This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.
Connessioni · History of systemic therapy
A scientist in crisis, cured in two sessions by an intervention that looks every bit like strategic therapy: the therapist is Franz Alexander, a psychoanalyst, in the 1940s. Luca Casadio traces the forgotten history of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies, from Ferenczi and Rank to Alexander and French, the Balints, Weiss and Sampson, and shows how closely systemic therapy resembles them without knowing it. From this he draws a plea for an irreverent clinical practice, in continuing revolution.
Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of La memoria corta dell’approccio sistemico e la storia rimossa delle psicoterapie psicoanalitiche brevi, by Luca Casadio, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 8 (2020), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; the two epigraphs are presented as block quotations; quotations are translated from the Italian, including those from works first published in English (Ferenczi and Rank, Balint, Eagle, Bion), which the author cites from their Italian editions; titles of works are given as the author cites them; a few misspelt proper names (Alexander, French, Ferenczi, Deutsch, Greenberg) have been silently corrected; the years cited in the text, which do not always match the bibliography, have been left unchanged. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.
It is entirely misleading to present a clinical model as static, unchanging, faithful to its basic premises.
Luca Casadio
Mao’s thesis was that after every revolution comes the restoration; after the revolution the strongman emerges, the dictator. And to prevent this, he organized the permanent revolution.
Luigi Boscolo
The revolutionary becomes respectable.
Wilfred Bion
To reflect on brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies, on their history and on their relationship with systemic therapies, it may be useful to start from the description of a short clinical case: a case resolved in only two sessions.
Byron (a pseudonym), a well-known 51-year-old scientist, had contacted a psychotherapist because of a state of great agitation. He felt extremely weak; he could not achieve full sexual potency, rest peacefully or talk with other people without suddenly bursting into tears. Over the previous three years of his life, Byron had already had three such episodes, but this last one, the worst of them all, had begun a few weeks before the psychological consultation. At that time, the scientist was engaged in a piece of scientific work and, shortly after the consultation, he was due to attend a very important conference at which he was to present his work publicly. Despite the positive results, Byron had developed an aversion to that work, which led him to decide not to present it himself, leaving the task to his team.
The first clinical interview revealed that Byron was the only child of two elderly parents, who had, however, already had many children from previous marriages. He himself said that he had been spoiled by his parents. As a very small child, Byron had suffered from a mild form of poliomyelitis, which led his family to define him as weak and vulnerable, unlike his very capable and active siblings. Only at school did he manage to shine and show all his abilities.
Byron’s first marriage was unhappy, and during it he suffered from premature ejaculation. His wife, according to him, was depressed, given to drink and unfaithful. Three years after the divorce, however, Byron married again, and this marriage was happy and lasting.
During the first interview, the therapist was struck by the emphasis the patient placed on his professional altruism. He said, in fact, that he worked for the whole of humanity and not for himself. The therapist immediately intervened, pointing out that Byron, in his view, was denying his selfishness, refusing to admit how gratifying it was to solve a hard problem. The therapist added that he firmly believed in his altruism but was also convinced that everyone can have a form of selfishness, a healthy selfishness.
After this first session, Byron felt that his condition had improved. He was also struck by how clearly the therapist explained his symptoms to him. Byron had never thought that he might have attitudes he was unaware of. He had also understood that he was, in truth, very competitive.
In the second interview, the therapist pointed out to Byron the coincidence between the decline in his sexual potency and the growing importance of his work for him. Patient and therapist then focused on the relationship between work and the sexual sphere. Byron admitted that he had begun that research in order to refute a widely accepted thesis, thus acknowledging his competitiveness and his wish to assert himself. The therapist then said that he had wanted to defeat the previous generation, with his work and his intellectual gifts. And that, therefore, his withdrawal from the project at the last minute was a way of attacking the younger members of his team. The therapist dramatized the situation: go on without me, young lions, he said, if you can. But you can’t. You need me. The others keep begging you, the therapist said, but you are unbending. No, I have fought enough, sort it out yourselves. I cannot compete with these young people sexually, but in the things that matter I can still consider myself better than the young. But to be able to think this way, the clinician went on, you need the illness, an alibi: you are depressed, you cannot sleep, you keep crying, you want no recognition. That way you manage to feel pleasure without feeling bad. You play the martyr to cover the triumph of your revenge on your colleagues. Whose only fault is to be younger than you.
The patient’s response to this reformulation was excellent; he agreed with the point of view expressed by the therapist and, after the meeting, his symptoms abated so much that another session was not needed.
