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This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.

Connessioni · Disability

The diagnositis virus

A psychologist and the mother of a little girl with Down syndrome, Claudia Trombetta borrows from Andrea Canevaro the word “diagnositis” to describe the inflammation of categorical diagnosis in childhood. She describes its symptoms, from medical hegemony to prognoses that shut people in, starting from her own encounter with a rehabilitation protocol. She then proposes four remedies: “nibbled” diagnosis, the ICF, scientific scepticism and the curiosity dear to Cecchin.

Authors Claudia Trombetta, clinical and community psychologist, psychotherapist and trainer (Centro Verba Manent, Relazioni e Benessere)First published Connessioni, 17 December 2017Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Il virus della diagnosite, by Claudia Trombetta, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 2 (2017), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. Paragraphs and headings are those of the journal, including the numbering of the symptoms, which jumps from the third to the fifth; the note on the author, placed by the journal at the head of the article, appears in the author line; the two epigraphs and the quotations from Frances, Bateson and Cecchin, which the journal gives as ordinary paragraphs, are set off as block quotations; quotations are translated from the Italian, except for the passage from Bateson’s Mind and Nature, given in its original English; the neologism diagnosite is rendered as “diagnositis”; a few typos have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

There can be no diagnosis of the person without a diagnosis of the context.

Claudia Trombetta

How much damage the notions of norm and categories have caused, so present nowadays in unconscious, obsessive, neurotic form! Who does not see the drawbacks that both of them entail? Both of them oppose, marginalise and shut away.

C. Gardou

Introduction

In recent years, in my professional work, I seem to observe an excessive spread of categorical diagnoses in childhood and adolescence, with the risk of a boomerang effect on the very children with fragilities whom the diagnosis is meant to help.

Alongside this concern there is also a bitter reflection that has emerged from the intertwining of my professional life and my personal life as the mother of a little girl with Down syndrome: you realise that, once the diagnostic label has been attached to a disabled child, despite an apparent offer of services and possibilities, you often experience a considerable narrowing of the scenarios and choices available in your life.

Categorical diagnosis, in fact, tends to lay down a rather one-track path of care, rehabilitation and life, to the point that choosing something different from what science and society have decided is appropriate for that specific diagnosis becomes a constant daily effort. So I will try to set out my doubts about the usefulness and effectiveness of this spread of categorical diagnosis in childhood and adolescence.

Symptoms of diagnositis

What is diagnosis, particularly in psychology and psychiatry? An important tool available to health professionals for getting to know and better helping people who live with and present fragilities. If we recover its etymological meaning, we see that diagnosis means precisely “knowing through” and “knowing by separating”. Separating, then, differentiating, in order to know better. We know, in fact, that knowledge arises from the perception of difference: if I did not know “rough”, I could not feel “smooth”; if I did not know pain, I would not know joy; if normality were not defined, there would be no abnormality either. Differentiating helps us to know and to give shape to our knowledge. Diagnosis, then, should highlight differences that make it possible to include people in some categories and exclude them from others, and this should help professionals to better define pathways of care, rehabilitation, education and inclusion.

However, we are living through a socio-cultural period in which we risk being too fascinated by scientific technicality and specialism, by the idea that science and techniques can solve every problem, reducing human complexity to a set of independent organs, characteristics or symptoms over which we think we have control the moment we categorise them.

On this cultural humus the virus of diagnositis can easily develop and spread, an ironic neologism that I heard Andrea Canevaro use at a conference and that I decided to adopt because it is full of positively provocative prompts.

Diagnositis is the disease that attacks diagnosis, inflaming it, stiffening it, making it inflexible and dysfunctional and reducing its potential for knowledge. When do we catch diagnositis? Any expert and any society can catch diagnositis when they switch off curiosity towards the person, reducing them to their diagnosis, often a mere “sum of symptoms”, which adds little to the understanding of the person’s psychological, existential, relational and social dynamics. It seems to me that today the diagnositis virus is becoming very resistant and spreading in epidemic fashion, as if we had an obsessive need to label and define every facet and difference in our nature as human beings so as to be able to control it and reduce collective levels of anxiety in the face of the many diversities present in our societies today. So it happens that what used to be simply different, perhaps even odd, is now pathological. We find it hard to welcome and respect what lies outside the norm; we often feel destabilised by diversity and think that the best way of managing it is control and separation, which guarantee us a good level of reassurance.

