translators. Then there is the famous case of Little Hans (Freud, 1908), a five-year-old child, the son of one of his female patients and of one of his pupils, who had developed a phobia of animals, horses in particular, at the time of his little sister’s birth. Freud analysed the child through the reports of the father, who wrote down his own conversations with his son and passed them on to Freud. On one occasion he saw father and son together in a session. In any case, he saw clearly how much the family environment affected the treatment: “You will understand, moreover, how important the social environment and the cultural level of the patient’s family are for the prospects of success of a treatment” (Freud, 1916-17, pp. 602). On yet another occasion he let slip a remark that we might summarise more or less as follows: the relatives of neurotic patients often work against the treatment, and most of the time would themselves need treatment, but “I have very little confidence in any individual treatment of them” (Freud, 1912, p. 1707). We might try to follow his reasoning: if they are considered neurotic in their turn, why should the treatment that works for the patient not work for them? If, on the other hand, we do not consider them patients in their own right, but patients in relation to the “main” patient – one would be tempted to say the “identified patient”, in Selvini Palazzoli’s expression (Selvini Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin & Prata, 2003) – then, if “individual treatment” does not work, perhaps a family treatment might.

This is the crossing of the ford that Ackerman feels he must make, with a remarkable intellectual freedom that perhaps recalls the first glimmer of freedom of conscience in the theoretical sphere, when Aristotle intellectually took leave of his teacher Plato: amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas. In a similar way, Ackerman says that the best way to honour Freud, to credit him with having pointed out the fundamental role of relationships between parents and children in the development of the subject, is to continue his inquiry by taking into account the most recent findings – later than Freud himself – of the social sciences and of the study of human communication, so as to address “the mental health problems of family life” (Ackerman, 1968, p. 17). He does not put it in these terms, but the idea really seems to be: this is what Freud would have done.

On the basis of these premises Ackerman – who, as Lynn Hoffman recounts, having met him and written about him in her last work too (Hoffman, 2002), was a blunt, brilliant person who did not bother much with formalities – began to see families and to refine his therapeutic technique. Several writings followed, from the earliest articles, such as The unity of the family and Constructive and destructive tendencies in children; an experimental study (Ackerman, 1938, cited in Bertrando, Toffanetti, 2000), to the two fundamental texts that gather years of clinical experience: Psicodinamica della vita familiare (1968), which sets out to frame family therapy within the psychodynamic perspective, and Patologia e terapia della vita familiare (1970), devoted to the therapeutic process.

Ackerman starts from a very simple observation, which has the flavour of those obvious truths that herald great turning points in human progress, and which recalls the enthusiasm with which, as we shall see, Lynn Hoffman recounts the “discovery” of the one-way mirror (Hoffman, 1984): “In interviews with the family, one member reveals what the other conceals. The children blurt out what the parents conceal together. What one member expresses in an involuted and distorted way is corrected by another member” (Ackerman 1970, p. 102). From this comes an extraordinary wealth of reflections and clinical accounts, moving precisely between a solid theoretical base and a continuous refinement of therapeutic technique.

Now, the preface to the Italian edition of Psicodinamica della vita familiare, which had first appeared in 1958, was written ten years later by Mara Selvini Palazzoli, who had begun to take an interest in family therapy during the 1960s. Having left internal medicine, she had turned to eating disorders, through studies and research that led in 1963 to the publication of L’anoressia mentale (Selvini Palazzoli, 2006). Already in the experience gathered for the first edition, and increasingly in the following years, Selvini Palazzoli realised that, in treating anorexic patients, it was necessary to involve the rest of the family, directly observing the interactions among its members. While this change of perspective was maturing, in 1967 she travelled to the United States, where she attended a conference in Philadelphia, and there she met Luigi Boscolo, who had trained analytically with Ackerman and Silvano Arieti. Boscolo, too, had discovered an interest in psychopathology, abandoning his initial plan to train in paediatrics. The following year, in 1968, Selvini Palazzoli wrote the preface mentioned above: a few pages in which she summarises the trajectory Ackerman had followed up to that point, dwelling on the relationship between individual psychotherapy – which clearly refers to their shared psychoanalytic training – and family psychotherapy, and showing precisely that “natural” evolution towards opening up to families which represents Ackerman’s path.