A follow-up six months later, and another a full nine years later, confirmed that this change was stable. Over the years, the patient had only one brief depressive spell, with no further symptoms, which passed quickly and required no treatment. (see Flegenheimer 1982, pp. 42-44)
Reading this clinical case raises a few questions: can the therapist’s epistemology, or even their training, be inferred from this short excerpt? Is this perhaps an individual systemic therapist? A strategic intervention? Or some other recognizable kind of training?
And yet (let us reveal the mystery at once) the therapist in question is a psychoanalyst: Franz Alexander, who in the course of his career also became director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. After this brief therapy, the first of his life, carried out in the 1940s (well before the birth of the systemic perspective), Alexander was persuaded to try other brief interventions, in order to outline the main curative factors. Obviously, this intervention looks very different from a classical psychoanalysis, but can it nevertheless be considered psychoanalysis? And why did these reflections not have the following they deserved? And why, again, has no one yet made a connection between brief analytic psychotherapies and systemic therapies?
That no comparison has ever been made between these two forms of therapy is simply a pity, a missed opportunity. Not least because, in my view, the results could be interesting. For want of anything else, I shall try to go down this road myself.
Writers, and experts in so-called storytelling, maintain that certain fundamental elements must be present in a story. First of all, a hero: a subject with a dream, an ideal, a clear point of view and a clear goal to reach. Someone who desires, who wants something and who tries to transform the situation in which they live. In short, a character able to work concretely to achieve a result, bringing into play all the energy at their disposal. As a second element, perfectly opposed to the first, it may be useful to have an antihero, a counterweight, someone with a vision equal and opposite to the hero’s, able to make the coveted goal futile, or simply even harder to reach.
But the narrative elements are not limited to these first two. A mystery, a secret or something left unsaid can make the story richer and more worthy of interest. Other devices can also be brought into play, such as the introduction of a forerunner, a visionary, a figure with a clear, almost prophetic vision. And finally, as a last narrative device, one can also use another form of opposition to the hero (besides the antihero): that of the establishment, of the institution. A conservative, socially recognized presence, defending the status quo, which stubbornly, obtusely and obstinately stands in the way of any form of change or innovation.
Well: the history of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies, which I am about to tell, of their evolution within the field of psychoanalysis (and of their complete repression), contains all these ingredients and is, at the same time, an interesting source of reflection for systemic therapy. Let us not forget that the most important systemic therapists, such as Don Jackson, Salvador Minuchin, Nathan Ackerman, Mara Selvini Palazzoli, Luigi Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin and others (those who were the first, at least in Italy, to carry out the so-called systemic turn), all had a psychoanalytic training, a solid background and a very well-structured point of view. They felt an urgent need to abandon psychoanalytic technique and embrace a new way of working with families but, at the same time, they drew on a capacity for reading clinical events, and the stories of their patients, that came from their previous training. Various handbooks describe precisely this transition. Let us take one of them, Clinica sistemica, by Luigi Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin, Lynn Hoffman and Peggy Penn (1987), four protagonists of this change. According to Lynn Hoffman, the protagonists of the Milan Group abandoned psychoanalytic techniques and the psychoanalytic setting mainly because of the length of the therapies and the meagre results achieved. For this reason, once they had learned of Gregory Bateson’s contributions on schizophrenia (Bateson 1982, Casadio 2010), Mara Selvini Palazzoli and the others took an interest in the work of the Mental Research Institute, and asked Paul Watzlawick himself, who led it, for a year-long consultation. This was the first step towards the creation of a systemic intervention, and also the group’s first epistemological revolution.
Other centres, such as the Ackerman Centre for Family Therapy (see Ackerman 1938), headed by Don Bloch, where Lynn Hoffman came from, sought a middle way, defining a family therapy able to integrate classical psychoanalysis with Bateson’s new ideas and a more pragmatic approach.
The changes made by systemic therapists over the years were many; the most interesting point concerns moving beyond the idea of the mind as a black box, which underlay the first strategic approach (and behaviourism), and opening up to the world of shared meanings and to the sharing of emotions, unconscious premises, stories, goals and relational adaptations; in short, to second-order cybernetics (Telfener, Casadio, 2003; von Foerster, 1985). This also meant moving beyond the idea of controlling patients, towards a more equal (and non-instructive) exchange between the treating system and the family system, free of all the military metaphors of the first cybernetic inspiration.
Yet in all these theoretical steps no one ever mentions brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies, which by the 1970s had already been widely tried out and recognized. Clearly, there is a reason for this forgetting.