Even someone who has devoted their professional life to processes of diagnostic categorisation, such as Allen Frances, the psychiatrist who led the group that published DSM-IV and a member of the committee that drafted DSM-III, forcefully puts critical reflections to the scientific community:

The evidence of diagnostic inflation is everywhere.

There have been four deadly epidemics of mental disorders in the past fifteen years. Childhood Bipolar Disorder has, as if by miracle, increased fortyfold; Autism, spectacularly, twentyfold; Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder has tripled in prevalence.

When incidence skyrockets, part of the growth is due to genuine cases that were previously missed: people truly in need of diagnosis and treatment. But more accurate diagnosis cannot, on its own, explain why so many people, and especially children, have suddenly begun to fall so seriously ill (Frances, 2013, p. 128).

In Italy, autism diagnoses have increased exponentially in recent years, and ADHD diagnoses are spreading fast. Will the next invasion be Childhood Bipolar Disorder? Now that we have defined diagnositis and understood that its spread may give rise to legitimate concern, I will try to list its symptoms so that it can be recognised.

First symptom: medical-clinical hegemony

We catch diagnositis when we give medical-clinical diagnosis a central role, hierarchically prior to and not on an equal footing with other forms of knowledge of the person, such as anthropological, educational, relational and social knowledge. Dangerous and limiting consequences follow from this choice, first of all the idea that the disabled person is sick. Chronically sick, moreover, because disability, in most cases, lasts a lifetime. Disability may have medical complications, but it is not an illness: it is just one possible condition of human existence. And yet the underlying idea persists that the disabled person is sick and that it is therefore necessary to intervene therapeutically so that they recover, even though we know they will never recover.

An unscientific paradox that narrows existential possibilities instead of widening them, as Montobbio points out:

[…] the conviction that Down syndrome (and handicap in general) belongs to the sphere of illness. This connection leads to thinking that the disabled person must be assessed and treated, and that the doctor is not only competent for the morbid aspects but is the figure who can dictate the rules of their personal life. In many cases the instrument of care is confused with its aim (which is to enable the disabled person to live among us), so that a sort of interminable rehabilitation is put in place that in fact erases existence. (Montobbio, 1994, pp. 19–20)

If the person, in their existential complexity, disappears and only “the patient” remains, it follows that every proposal for their life is of a therapeutic and health-care kind: physiotherapy, speech therapy, psychomotor therapy, occupational therapy, hippotherapy. A disabled person cannot go horse riding as and as much as they are able to: no, the disabled person does hippotherapy! They cannot do gymnastics as and as much as they are able to: no, the disabled person does physiotherapy! The disabled person cannot spend time on manual or play activities or deal with everyday chores as and as much as they are able to: no, the disabled person does occupational therapy.

Obviously, therapies do not take place in places that are “for everyone”, but in health-care settings that are specialised and therefore separate, with evident harmful consequences both for the processes by which personal and social identity is built and for the dynamics and possibilities of social inclusion and participation. Since, obviously, the disabled person does not recover and often does not even improve, sometimes the therapies are increased in quantity and intensity, at other times people complain of poor cooperation and oppositional behaviour, interpreted as a sign that the person or their family has not accepted the disability.

At still other times, issues of another kind come into play: economic, organisational and institutional, or tiredness and burnout. Then care is given up and the disabled-sick person becomes a disabled-assisted person, from whom every hope and every investment in a life plan is withdrawn.