In these first steps there do not seem to be any major reflections of principle on whether or not the two theories are compatible, and family therapy appears rather as a therapeutic approach born of psychoanalytic theory; I was very struck by the few words reconstructing Ackerman’s “turn” on the website of today’s Ackerman Institute in New York: “Although trained as a classical analyst, Dr. Ackerman broke with this approach after World War II when he began to experiment with seeing patients and their families in a group” (Ackerman Institute). The break with tradition, which Ackerman and Selvini Palazzoli have in common, is certainly undeniable, but despite that “although”, which seems to allude to a sort of “disavowal” of psychoanalytic training, reading both of them, it seems that the difference in “approach” should be emphasised rather than the theoretical contradiction.

We must then understand how one gets from these first steps of “systemic” thinking to the statement with which Lynn Hoffman recounts the formation of the Milan Group: “The dispute between the psychoanalytic model and the systemic family model moved to Milan, where the possibility that the two models were compatible was seriously examined. Having established that they were not, Selvini Palazzoli and her colleagues broke away from the original group in 1971, with the aim of working exclusively within the family system, or rather within what they would later call the systemic field” (Hoffman, in Boscolo et al., 2004, pp. 25-26). From that moment on, at least for Selvini Palazzoli, the problem of the relationship with psychoanalysis was no longer addressed, at least explicitly, as her energies were concentrated on a new theoretical framework, which owed a great deal to the discovery of Gregory Bateson, and on developing a therapeutic technique whose experimentation would lead to Paradosso e controparadosso (2003). Lynn Hoffman herself, who reconstructs this history in her last work, Family Therapy: An Intimate History (2002), not yet available in Italian, began to frequent the Milan group in via Leopardi, on periodic “pilgrimages”, as she herself writes, following the therapists at work from behind the mirror and drawing from this very experience the inspiration to found (ideally closing the circle) a new team inspired by the Milan model at the Ackerman Institute, together with Peggy Penn. For Selvini’s group a new theoretical adventure began, which really seemed to mark a clean break with the psychoanalytic past: for a time Watzlawick acted as a consultant to the team, and Gregory Bateson’s writings were the lifeblood that enthusiastically fuelled the experimentation of that period. The group read and reread his works, and the studies on human communication in their interweaving with clinical practice – in particular the concept of the double bind, which Bateson had already developed in 1956 in Verso una teoria della schizofrenia (Bateson, 2013b). The analysis of the family’s communicative transaction, particularly in its dysfunctional dimension, when messages disconfirm one another, underlies the clinical cases presented and discussed in Paradosso e controparadosso, where the team seeks to counter paradoxical communication with a counterparadoxical move, so as to perturb the unhealthy homeostatic equilibrium that the family members have reached. In the account of these interventions the vocabulary becomes “military”: “competitive spur”, “team battles”, “opponents’ strategies”, “players on the field” (Selvini et al., 2003, p. 15).

This way of understanding therapy foreshadows the strategic direction that increasingly distinguished Selvini Palazzoli from other members of the group, in particular Boscolo and Cecchin, who in fact left the team in which they worked with Selvini and Giuliana Prata in 1980, taking the name of Associati di Milano and devoting themselves on the one hand to training future therapists and on the other to developing a less strategic therapeutic technique, less bound to the image of how the family “should be” (Boscolo et al., 2004), based for example on circular questions, perhaps one of the most important cornerstones of the new approach (Hoffman, 2002), open moreover to a “curious” (Cecchin, 1987) and “irreverent” (Cecchin, 1993) stance, and drawing a great deal, in the following years, from the theoretical contributions of second-order cybernetics, following the thinking of Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.