But perhaps it is better to proceed in order. In my view, reflecting on the evolution of psychoanalysis, with the introduction of brief therapies, also allows us to understand better the changes that took place within the systemic perspective. The forgotten history of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies can thus serve as a kind of mirror in which the systemic approach, too, can see itself reflected and better understand itself, its past and its possible future developments. For anyone who knows these events, it is easy to grasp this double reference, systemic and psychoanalytic, always relational in character. It is a very interesting dialectic, because these different approaches nonetheless show a common pattern and a similar evolution. For this reason I feel able to state, without fear of contradiction, that systemic therapy and brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies are close relatives, almost blood sisters, even though this bond has not yet been explored sufficiently. And yet these forms of psychotherapy were born in the same historical and social context, in the same cultural milieu, reflecting on the same clinical difficulties and responding to the same objections, theoretical and practical, albeit with unique and specific features.
To make an overall assessment of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies, we need to tell the story from the beginning and turn to an important and controversial figure: Sándor Ferenczi. Here is our visionary, our messiah; the author able to foreshadow a new relational approach, calling several psychoanalytic dogmas into question.
Sándor Ferenczi was born in Miskolc, Hungary, in 1873, and he was the only one in the first group of psychoanalysts, the founding group, to have a charisma comparable to that of Sigmund Freud. While all the others were Freud’s pupils, Ferenczi (nicknamed, not by chance, Freud’s grand vizier) was a true friend, adviser and sounding board for the father of psychoanalysis himself. So much so that in 1909 Ferenczi was chosen by Freud himself, together with Carl Gustav Jung, to bring the psychoanalytic plague to the United States of America.
Moreover, it is to him, and not to Freud, that we owe the importance given to certain fundamental concepts, first and foremost transference and countertransference. But also to trauma, to biography, to the maternal role, and to the birth of international psychoanalytic institutions, which Ferenczi led for a long time. He is therefore a central figure in early psychoanalysis, although even today he is not fully recognized and appreciated.
And yet, in the psychoanalytic milieu of the twentieth century, it was openly said that Freud may have invented psychoanalysis, but Ferenczi knew how to practise it like no one else. It is no coincidence that Ferenczi asked Freud to undergo a psychoanalysis with him (as Groddeck also did), in order to overcome the cumbersome myth of a psychoanalyst able to found a new discipline without ever having experienced a real analysis. But all he obtained was a refusal.
We must therefore regard Sándor Ferenczi as a true pioneer, a scholar of the mind and of relationships, a forerunner of and experimenter with psychoanalysis and the so-called talking cure. But also, as we shall see, as the forerunner of every relational approach, the systemic one included. Let us remember that Ferenczi practised as a psychoanalyst and psychotherapist when the profession had not yet been codified, and that he himself contributed, not always successfully, to defining it and making it evolve. For these reasons, Ferenczi met strong opposition within the field of psychoanalysis itself, from the psychoanalytic establishment. To give just one example, Ferenczi was described as psychotic by Ernest Jones, who had been his analysand and was also Freud’s official biographer, and relegated to the margins of the psychoanalytic movement. Margins from which he has only recently been re-emerging, to take on a new role, thanks to a genuine revival of interest in him (see Borgogno, 2004, or Haynal, 2007).
Among the various clinical ideas that Ferenczi introduced into psychoanalysis, the most famous is the so-called active technique. A technique that can also be seen in Alexander’s clinical case described in the introduction.
The psychoanalyst, according to Ferenczi, should not remain passive during sessions or be a kind of opaque screen for the patient, as Freud had already theorized, but should keep an active profile. That is, the analyst was to be in conversation with the patient, propose questions and issues and, in particular, do certain things that would help shorten the overall length of treatment, such as: 1) “preventing or prescribing certain forms of behaviour, such as forbidding rituals in obsessive patients or exposing phobic patients to the experiences that trigger their phobias; 2) arbitrarily setting a time limit for therapy; 3) using induced fantasies to speed up the exposure of hidden conflicts; 4) taking on a definite role towards the patient” (Balint, Ornstein, Balint, 1972, 15).
Techniques that Ferenczi had been using since the 1920s.
This passage makes it clear that clinical prescriptions, which many authors (see Watzlawick, 1988) regard as the most important clinical innovation of the systemic approach (along with circular logic and the view of pathology as a family matter), are not in fact such an original idea. And also that these same prescriptions, together with the active techniques proposed by Ferenczi, had already revolutionized psychoanalytic practice, in a direction very similar to the one later taken by systemic theories.
Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank were the first psychoanalysts to raise the problem of the length of psychoanalytic treatment. Their 1922 book, The Development of Psychoanalysis, is a complex and intricate work. The authors, however, do not always seem to agree on the theses they put forward, the language they use is formal and old-fashioned, and there are no clinical examples to support the ideas proposed. Moreover, Ferenczi and Rank seem very timid, particularly cautious about going against certain fundamental principles of psychoanalysis, and state that these are merely variations on the classical technique.