Unfortunately, however, all this activity is the fruit of a misunderstanding born of the underlying idea that disability is an illness and that the doctor who makes the diagnosis is the one entitled to define the disabled person’s life path. Claudio Imprudente expresses this original misunderstanding with his usual simplicity and extraordinary irony:

[…] I am often invited to various events and conferences. So I also happen to be invited to the famous festivals for the sick. Do you know what I do on these occasions? I take my temperature: if I have a fever, obviously I don’t go, because I am ill. If I don’t have a fever, it means I am not ill and so… I don’t go. (Imprudente, 2003, p. 99)

The clinical paradigm cannot be considered central and hierarchically superior to the others when we talk about disability: it rightly has its own importance and authority, on a par with knowledge of the person gained from other points of observation: psychological, family, relational, school, community and social.

We must be very careful: if we get the premises wrong, we inevitably get the resulting interventions wrong, as Medeghini argues:

[…] The cultural hegemony of the individual biomedical model in defining disability has also conditioned academic studies, whether sociological, educational or other. The “ableist” dimension is the central element that conditions and drives people to say: “We must enable people with disabilities, we must give them the skills so that they adapt to school and to the social context.” And yet these experiences have proved weak because they do not question contexts and their disabling role, or the power of language to silence people with disabilities. (Medeghini, 2013)

Second symptom: hypertrophy of the diagnostic category

When we are affected by diagnositis, we assume that people who belong to the same diagnostic category have the same needs, limits, and cognitive, emotional and personality characteristics. In truth, we often theorise that each person differs from others, that we cannot generalise, that we are all different, that personalised pathways must be set up, but we behave as if people with the same diagnosis were all the same. We see the diagnosis before the person and we look, often unconsciously, for all those characteristics and attitudes we think belong to the category, overlooking instead those that depart from it and thereby missing opportunities for true knowledge. Our mind tends, in fact, to seek confirmation of its own theories by emphasising the data that support them, minimising those that disconfirm them and producing, through self-fulfilling prophecies, significant pragmatic effects in the relationships and contexts in which we live and work (Watzlawick, von Foerster, Rosenhan, 1988). When the diagnostic category becomes hypertrophic and we see the people within the same category as “all the same”, the intervention protocol in turn becomes presumptuous and self-centred, leading us to adapt the person to the protocol rather than the protocol to the person. I would now like to share a personal experience I had with my little girl with Down syndrome.

We had reached Irene’s two and a half years having managed to avoid, thanks to our enlightened child neuropsychiatrist, being placed in the classic protocol, the most widespread one for Down syndrome. This pathway provides that, faced with a newborn with Down syndrome, early intervention is carried out as follows: physiotherapy straight away, then psychomotor therapy, then speech therapy. If there is not yet a place in speech therapy, occupational therapy in the meantime, just so as not to leave these children idle, since, as everyone knows, they are lazy by nature!

With Irene about to start nursery school, however, we found ourselves having to go through the bureaucratic procedure for certifying her as a pupil with a disability. To do so, I contact the UONPIA, the child and adolescent neuropsychiatry service. Irene and I have a first and only interview with the child neuropsychiatrist, who books me an appointment with the speech therapist. I go to the speech therapist thinking that the meeting is necessary for Irene’s certification. Only during the interview itself do I discover by chance that the speech-therapy assessment is not needed for the certification. So why am I there? Why was I given an appointment with a specialist to start an intervention without the reason being explained to me and without my opinion being sought? The speech therapist herself does not even ask the question: it is obvious that the intervention should begin.

It is probably that service’s protocol. Valid for every child with Down syndrome. But shouldn’t the protocol be explained to and agreed with the family? When I reach the door of her office, the speech therapist is on the phone and waves me in. She is arguing heatedly on the phone with a mother, saying that she absolutely cannot take the child on for a few months, because she does not have time. The mother probably insists; the speech therapist restates her position. The phone call lasts a few minutes. Then the exhausted speech therapist puts down the receiver and turns to me, showing me her diary: “Look, look whether it isn’t true! My diary is full, I can’t do more than this. Look, look.” I look; I feel sorry for her and for her burnout.