However, going back to the years when the Milan group was formed, Luigi Boscolo himself, the one in whom the anchoring in psychoanalytic origins probably remained strongest, was enthusiastic about Bateson’s writings, of which he speaks in almost moved tones: in 1972, shortly after the group was formed, Verso un’ecologia della mente (Bateson, 2013a) came out in the original, and reading it was a dazzling experience for Boscolo, so much so that he would compare the depth of Bateson’s thought to that of Freud, adding that he owed to Bateson the discovery of the complexity and of the circular, not linear, nature of reality (Boscolo, 2009). And, paradoxically, it was Bateson, who later published Mente e natura (Bateson, 1993), who also became the key to understanding the separation from Selvini Palazzoli: whereas she was basically still looking, despite her stated intentions to the contrary, for a linear cause to which a therapeutic strategy would correspond, Bateson made it possible to insist on circularity, giving up an aetiological search.

Read with hindsight, the ambivalence within the group was present from the beginning and, on top of everything else, it may well be that the relationship with psychoanalysis was one of the underground issues that resurfaced powerfully many years after the split of the original team; looking back après-coup on those years, Selvini Palazzoli and Luigi Boscolo in fact see it in decidedly different ways. This is what Selvini says in a 1992 interview:

[…] and so at the end of 1971 I formed a new team with Luigi Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin and Giuliana Prata, all psychiatrists with a psychoanalytic background, but all rather disillusioned with psychoanalysis, and looking for something new. […] We agreed to opt for the systemic model, especially in order to avoid any contamination by linear thinking. I realise today that at that time the decision was a sort of religious consecration to a new faith, a real apostasy that scandalised a great many of our former colleagues. (Selvini Palazzoli, 1999, p. 15, my italics)

A practical choice, then, to leave psychoanalysis behind. But Boscolo has to admit:

This was a way of getting back in touch with our past, with what had had meaning and importance for us; psychoanalysis came back in through the door, whereas before it came in through the cracks in the window, because we had to be “systemic purists”. (Boscolo et al., 2004, pp. 340-341, my italics)

This tension erupted when Selvini Palazzoli, with her son Matteo Selvini, Stefano Cirillo and Anna Maria Sorrentino, devoted herself to a therapy that used game theory and the “invariant prescription”, while Boscolo, after years of work with Cecchin in the “systemic” training school, between circularity and the narrative approach, returned to reflect on the value of individual therapy, whose prototype is undeniably the Freudian setting (Boscolo, Bertrando, 1996). The issue could, however, be read not in terms of a split present from the start, but of complementarity between approaches, in the “unsaid” of each therapist (Boscolo et al., 2004), which, as long as the group worked together, was certainly an asset.

Transference

In this attempt at a historical inquiry into the relationship between systemic thinking and psychoanalysis, there are some themes that revolve around the obvious difference in setting, and we can single out a couple of them: one is evident at first contact with systemic therapy, and it is the one-way mirror; the other has to do with transference.

I would like to start with the latter, because it seems to me legitimate to ask what becomes of transference in family therapy, not so much as a primarily theoretical question, but from the perspective of someone who, as Luigi Boscolo did for a time, spent half his time seeing patients in individual analysis and the other half seeing families with Selvini Palazzoli’s team. Freud’s prohibition, which we have discussed, on the presence of other people in the therapy room certainly has to do with the transference relationship, as an altogether peculiar event in which the unconscious is the protagonist, and which can admit no triangulation other than, precisely, that between the analysand, their unconscious and the analyst. Today some in the psychoanalytic world strongly emphasise the incommensurability of transference with the more general concept of the “therapeutic relationship” or the “therapeutic alliance” (see for example Di Ciaccia, 1987). Naturally, if we approach the question from this point of view, it makes no sense even to begin asking whether transference is possible in systemic family therapy. If, on the other hand, we agree to discuss how the therapist, or the therapists – as would be the case in the configuration of Selvini’s team – enter into a relationship not only with the family members but with the relationships between them, adding that the first therapists we are talking about were or are psychoanalysts, the question becomes, on the contrary, very interesting to explore. In Paradosso e controparadosso (2003) the question, which remains beneath the surface at various points where the relationship between therapists and family members is examined, is addressed explicitly in only one place, by way of a comparison:

After a series of errors, we finally managed to find a solution.