Freud himself, in the first part of his career (Breuer, Freud, 1895), had carried out brief psychotherapies and, for some clinical cases, such as that of the Wolf Man, set a precise date for the end of therapy. Starting from these considerations, Otto Rank was the first to argue that a time limit should be one of the cornerstones of the new psychoanalysis. In his view, setting a time limit forced the patient to “face reality” and not to establish a long bond of dependency with the analyst, which only postponed the end of the cure.
And if Rank championed the time limit, Ferenczi can be considered the promoter of the so-called active technique, which we have already mentioned. For Ferenczi it was important to set limits on free association, including by giving the patient prescriptions and clear instructions. But in The Development of Psychoanalysis Ferenczi and Rank go beyond all this, stating that psychoanalytic treatment all too often ends up becoming a form of intellectualization. According to the authors: “in a correctly conducted analysis, one should not retrace the patient’s whole developmental path, but only those stages of the development of infantile libido at which the ego […] has remained fixated” (1922, p. 19). In practice, one can start from the trauma suffered, from the context in which the problem arose.
By carrying out a total reconstruction of the patient’s past, on the other hand, one risks losing sight of the emotional side, both of the subject and of the analytic encounter itself. The clinician’s activity makes sense, in fact, if it helps to maintain contact with the living world of the emotions. And this is fostered by identifying a specific focus on the subject’s main conflicts, let us say on their relational world. Another point of consonance with the early systemic therapies, which proposed focal, problem-centred therapies (Watzlawick, 1988).
One of the most interesting aspects of Ferenczi and Rank’s proposal concerns precisely the link between the relational focus and the emotional side. Cure, according to the authors, occurs when patients relive their own emotions (towards certain important figures from the past) and manage to understand them (in their development and consequences) in the transference, that is, in the relationship with the clinician. To evoke emotions (affects, in psychoanalytic terms), the authors recommend using, in addition to prescriptions, an emotional attitude specific to that particular situation and that particular patient. Today we might call it an intervention attuned to the patient’s needs.
With the work of Ferenczi and Rank, theoretical and clinical interest shifts from the characteristics of the patient, from their pathology, to the response the analyst can offer, and to the relationship that the therapeutic couple (seen as a system) comes to define. That is, to all the possible feedback loops that the therapist can help to shape. In practice, the focus moves from transference to countertransference, and to the inseparable relationship between the two.
Freud’s attitude towards Ferenczi and Rank’s work was ambivalent: at first he supported them both, backing the whole project, and actively urged them to continue their studies, but then he raised doubts and finally openly criticized the very foundations of their theories. We all remember, in fact, the famous sentence in which the father of psychoanalysis warned against mixing the gold of psychoanalysis with the copper of suggestion. The psychoanalytic establishment soon rejected the project of brief psychotherapies, effectively obscuring the results achieved and the reasons that had motivated it.
Later on, Ferenczi and Rank also abandoned their innovative ideas: Rank devoted himself entirely to the so-called birth trauma, which in his view took on a predominant (if unsuccessful) role, while Ferenczi remained trapped in a contradictory attitude, dependent on the paternal figure (represented by Freud) yet always ready to introduce innovative ideas that undermined the basic concepts of psychoanalysis itself. In short, Ferenczi and Rank’s revolutionary ideas were expelled from the field of psychoanalysis and vanished into thin air. At least for some twenty years.
The project of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies was taken up again only in 1946, by Franz Alexander, a Hungarian psychoanalyst who became a naturalized American citizen and later also held the post of director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis: the author of the clinical case we have already described.
Alexander’s work, in collaboration with French, had the same aim as that of Ferenczi and Rank: to define the basic principles of brief and effective interventions. The project was ambitious: to support these hypotheses, some 600 patients were treated, both at the Chicago institute and privately. The results of this study were then published in 1946, in Alexander and French’s volume entitled Psychoanalytic Therapy.
Obviously, the starting point was the same as that of Ferenczi and Rank’s work more than twenty years earlier. Alexander and French’s narrative style, however (unlike that of their colleagues), was clear and incisive, and their volume was backed by substantial clinical documentation. In this work, Alexander openly challenges the Freudian assumption that the results of clinical intervention are proportional to the frequency of sessions. Only by setting this assumption aside, in fact, could parameters be proposed that would shorten the length of treatment. According to Alexander, it was possible to obtain even better results than with classical treatment, precisely because brief therapies held the phenomenon of regression in check. And like Ferenczi and Rank before them, Alexander and French argued that it was not necessary to analyse every aspect of the patient’s life. Rather, therapy had to clarify the precise point, the moment at which the trauma from which the patient’s difficulties arose had occurred. Once again, a relational focus.