We come to us, and she tells me that with Irene it is necessary to intervene immediately, “she’s already over three”. “No, look,” I say, “she’s still two and a half.” She carries on with her idea: let’s do an indirect programme. “The support teacher needs to come and see me here once a month from September.” “Well, look,” I say, “this year we’ve chosen to put her in nursery school without a support teacher.” She is almost stunned. With even greater conviction she returns to her programme: “Then go to the town council and ask for an educator to be assigned to her.” I feel as if I am on a hidden-camera show. “Look,” I say, “we’ve been discussing with the school for several months so that it would accept our idea of not using a support teacher; not asking for specialist support for the time being is a very carefully considered choice. Now that the school agrees, it really doesn’t seem appropriate to go to the town council and ask for an educator.” The speech therapist does not give up and plays the terror card, telling me something like: “Madam, you should know that it’s necessary to intervene early, because at four the first phase for learning the prerequisites of language closes, and at six the second closes for good. So now I’ll give you some questionnaires to do at home, you bring them back to me next week and then we’ll start the indirect treatment with you parents. Every child is different, all right, but Down syndrome is Down syndrome.” And she books me an appointment two weeks later in her overflowing diary. I can’t help asking her whether she will have time to analyse the questionnaire results before our next appointment. I seem to notice a little surprise, and then she replies: “Of course, I take work home too.” So I ask her whether she does not think it appropriate to see Irene before starting any treatment. She grants me that, for the next time.

What confusion I felt leaving that office! How many questions then, how many questions still come to me today about that meeting. Didn’t she want to see Irene to understand what to do for her? She knew absolutely nothing about her: she had even got her age wrong! Why didn’t she ask me anything about her? Why didn’t she ask me what she was like at home? Or what she did. Or what she was like at the nursery. Whether she had brothers, sisters. Whether she played or not, alone or with others. Nothing. Why didn’t she ask me what the neuropsychiatrist who had been following her since birth thought of her? Didn’t she want to understand who this little girl was, through the eyes of the people who knew her, since she did not know her? How can a professional, technically well trained as well, as I later found out, start treatment without either seeing the person or asking anything about her? That is why her diary was so full! Wasn’t it so full perhaps because she was misjudging with whom, when and how to start treatment?

She did not even ask me why I was there. If she had asked me, I would have told her straight away that I was there for the administrative procedure for enrolment at nursery school. She would have told me that, on the contrary, the speech-therapy assessment was not necessary for that procedure. We would immediately have understood that I neither needed nor wanted to be there and we would have said a cordial goodbye, each respecting the other’s choices. And she would have had more space available for others in her overflowing diary. And then, why had the neuropsychiatrist not asked me whether I wanted an appointment with the speech therapist? Why did she claim the right to decide for us? In our place? She could have given us advice, a therapeutic recommendation of her own, but not taken for granted that her decision about what we should do was obvious and to be followed.

Why did I feel so frustrated, so confused, so humiliated leaving that interview? Because in there I was not present, with my story, my little girl, our story. In that head and in that relationship there was only a diagnostic label: “Down syndrome”. Nobody cared about us at all. So diagnosis, from being an instrument of knowledge, becomes an instrument of prejudice. The diagnostic category takes possession of the individual, mocking individual differences. It loses its value as an instrument “for knowing better” and becomes an instrument that obstructs sincere, deep knowledge, interested in the person. If this “non-knowledge” is passed off, through high-sounding and deliberately incomprehensible terms, as scientific knowledge, it is not hard to understand how much damage it can do. How many additional problems in the already demanding lives of people and families living with disability.

Third symptom: diagnostic banality and prognostic illusion

When we are affected by diagnositis, we move away from a serious, ongoing diagnostic process and rely excessively on diagnostic categorisation which, often, not only limits the possibilities of knowledge but also offers prognostic illusions that lack any scientific basis and are frequently disproved. The dormitive principle, a Batesonian teaching (Bateson, 1984), helps us understand what I have called “diagnostic banality”, typical of when we use apparently explanatory labels that are in fact mere tautologies, explanations that contain no additional information.