This consists in referring the problems of the intergenerational relationship exclusively to ourselves, at the appropriate moment, in a way very similar to the interpretation of the transference carried out in psychoanalytic treatment. (Selvini Palazzoli, 2003, p. 97)

This is a strategic measure, which serves to make countermoves in response to the family’s manoeuvres, and in which the unconscious is neither evoked nor “summoned”, but it nonetheless seems interesting to me that Selvini Palazzoli uses the psychoanalytic language that is familiar to her, lending it to her own strategic vision of family therapy.

Another interesting reference concerns countertransference, to which Lynn Hoffman compares the situation in which the therapists are sometimes left in the therapy room with the family while the consultants confer elsewhere; in this situation the therapists are led to regard themselves as part of the observed system rather than the observing one, and Hoffman comments on this situation by saying that it is “similar to the emphasis placed on countertransference in individual psychoanalytic therapy” (Hoffman, in Boscolo et al., 2004, p. 35). This theme of the observing and observed system is clearly central to the systemic approach, and it has to do with cybernetics, second-order cybernetics in particular, as Boscolo and Cecchin’s later reflections would show.

Ackerman, who for chronological reasons inevitably could not have the theoretical tools of second-order cybernetics, has a flatter view of the observing system/observed system, but he nonetheless recognises the importance of characterising in some way the therapist’s presence in the family context:

the physician integrates his knowledge and his use of himself in a special way. He is a participant observer; he is active, open, fluid, decisive, at times blunt. He penetrates directly into the family conflict to energise the processes of interaction and influence them; he withdraws to objectify his experience, to grasp the most significant events and evaluate them; then he re-enters the arena. […]

It is important to define the processes of transference, countertransference and reality testing within the framework of direct interaction with the family. (Ackerman, 1970, p. 102, my italics)

The therapist’s positioning within the therapeutic situation is of the greatest interest to Ackerman, who considers the possible alliances that the various family members may form at different times; the point is not to avoid these understandable attempts (to have the therapist on one’s side) but evidently to manage them, safeguarding a neutrality that is substantive rather than phenomenological; at times the therapist will seem to “side” with a family member in order to support them at a moment of greater weakness; at times the therapist takes the place of a “parental figure” (Ackerman, 1970), but in substance, when all is said and done, will maintain a substantial equidistance. Continuing in this direction, Minuchin would speak of the therapist’s “solidarity” with the family member who feels in a subordinate position, so as to bring about a redefinition of family relationships (Minuchin, Fishman, 1982): what is at stake is obviously not the therapist’s equidistance in the ethical sense, but the strategic aspect. This is in fact the opposite of the perspective of Selvini Palazzoli’s team, which takes the greatest care to “neutralise” any attempt by a family member to form a sympathetic alliance with a therapist: the reason is a communicative one, since the therapists’ discourse must stay at a metalevel with respect to the family’s communication (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). This is the concept of “neutrality” – developed later, in particular, by Cecchin (Cecchin, 1987) – which can be summed up in this thought experiment (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980): if, after the session, or when the therapist moves behind the mirror, an outsider came in and asked each person for their impressions of the therapist, many “qualities”, positive or negative, would certainly emerge; but if each person were asked whose side the therapist had taken, no clear and certain answer should emerge. It is natural, in fact, for each person to feel the therapist closer to them at certain moments, “but in the overall course of the session the algebraic sum of the successive alliances will have zero as its final result” (Ibidem, p. 18).