It is no coincidence that French spoke of a focal conflict, around which the sessions invariably centred. This conflict shows a common pattern, the expression of an older and deeper nuclear conflict. For French, in brief therapies, it was useful to give these conflicts a (relational) meaning, and they were to be discussed with the patient. This approach was the very heart of the treatment. To achieve this aim, one could vary the frequency of sessions, use a face-to-face position and interrupt treatment for certain periods. All of these were parameters that helped reduce the patient’s dependence on the clinician, and thus also the overall length of treatment.
For each case, moreover, after an initial assessment, an individual plan was to be drawn up and shared, one that could, among other things, assess the so-called ego strength, that is, the patient’s capacity to adhere to reality and to achieve insight.
Let us remember that Alexander, unlike Rank, did not set a time limit for therapy, but nonetheless carried out brief psychotherapies, from 10 to 30 sessions. The core of Alexander’s proposal concerned the therapist’s activity and the emotional tension of the treatment itself. For this reason, Alexander introduced a new curative factor: the corrective emotional experience. It is an original contribution, a central element of cure, and in my view of systemic cure too.
A corrective emotional experience can be said to have taken place when patients relive the historical traumatic experience (even partially), the same context, the same lived experience, in the relationship with the therapist (or even, during therapy, with another important figure in their life), but with a positive resolution of the underlying conflict. In this, Alexander also takes up some of the ideas of Breuer and Freud set out in Studi sull’isteria (1985). Alexander was convinced that knowing how to modulate the transference, that is, how to take on a specific role towards the patient, was one of the basic features of psychoanalytic treatment, and one of the most effective. It should also be remembered that these ideas seem self-evident today and are put into practice by a great many psychotherapists, but they were not at all accepted when Alexander and French’s book was published, that is, in the 1940s, just after Freud’s death.
Nevertheless, these proposals were regarded by the psychoanalytic establishment as an outright attack on official psychoanalysis. An attempt to undermine psychoanalysis itself. And the authors were judged to be heretics, far removed from psychoanalysis proper. It was certainly a political rather than a scientific problem. Perhaps because, once again, the classical technique had to be accredited as the best therapy, the most complete, the one free of any possible flaw or even the slightest contraindication.
But let us try to describe another clinical case, also taken from Alexander and French’s 1946 work.
Carlo is a 42-year-old industrialist who turned to Franz Alexander because of his irascible mood and because he has great difficulty getting along with people. He suffers from cramps in his arms and has recently become completely impotent. Carlo’s father was very authoritarian, both in the family and at work, and had left Carlo with a great sense of inadequacy during his childhood. His mother died when Carlo was only 10, and his father when he was 30, leaving him an orphan with no one. After his father’s death, Carlo took over the running of the company, with great success. But towards his wife and his son, Carlo took on the same authoritarian attitudes as his father. For this reason his wife asked for a divorce, although a year and a half later they remarried, with no change in family relationships. In the consultation, Alexander was unable to reconstruct any factor that had triggered the impotence.
The whole treatment lasted 26 sessions, over 10 weeks. In the first meetings, Carlo tried to recreate with the therapist the same relationship he had had with his father; he followed the therapist’s advice slavishly but at the same time was very competitive with him, responding to interpretations by saying that he was successful in business. Alexander then presented himself in a way quite unlike the father: he did not take decisions, he left the patient to decide the number of sessions and, when the patient paced the room during the session, he did not intervene. The therapist supported the patient by criticizing his own knowledge and that of psychiatrists in general. Had Carlo remained competitive with this treatment, Alexander would have found it easy to show how much this depended on him, but there was no need: the patient soon improved his behaviour, towards his wife and son too. Even when the situation threatened to become competitive, Alexander asked many questions, always showing interest. In the eighteenth session Carlo was particularly didactic and condescending, but Alexander kept to his therapeutic attitude. From that session on the impotence disappeared, and Carlo also freed himself from his fear of his father. Carlo experienced help from others as a sign of superiority, an attitude that could make him feel unmanly. At this point, treatment was interrupted for two months and the positive results lasted, so therapist and patient together decided to end therapy. At follow-up, nine months later, the changes were found to be stable. (Flegenheimer 1982, pp. 40-42)
Other important clinicians proposed their own modifications to the model of brief analytic psychotherapies, such as Sifneos, Malan and Mann (see Flegenheimer 1982, Grasso Cordella 1989).
Michael Balint, a psychoanalyst of Hungarian origin who later became president of the British Psychoanalytical Society, together with his wife Enid and other collaborators, carried out an interesting piece of action research on brief psychotherapies. To this end, in the mid-1950s, at the Tavistock Clinic in London, he formed a group of specialists, including David Malan, an expert in brief psychotherapies and the author of several essays.