A common form of empty explanation is the appeal to what I have called “dormitive principles,” borrowing the word dormitive from Molière. There is a coda in dog Latin to Molière’s Le Malade Imaginaire, and in this coda, we see on the stage a medieval oral doctoral examination. The examiners ask the candidate why opium puts people to sleep. The candidate triumphantly answers, “Because, learned doctors, it contains a dormitive principle.” (Bateson, 1984, p. 118)

Not infrequently, categorical diagnoses contain information that is useless and unusable for planning, rehabilitation and education, if not dangerously usable. Take the example of the IQ (intelligence quotient) score as a cornerstone in formulating a diagnosis of intellectual disability.

Giorgio, with cognitive and psychomotor delay, has a chronological age of eight and a mental age of three and a half. What does that mean? What exactly does the IQ indicate? What use is it to us? How do we use this information? Does it mean that we have in front of us an eight-year-old child, but that it is as if, in every respect, he were three and a half? So how do we relate to him? Do we ask him the things we would ask a three-and-a-half-year-old? Do we treat him like a three-and-a-half-year-old? Do we ask him to carry out the tasks and activities a three-and-a-half-year-old would carry out? Don’t you think this could be dangerous? Don’t you think it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy? When this eight-year-old child continues to behave like a three-and-a-half-year-old, will we say that this behaviour is connected with his deficit, or with the fact that we treated, taught and brought him up, even at eight, as if he were a child of three and a half?

Josep Espinàs explains this idea very well, writing to his daughter Olga, a young woman of twenty-six with Down syndrome:

[…] The experts talk about the mental age of girls like you. What can I tell you, I don’t entirely agree. What is your mental age, now? There is surely some test that will tell us six, or eight, or ten, I don’t know. It is a falsehood disguised by figures. You can’t do the sums that a seven-year-old girl is able to work out, but you have a view of human behaviour, of social relationships, of the value of what others say, that a child does not have. It doesn’t seem to me at all that you have a childish mind, and I am convinced that mixing up the intelligence quotient with actual mental age is nonsense. You are very poorly suited to learning many of the subjects that make up traditional schooling, but the mind is something else, and your mind works so well in certain respects, respects that I value highly from a human point of view, that I find it as adult as your body. (Espinas, 1990, p. 28)

Olga may have a mental age of seven, but she has had so many more experiences than a seven-year-old girl. She has had to face so many more struggles and disappointments. She has been able to feel so many more joys and satisfactions. At a social, relational and emotional level she has lived so much more than a girl of 7. So, to really know her, what use is it to us to know that her mental age is seven?

Associated with diagnostic banality we find prognostic illusion, that is, the idea that the future of a person with a disability can be predicted from the categorical diagnosis. Being an illusion, it is frequently disproved, as Claudio Imprudente, among others, tells us with simplicity and humour in the pages of Candido Cannavò’s book:

[…] Do you know what the doctor said to my mother on the day it became clear that her only son was afflicted with spastic tetraparesis? “Madam, this child will be a vegetable.” One day I realised what my destiny was and I made a choice: if I have to be a vegetable, I prefer the geranium.

Why a geranium? “It’s a plant I like, a flower that lasts over time.” (Cannavò, 2005, p. 38)

Today Claudio is a writer, trainer, speaker and president of the Centro Documentazione Handicap in Bologna, thanks to his family’s stubborn opposition to the dire medical predictions. How many times have I heard resigned and powerless teachers tell themselves: “The experts said this child will never speak”, or: “The neuropsychiatrist said he will never be able to achieve academic learning, we should just offer him practical activities.” What makes people place so much trust in a diagnosis? Doesn’t the idea that a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis can predict the future seem to us to belong to superstition dressed up as pseudo-science? Don’t we find it very dangerous, in its stigmatising and invalidating effects, to regard it as so truthful?