There are, then, themes that come close to, or border on, the typically psychoanalytic theme of transference and countertransference, but the particular therapeutic situation of systemic family therapy leads rather to a focus on the therapists’ positioning within the relationship with clients. While the therapist’s neutrality seems to go in the opposite direction to the establishment of a transference situation with the patient, reflection on countertransference seems more ambivalent: what effects on the “system” does the feedback of what happens in the session on the therapists’ emotional experience have? What prejudices, beliefs and automatic thoughts are elicited in the therapists by the words or emotional situations circulating in the session? Reflection on prejudices is central to the work of Cecchin (1997), who indeed holds that therapy consists precisely in the circularity between the therapist’s prejudices (their experience, their view of their own professional mission, etc.) and those of the client.

Paolo Bertrando (2012), for his part, also addresses the therapist’s emotions, when he reconstructs a “late rethinking” by Boscolo, which concerns precisely the role of emotions, which turn out to have an unexpected importance in the therapeutic situation, at least as much as the cognitive aspect, the one based on the circulation of speech and its analysis. If, then, we start from the importance of emotional-relational transference in psychoanalysis, we cannot fail to be struck by the importance that Boscolo, in the last phase of his professional life, gives to the emotions of clients, but also, and in a particular way, of therapists: “The therapist who has emotions makes them available to the patient to allow him to think about what he may feel.” (Boscolo, in Bertrando, Toffanetti, 2000, p. 385). This therapeutic effect of emotions is linked by Bertrando (2012) to a series of reflections by authors from the psychoanalytic field who show interest in and attention to this very theme, summed up in the sentence by Frank [sic: Franz] Alexander, which can evocatively be set alongside Boscolo’s remark quoted above: “the patient, in order to be freed from his neurotic ways of feeling and acting, must undergo new emotional experiences” (Alexander, cited in Bertrando, 2012, p. 157).

The view brought into therapy by second-order cybernetics takes into account, in addition to the emotions of clients and therapists, prejudices (Cecchin, 1997), as particular “lenses” that every human being possesses and that inform them about how to read and respond to life’s stimuli. In this sense prejudices are a reading of interactions that is at once cognitive and emotional, contextual and dynamic. They carry within them an emotional aspect that is at once stimulus and response in the interaction. This is why one can say that the reading that a person – therapist or client – gives of an event is the product of their prejudices, that is, of emotional and relational frames of reference, preconstituted schemas that need to be modified just as much as the automatic transference responses that leave a person stuck in a neurotic dynamic.

Naturally, as with transference and countertransference, this is a dynamic relationship that changes over time: one could speak here of a therapeutic alliance that presents patterns, recognisable not only by the client but also by the therapist, which are moments of change and have a specific emotional connotation: they “become specific moments of meeting; the implicit knowledge of each partner changes, creating a new intersubjective context: the relationship has changed” (Bertrando, 2012, p. 158).

The mirror

If transference is something of a symbol of psychoanalysis, the one-way mirror is a symbol of systemic therapy. It first appeared (see Bertrando, Toffanetti, 2000) in Berkeley, California, where Charles Fulweiler used it to observe psychologists who were learning to administer tests, in order to supervise them. Later Minuchin enthusiastically adopted it in his own practice at the end of the 1950s, thereby revolutionising his therapeutic setting. I found the most evocative words on this subject in the prologue, aptly entitled Dietro lo specchio (Behind the mirror), that Hoffman wrote at the beginning of one of her major texts (Hoffman, 1984): “This book is a journey to a newly discovered realm, the world behind the mirror” (p. 13). Immediately afterwards she compares the introduction of the one-way mirror in psychotherapy to the discovery of the telescope, which brings a “new way of thinking”, indeed an “epistemological revolution”. The comparison with Galileo is evocative and apt: it is obviously not the object itself that is particularly new, but the incredible theoretical courage behind the revolutionary gesture of pointing it at the sky. In the same way, the mirror offers a “bicameral vision” that entails a profound change in diagnosis – the patient’s symptom is framed within a system of relationships – and in therapy: the possibility of change is linked to intertwining systems of relationships, and no longer to two individuals meeting in the therapy room. Naturally, the key elements of systemic therapy are played out around the mirror: the team, the cybernetic model, right up to Tom Andersen’s reflecting team.