The Balints held a series of training seminars and then began to define their model of intervention, which came to be called focal psychotherapy. The basic idea was to concentrate on the therapist-patient relationship (and not on the patient’s psychiatric pathology) and on the clinician’s possible ways of responding. The Balints thus set up a multidisciplinary team, which would read the referral notes (from general practitioners or other therapists), discuss the case, formulate a hypothesis for intervention and then assign the case to a member of the team on a voluntary basis; a form of teamwork comparable to some later interventions adopted by systemic therapists.
Each therapist, before the psychotherapy proper, would conduct one or two assessment interviews, centred on family relationships, those of the family of origin and those of the current family, and on the context in which the symptoms had appeared. And even once the case had been assigned to a single professional, group discussions continued, together with a description of the therapeutic process under way, especially when difficulties emerged. In several cases, couple meetings were also held, as reported in the case of Mr Baker, described session by session in the volume published in 1972 (Balint, Ornstein, Balint, 1972).
Another salient aspect concerns the basic technique used by the group. In these focal therapies, Michael Balint introduced so-called multiphasic interpretations, genuine four-handed interpretations, arrived at jointly by therapist and patient. This approach goes beyond the classical impulse/defence scheme of classical psychoanalysis, in which the patient resists the analyst’s interpretations, while the analyst struggles to bring denied and refractory material to consciousness.
To arrive at a multiphasic interpretation, by contrast, the patient’s active contribution is needed. During the interview, the therapist would offer observations on what the patient was recounting, then assess the responses to these interventions and finally, if there was agreement, build a more systematic hypothesis in a joint effort. The basic idea was to co-construct, together with the patient, a shared frame of understanding, able to give a new reading of the symptoms, but also of the relationships experienced by the patient, which were considered the main factor of change.
But Balint’s group did not stop there; it also took into account, as a curative factor, the patient’s own independent discoveries. In this case, the interview itself could no longer be thought of as work done by the therapist on the patient, as described by classical psychoanalysis, but as a joint elaboration of (cognitive-affective) categories, able to give new meaning to events and to enable the patient to rewrite their own story, their own biography. Balint thought of the interview as a whole as an affective, highly creative context in which to deutero-learn (as we would say today) ways of reflecting on one’s own relationships and one’s own existence.
Contemporary psychoanalysis can no longer be thought of as a coherent movement; it is more like an archipelago of groups and splinter groups with local and contradictory epistemologies, working on circumscribed models. One of these groups, and in my view one of the most interesting, is led by Joseph Weiss and Harold Sampson, two psychoanalysts who work at Mount Zion Hospital in San Francisco. In addition to running an important clinical centre, Weiss and Sampson carry out research, among other things by video-recording entire psychotherapies and trying to describe their curative factors. They too build on the pioneering work of Ferenczi and Rank and on the insights of Alexander and French. And they too have developed an original interpretation of the concept of the corrective emotional experience (which today, with Antonino Ferro, we might call a transformative emotional experience).
The Mt. Zion Hospital approach is also based on the basic psychoanalytic idea of the conscious/unconscious antinomy, but it radically changes the terms of the question. According to classical Freudian theory, consciousness is in constant conflict with instinctual drives and repressed contents precisely because the latter, although pushed away, press to find a way through to awareness. According to Weiss and Sampson, by contrast, what regulates the emergence of unconscious contents is the subject’s assessment of danger, their own sense of safety. In practice, the passage from unconscious to conscious depends on an assessment of the intersubjective context the subject is experiencing. An assessment that may itself be emotional, and therefore entirely unconscious.
Instead of holding that everyone’s basic drive is to gratify their unconscious infantile wishes, as Freud maintained, the Mt. Zion group hypothesizes that people come to therapy with the wish to master their traumas, and the conflicts and anxieties they have experienced in their lives. To do this, conditions of safety must be achieved (Weiss Sampson 1993).
The difference between the two models is substantial: according to classical psychoanalytic theory, therapy “must induce the patient to do what he does not want to do (namely, give up his infantile gratifications) […]; by contrast, according to the Mt. Zion group’s model, the therapist can help the patient by allowing him to do what he unconsciously wants to do (namely, change his pathogenic beliefs and overcome the resulting feelings of fear, anxiety and guilt)” (Eagle 1984, page 107).
The example Weiss uses to describe the importance of conditions of safety is taken straight from everyday life: crying at the happy ending of a film (Weiss 1952). According to the San Francisco psychoanalyst, people do not cry when the experiences seen on screen are at their harshest and most emotionally charged, nor are they happy when, at the end of the film, everything turns out for the best. Instead, people cry when, for example, a couple who have been through many vicissitudes are finally reunited, simply because at that moment the conditions of safety I mentioned earlier have come about. Only when protected by a warm embrace can all the difficulties, anxieties and pain the protagonists have experienced be expressed. Indeed, the viewer who cries at the happy ending is no longer tense and anxious but feels free to express their emotions fully, in what is often called a liberating cry, a theory quite different from abreaction. In this way, the full expression of feelings is possible only if specific conditions are created, that is, if a warm and safe relationship is created, one that is above all different from the traumatic experiences the subject has lived through.