[…] A description can make a given situation clearer, highlighting resources and possibilities, or it can mystify and prevent developments, as when it says: “Your behaviour is caused by an incurable and irreversible illness, genetically determined, so that you are destined to be fragile and dependent on us experts for the rest of your life.” (C. Meyer, Le narrative del Centro al Dragonato, unpublished, p. 1)

David Tzuriel, too, reflects on the usefulness and questionable nature of the verdicts produced by diagnostic tools, even ones highly accredited in the scientific community, such as tests:

[…] I will never understand what drives psychologists to want to be fortune-tellers. It is cold comfort to know that our tests succeed in accurately predicting that a given child will do poorly at school. There are numerous sources from which predictive information comes. We need tools and approaches that tell us how to defeat these predictions! (Tzuriel, 2004)

When diagnositis strikes, the risk is that diagnosis, instead of helping us to understand and act, offers only stereotyped and invalidating information. What should open the way to a better life risks becoming a tool that limits opportunities and possibilities for growth, depriving the individual and the family of the possibility to dream, to change, to build a future that no one, absolutely no one, can predict.

Fifth symptom: if they do not fit the theory, so much the worse for the facts

The saying attributed to Hegel sometimes comes back to me: “If the facts do not fit the theory, so much the worse for the facts.” To describe this symptom of diagnositis, one story is enough. In supervision, an educator tells me that she works with a young boy flagged in primary school for mild cognitive delay, as shown by the administration of the WAIS intelligence test. So, by law and by habit, the support teacher and the educator are brought in.

After getting to know him and accompanying him for some time, the educator begins to have some doubts: the child seems to be doing rather well, both academically and socio-relationally, and the presence of help and support may risk harming more than helping. So she takes the question to the child neuropsychiatrist, very professionally questioning the need for and appropriateness of her educational input. The neuropsychiatrist is not very convinced but, prompted by these reflections, decides to repeat the test. In Test Veritas Est! The test confirms the below-average intelligence quotient. So there is no arguing: the child needs academic and educational support. The test says so. “But the child is doing fine at school, he’s happy there and he’s getting on well,” the educator maintains. “He probably manages to compensate for his low IQ with other abilities. But the IQ is low!” the neuropsychiatrist replies.

Listening to this story, I feel saddened. My mind fills with questions. Can a test really be so omnipotent in classifying? Is what comes out of it really “the Truth”? Can the IQ score produced by a test really effectively predict a person’s abilities and, above all, their quality of life? And even more so those of a child? What does “He probably manages to compensate for his low IQ with other abilities. But the IQ is low. So do we keep the support?” mean?

Isn’t this what all of us do, every day: compensate for our cognitive, social, relational and physical limits by using our best qualities and skills? Isn’t this precisely one of the main aims of school and education: to allow each person to develop their specific and personal potential as fully as possible while reducing their limits? Is there anyone among us who does not try to compensate for their limits with their qualities?

When we are affected by diagnositis, we think it does not matter that the child knows how to manage his limits and potential intelligently and so manages to live reasonably well. What matters most are the test scores.

The therapy for diagnositis

It is not doubt that drives one mad, but certainty.

Musil

Fortunately, faced with such a complex clinical picture, we have effective therapies available to tackle diagnositis and contain its spread in the field of disability. I suggest a few.

First therapeutic resource: nibbled diagnosis

A first resource for recovering from diagnositis is to recover a theoretical and operational model that expresses diagnosis as a continuous and always perfectible process of searching for meaning and possibility. The diagnositis virus is progressively weakened if we slow down the race towards categorical diagnosis and allow ourselves time to get to know the child, their fragilities and their individual, relational, family and social resources in depth.

Sergio Neri’s idea of “nibbled diagnosis” (diagnosi sbocconcellata) is interesting: it pairs the word diagnosis with a word as unscientific as “nibbled”, in a combination rich in evocative power that provokes new thoughts. This definition protects diagnosis from the risks of narcissistic ambition and reminds it that it can only be partial, precarious, limited, constantly revisable. It is neither ethical nor scientific for diagnosis to define a destiny, for it to perceive itself and be perceived as stable, irreversible, definitive. “Nibbled diagnosis” calls for a process of knowledge that is never complete, continually evolving, fallible and revisable, and, for that very reason, scientific according to Popper’s principle of falsifiability.