Epigenesis

Here, then, are some points of contact between psychoanalysis and systemic thinking, from a perspective in which the de jure inquiry into the compatibility, or the possibility of integration, of psychoanalytic theory with the systemic approach merges with fragments of historical reconstruction; these show us de facto how, in the personal development of therapists, in clinical experience, in welcoming patients’ distress, some convergence, at times perhaps even a friendship, has existed.

There is thus a convergence between the theoretical position taken on the integration of different approaches and the account of therapists’ training and personal experience: Boscolo expresses this clearly when he speaks of an “epigenetic perspective” (Boscolo, Bertrando, 1996, p. 35). The point is not to throw away one’s past for good by embracing new perspectives that erase the previous ones, nor simply to accumulate ideas and techniques in the manner of a fragmented eclecticism that grows indefinitely; theoretical purism is thus valuable only if it serves the training of therapists, but over time experience leads one to feel “at ease” within one’s own model, while being able to use other models too, where there is a need and where they prove useful. Experience and one’s own “provenance” are indeed the very substance of this epigenetic perspective, “in which every theoretical or practical change comes to connect over time with those previous perspectives that have proved useful” (Ibid., p. 37).

How this approach plays out specifically in the relationship between a psychoanalytic “provenance” and systemic therapy is what this paper has tried to outline, in the awareness that the subject is far more complex and deserves broader reflection; very simply, however, Gregory Bateson’s metaphor comes to our aid when he states (Bateson, 1993) that binocular vision – two different perspectives looking at the same object – makes it possible to grasp depth, a new dimension compared with monocular visions alone, each of which tells us of a flat world, and therefore, certainly, a less engaging one.

Complexe Systémique: key points

The article does not claim to give a full history of the relationship between psychoanalysis and systemic therapy: it assembles fragments, mostly around Boscolo, and reads the texts closely rather than debating them. Its value lies in recalling that the Milan school was born of psychoanalysts, and that the “systemic purism” of the 1970s was a practical choice, almost a conversion, rather than a demonstration of incompatibility. Three ideas are worth keeping for practice. The question of transference does not disappear in family therapy: it shifts to the therapists’ positioning, to neutrality and to countertransference, which Cecchin takes up as prejudices. The therapist’s emotions become a tool when they are made available to the person in therapy, as the late Boscolo argued. Finally, Boscolo’s “epigenetic perspective” marks out a path between purism and eclecticism: keeping what has proved useful from one’s earlier training and using it from within one’s own model. The question put to training remains open: where will clinical depth come from once psychoanalysis is no longer the common trunk? Read alongside the interview with Anna Nicolò on the meeting of psychoanalysis and systemic therapy, and the “systemic prejudices” set out by Cecchin.

References

Ackerman, N. W. (1968), Psicodinamica della vita familiare, Torino, Boringhieri.

Ackerman, N. W. (1970), Patologia e terapia della vita familiare, Milano, Feltrinelli.

Barbetta, P. (2012), Una psicoanalisi del gesto: Mara Selvini Palazzoli e Gisela Pankow, in Barbetta, P.; Casadio, L.; Giuliani, M. (2012), Margini: Tra sistemica e psicoanalisi, Torino, Antigone.

Bateson, G. (1993), Mente e natura: Un’unità necessaria, Milano, Adelphi.

Bateson, G. (2013a), Verso un’ecologia della mente, Milano, Adelphi.

Bateson, G. (2013b), Verso una teoria della schizofrenia, in Bateson, G. (2013), Verso un’ecologia della mente, Milano, Adelphi.