In the light of this, the very idea of therapy is completely revisited. According to Weiss, patients continually sound out the therapist, subjecting the therapist to real tests, in order to understand whether or not the conditions of safety that will allow them to express their emotions and so overcome their difficulties are actually present. As Morris Eagle writes about Weiss and Sampson’s work: “The tests presented to the therapist often centre on those very themes that were traumatic and filled with anxiety, not because of a drive-based repetition compulsion but for the purpose of mastery. Thus the patient who unconsciously believes that by competing with his father in childhood he hurt him may compete with the analyst, not because he wants to hurt him but to reassure himself that competing with him does not hurt him. Through this test the patient hopes to overcome the constricting belief that by competing with an authority he must necessarily harm it” (1984 page 108).
Therapy is thus regarded as a meaningful relational experience, able to modify certain maladaptive learnings from the past.
To sum up, the test is passed if, instead of recreating the traumatic pattern of the past, the therapist is able to set up clinical conditions that allow those same situations to be experienced differently. And to evoke entirely new responses from the patient. All this leads to change without the need for insight, which may, if anything, follow the experience itself, with the emergence of new memories and new details.
Therapy is thus played out on a concrete, relational level between patient and therapist, rather than on symbolic aspects, and it does not rest on an abstract and disembodied understanding of childhood problems.
The most interesting aspect of Weiss and Sampson’s work is that it does not offer acontextual explanations but, on the contrary, tries to understand subjectively how the subject (knowing their developmental history) can make sense of a relationship, of a particular interactive context.
Personally, I do not know whether there really is an unconscious plan in the patient’s mind that drives them to plunge back into situations that are hypothetically traumatic for them, in the hope of managing to master these relationships, or whether it is merely a (cognitive and emotional) pattern that repeats itself, or even merely a preconception of the authors, a basic positive connotation similar to that of systemic therapists. Certainly, this conception embodies a particular attitude towards the patient, who is seen as a process in evolution, striving to overcome certain vicious circles that limit their relationships.
In conclusion, I can say that Weiss and Sampson’s ideas are undoubtedly original and show the enormous variability of psychoanalytic epistemology, which has certainly not stopped at the basic concepts proposed by Freud, and they also show an affinity with some later systemic ideas.
Why do psychoanalysts and systemic therapists not know each other’s history? Why still perpetuate this senseless form of ignorance today? And what can we draw from a history of changes and of genuine paradigmatic revolutions?
If we approach the history of these two disciplines with a binocular vision, we find, besides the usual differences, a consonance of aims, common themes and very similar issues, as well as a few curious aspects. Deutsch, for example, in the 1950s, used key words as an active technique in his brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies (Haynal, 2007), just as systemic therapists did some forty years later, while completely ignoring his work.
The Milan group, too, in the 1970s, found itself setting in advance the number of sessions to be held (even though it later abandoned this protocol): 10, to be precise, exactly as prescribed by Malan’s psychoanalytic model. So how should we regard these coincidences? And how should we think of the different forms of psychotherapy? As self-contained, separate and independent bodies of knowledge? As a set of theoretical rules to be applied? Or rather as a body of knowledge that is (always and in any case) provisional, one that must be modified, amended and recalibrated to suit the needs of clinicians and their patients?
The most interesting aspect of this whole story lies in understanding the positive value of the various epistemological adjustments that have followed one another over time. These never lead to a final phase of normal science, in which a perfect and unassailable therapy need only be applied. It is no coincidence that over the years (see Hoffman 1987) the systemic approach has gone through so many theoretical and practical transformations, genuine paradigm shifts, which have enriched and transformed the first ideas of the 1960s and the systems theory conceived by a multidisciplinary biologist such as Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1969).
Psychoanalysis, for its part (despite the official version, which presents the discipline as a structure still faithful to Freud’s first precepts), has also gone through several epistemological revolutions, the most important of them precisely in a relational direction (Mitchell, 1988; Greenberg, Mitchell, 1983), which has produced a range of current models; a complex spectrum of ideas of great heuristic value.
All this brings us to a final consideration: it is entirely misleading to present a clinical model as static, unchanging, faithful to its basic premises (even if this has an undeniable social appeal). This description is never true, because psychotherapy, of whatever kind, is, as Ferenczi (1932) maintained, a social fact. A multi-person interaction that changes as the relationships between the subjects change. A system that changes when the idea of the family changes, and its basic social structure, or when the customs and habits of a social group are transformed, as well as the ways in which subjects describe themselves, combine with one another and tell their stories, or when the ways of dealing with problems and moments of crisis vary.