Second therapeutic resource: ICF, the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health

Adopting the theoretical and methodological approach proposed by the ICF can also help us in our battle against diagnositis. It is a classification tool that proposes a cultural shift of considerable scope, focusing attention on two fundamental aspects that traditional diagnosis does not consider, or considers little. The first: attention to functioning, together with dysfunction. The ICF is the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health. It is not aimed at a particular category of individuals, but at all of us, as beings endowed with functions and dysfunctions. All of us could assess our own abilities and disabilities on the ICF: trying to do so is a very interesting experience for professionals in health, education and the helping relationship. From this perspective, the fact that every person embodies disabilities and talents, which must be sought out with the same attention, is kept at the centre of the reasoning. The wall built to keep people with disabilities at a distance from those defined as non-disabled grows thinner, because the difference between the two categories of people becomes more quantitative than qualitative.

The second innovative aspect is the ecological perspective, from which it follows that diagnosis must also include a diagnosis of the context and of the relationship. The context must be analysed and assessed for its facilitating and hindering aspects. The context, exactly like the disabled individual, has limits and resources. There can be no diagnosis of the person without a diagnosis of the context. This concept is easily understood through an example: if I use a wheelchair and find a car parked on the pavement, the restriction on my walk is not determined by my personal impairment, but by the car on the pavement.

In the ICF, the individual medical model meets the social model of disability, and the result is a compromise that is more respectful of the complexity of disabling conditions, which would not exist without the collusion between the individual dimension and the socio-environmental dimension. In current diagnoses and in the rehabilitation and educational practices that follow from them, still mainly centred on assessing the individual, assessment of the context is still essentially absent or limited to an analysis of the family environment in its problematic aspects.

The ICF, as a classification and operational tool, can help to translate the necessary attention to potential and to context into diagnostic, rehabilitation, teaching and educational practice. Just think how much more complete and meaningful the drawing up of the Individualised Education Plan at school would be if we paid the attention required by the ICF to defining the facilitating and hindering factors present in the school and consequently set ourselves goals for improving the context, and not only the pupil with a disability!

It is certainly not a perfect tool: the ICF is very complex to apply, it uses normative criteria and language that are still closely tied to the individual biomedical approach, and it shows some ambiguities in the definition of central concepts (Medeghini, 2013; D’Alessio, 2013).

And yet, if it became part of the professional heritage of those who make diagnoses and those who work on the basis of a diagnosis, it would force an important cultural reorientation, helping to destabilise the most widespread and reassuring representation of disability: I, the able, non-disabled one, diagnose and treat you, the disabled, incapable and limited one.

Third therapeutic resource: scientific scepticism

Diagnosis is assumed to be a scientific product, and therefore authoritative, valid and objective, since science is an organic and systematic body of knowledge, established on the basis of a rigorous principle of verification of its validity.

In the world of schools I often breathe this climate of reverence towards categorical diagnosis, sometimes considered hard to understand and of little use, but certainly true: “He’s autistic, it’s not us saying so, the diagnosis says so!” It might perhaps be desirable, but for the moment it seems that our society cannot do without diagnoses: knowledge, interventions, economic and human resources and benefits all come to life on their basis.

If, then, we must go on living with diagnosis, we can nonetheless defend ourselves against diagnositis by thinking about it and using it with scientific scepticism.

[…] Recognising the need to classify does not mean that the current classification of mental illnesses is good. In fact, it is not. The conceptual model of illness that still dominates in psychiatry is the syndromic one: a constellation of symptoms and signs with a characteristic course. This is regrettable because it follows that psychiatric diagnoses are not very reliable and not very valid. Not very reliable means that different psychiatrists easily reach different conclusions about the same patient; not very valid means that once the diagnosis has been made, no very precise indications can be deduced from it either for prognosis or for therapy. Recognising that classification is inevitable does not mean asserting that classifications and diagnoses are always put to good use. The magical use of scientific jargon is frequent: giving a name to a phenomenon can create the false impression of having understood it. The diagnostic label can make us forget the individual, and the doctor ends up treating the disease more than the patient. (Reda, quoted in Meyer, p. 3)

Fourth therapeutic resource: curiosity

We can draw on another therapeutic possibility to counter the diagnositis virus. This is the professional skill that G. Cecchin called “curiosity”, understood as the ability to connect with the person and their system, to become passionate about how it works, to investigate alternative ways of functioning, to keep looking and searching for new connections between events, without being satisfied with a single glance, without imagining that the cause-and-effect relationship lies in the events themselves (Cecchin, 1987, 2008; Telfener, 2003):

So then the therapist moves into another category: instead of becoming a teacher, a moralist, an expert, the therapist becomes curious… You ask yourself different questions, you begin to admire their (the family’s) resistance, their capacity for survival (Cecchin, 2008, p. 60).