Bertrando, P.; Toffanetti, D. (2000), Storia della terapia familiare, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Bertrando, P. (2012), “I processi di cambiamento in terapia sistemica”, Riflessioni Sistemiche, 6, giugno 2012, 154-165.

Boscolo, L.; Bertrando, P. (1996), Terapia sistemica individuale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Boscolo, L.; Cecchin, G.; Hoffman, L.; Penn, P. (2004), Clinica Sistemica: Dialoghi a quattro sull’evoluzione del modello di Milano, edizione italiana a cura di Bertrando, P., Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Boscolo, L. (2009), Bateson a Milano, in Bertrando, P.; Bianciardi, M. (a cura di), La natura sistemica dell’uomo: Attualità del pensiero di Gregory Bateson, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Cecchin, G. (1987), “Hypothesizing, Circularity, and Neutrality Revisited: An Invitation to Curiosity”, Family Process, 26(4), 405-413.

Cecchin, G.; Lane, G.; Ray, W. A. (1993), Irriverenza: una strategia di sopravvivenza per i terapeuti, Milano, Franco Angeli.

Cecchin, G.; Lane, G.; Ray, W. A. (1997), Verità e pregiudizi, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Di Ciaccia, A. (1987), “Sulla cura psicoanalitica delle nevrosi e delle psicosi”, La Psicoanalisi, 6, pp. 142-150.

Freud, S. (1909), Il caso del piccolo Hans: Analisi di una fobia in un bambino di cinque anni, in Le opere complete, vol. I, Roma, Newton Compton.

Freud, S. (1912), Raccomandazione al medico sul trattamento psicoanalitico, in Le opere complete, vol. I, Roma, Newton Compton.

Freud, (1916-1917), Introduzione alla psicoanalisi, in Le opere complete, vol. II, Roma, Newton Compton.

Hoffman, L. (1984), Principi di terapia della famiglia, Roma, Astrolabio.

Hoffman, L. (2002), Family Therapy: An Intimate History, New York, W. W. Norton & Co Inc.

Lacan, J. (2005), I complessi familiari nella formazione dell’individuo, Torino: Einaudi.

Loriedo, C. (2002), Terapia dell’impatto emozionale di Nathan Ackerman, in Andolfi, M. (a cura di) I pionieri della terapia familiare, Milano, Franco Angeli.

Minuchin, S.; Fishman, H. C. (1982), Guida alle tecniche della terapia della famiglia, Roma, Astrolabio.

Selvini Palazzoli, M. (1999) in Doherty, W., “Il dissenso e la curiosità. Intervista con Mara Selvini Palazzoli”, Terapia Familiare, 61.

Selvini Palazzoli, M.; Boscolo, L.; Cecchin, G.; Prata G. (2003), Paradosso e controparadosso, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Selvini Palazzoli, M. (2006), L’anoressia mentale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Ackerman Institute for the Family, (Ackerman Institute), Our History: http://www.ackerman.org/our-history

Unofficial English translation of Terapia della famiglia: frammenti di storia, tra psicoanalisi e sistemica, by Massimo Martucci, Connessioni, new series, no. 5 (2019), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence (long quotations presented as block quotations). Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “Terapia della famiglia: frammenti di storia, tra psicoanalisi e sistemica”, published in Connessioni (2019) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

Read the original article

How to cite this article

Martucci, M. (2019). Family therapy: fragments of history, between psychoanalysis and systemic thinking (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/family-therapy-fragments-of-history-between-psychoanalysis-and-systemic-thinking (Original work published in 2019 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 5 (2019); republished in 2019 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/terapia-della-famiglia-frammenti-di-storia-tra-psicoanalisi-e-sistemica/)

To go further

Discussion

Comments 0

Log in to join the discussion. Log in

  1. No comment yet. Start the discussion.

Cart

Your cart is empty.