Curiosity, through a continuous circular process, drives us to explore and invent new points of view and new possibilities for action. By moving away from labelling and prejudice, it heightens the desire to understand the person, their family and their story, meeting and valuing the complexity of the experience of disability.

Curiosity is research, because it opens up new doubts and new questions, countering one of the most pathological symptoms of diagnositis: the need to find immediate and reassuring answers in early or, more often, hasty diagnoses. Curiosity rehabilitates doubt and gives it back its function:

Research begins when you stumble on a doubt. And searching and researching, racking your brains, tormenting yourself to the point of agony, if it does not produce immediate results, certainly increases intelligence or, at least, the ability to use it to the full (Piazza, 2005, p. 36).

Curiosity means letting ourselves be guided, during the diagnostic process, by the accounts of the real experts we meet. Who is an expert? Someone who has, and has had, experience. Without wishing to belittle the role and skills of specialised professionals with years of diagnostic and therapeutic experience, the greatest experts on disability are precisely those who experience it every day, often throughout their lives: disabled people and their families. If we allow ourselves to become curious about the history, lived experiences, emotions, thoughts and stories of the people we are going to diagnose and of their families, we may perhaps manage to slow down this strange and dangerous race towards diagnostic classification, thereby weakening the diagnositis virus.

Conclusions

I will conclude with two reflections.

In the last three months I have seen a well-known and accredited organisation working in the field of disability discharge four children with very severe forms of disability, while the same service takes on, for rehabilitation programmes that are sometimes intensive, children whose diagnosis of disability seems questionable, and not only to me. This is another, in my view terrible, effect of diagnositis that we cannot pretend not to recognise and must try to counter, because it harms both those who face serious obstacles on their life path and do not receive what they need, and those who find themselves victims of an inappropriate diagnostic label simply because they have characteristics that do not fully fit the norm.

The second, consequent reflection is an invitation to Disability Studies and to all those approaches that support a social and cultural reading of disability to enter more concretely into the health, social and community contexts experienced every day by people with disabilities, because the representations linked to the medical model are still the most widespread and deeply rooted, and those who try to counter them often feel like a lone Don Quixote fighting windmills.

Complexe Systémique: key points

Claudia Trombetta’s text draws its strength from her double position: as a psychologist and a mother, she conveys from the inside what a protocol applied without any real encounter produces. The scene at the speech therapist’s, who wants to start treatment without having seen the child or asked why the mother is there, is worth any amount of argument: diagnosis, meant to serve knowledge, ends up serving not to look. For systemic practice the article brings together valuable reference points: the self-fulfilling prophecy of a mental age that fixes expectations, Bateson’s dormitive principle, Cecchin’s curiosity, and the idea, carried by the ICF, that no diagnosis of the person holds without a diagnosis of the context. One may regret a sometimes polemical tone and a few references missing from the bibliography. But the final invitation holds for every team: treat diagnosis as a “nibbled”, always revisable hypothesis, and recognise disabled people and their families as the first experts on their situation. Read alongside narrative therapy with an adult with Down syndrome, and Rosenhan’s experiment on the power of psychiatric labels.

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Unofficial English translation of Il virus della diagnosite, by Claudia Trombetta, Connessioni, new series, no. 2 (2017), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence (epigraphs and quotations set off as block quotations). Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “Il virus della diagnosite”, published in Connessioni (2017) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Trombetta, C. (2017). The diagnositis virus (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/the-diagnositis-virus (Original work published in 2017 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 2 (2017); republished in 2017 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/il-virus-della-diagnosite/)

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