If all this is plausible, psychotherapy can no longer be conceived as a pure body of knowledge with a single root, as the writer Édouard Glissant (2005) would put it, nor as the work of a single person, however brilliant. It is rather a multiple body of knowledge, a mix of different ideas and of opposing epistemologies. A body of knowledge that is not always coherent, that is constantly evolving and that, to be effective, needs new adjustments, if not genuine revolutions. In short, a continuing revolution.
Today, psychotherapy must once again become a meaningful experience for the patient, or for their family, an emotional, cognitive and relational experience in the light of which to give new meaning to one’s life. An experience able to update and give new meaning to patients’ very maps, to their organizing principles. Maps built through experience, over time, across a whole lifetime, or across the broader (at least three-generational) life of the family of origin. But the changes cannot stop there; they must also involve those who practise clinically, their ways of looking at relationships, pathology and therapy itself. All this has an immediate impact on training, on how psychotherapy is taught, in Italy and around the world, and also allows us to take a look at the future of psychotherapy itself.
To respond to this order of problems we need experts who can modulate, if not transform, their own basic epistemology. Experts with mobile roots, able to deutero-learn (Bateson, 1972), precisely because what patients have to achieve stems from the change in the therapist, from the therapist’s own deutero-learning, which would thus become a fully relational concept.
What emerges, then, is the figure of a professional equipped to rethink their own references from scratch, without lapsing into an indifferent relativism for which every theory is as good as any other. A flexible, creative, evolving figure; an irreverent professional, as Gianfranco Cecchin suggested (Cecchin, 1992; Cecchin, Lane, Ray, 1992), who does not trust their own truths too much but who, like Wittgenstein, regards theories as ladders to be climbed (perhaps to enjoy a new view) and then thrown away, so as not to reify an axiomatic body of knowledge. So as not to create what Wilfred Bion called the calcification of thought (Casadio, 2010), an obstacle to change itself.
In this regard, let us remember that Sándor Ferenczi was an irreverent therapist, the first in history, as far as we know, since he stated, and noted in his Diario clinico, that analysts’ reference theories are often genuine delusions to which clinicians cling only to have comfortable certainties (Haynal, 2008; Ferenczi, 1932). And we should also remember his sensitivity, his tact (which for him had clinical value), and the curiosity he showed for his patients’ stories and for the conditions of their existence. Against this background, there may be room to seek a new alliance between systemic therapy and psychoanalysis, not least because in recent years what I myself have called systemic psychoanalysis (Casadio, 2012) has emerged: a relational, contextual psychoanalysis that has been able to abandon the classical concepts of drive, psychic energy and repression (seeking its own metapsychology in mother-infant relationships), and to move beyond a one-person model (Freud’s) in order to look at human beings and social relationships in a complex and contemporary way.
The challenge is considerable and future developments cannot yet be foreseen, but I am sure they can be better faced by bringing together problems and reflections, and also the possibility of building a multidisciplinary view of care, change, pathology and the complexity of what we still call life.
Complexe Systémique: key points
Casadio writes as a historian of ideas rather than as someone building a proof: the kinships he draws, from Ferenczi’s active techniques to systemic prescriptions, from Weiss and Sampson’s unconscious plan to positive connotation, are structural parallels rather than documented lines of descent, and several dates and references need checking. Its strength lies elsewhere. It reminds us that the founding figures of family therapy came from psychoanalysis, and that the story of the “systemic turn” has left in the shadows what it owed to brief analytic therapies: the time limit, the relational focus, the therapist’s activity, teamwork around the case. Two ideas are worth keeping for practice. The corrective emotional experience, like the safety “tests” described by Weiss and Sampson, invites us to look at what is being replayed in the therapeutic relationship rather than to search for the one right interpretation. And irreverence, from Ferenczi to Cecchin, guards against the calcification of models, systemic ones included. Read alongside the interview with Anna Nicolò on the meeting of psychoanalysis and systemic therapy, and the “systemic prejudices” set out by Cecchin.
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Unofficial English translation of La memoria corta dell’approccio sistemico e la storia rimossa delle psicoterapie psicoanalitiche brevi, by Luca Casadio, Connessioni, new series, no. 8 (2020), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.
Unofficial English translation of “La memoria corta dell’approccio sistemico e la storia rimossa delle psicoterapie psicoanalitiche brevi”, published in Connessioni (2020) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.
Read the original articleHow to cite this article
Casadio, L. (2020). The short memory of the systemic approach and the repressed history of brief psychoanalytic psychotherapies (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/the-short-memory-of-the-systemic-approach-and-the-repressed-history-of-brief (Original work published in 2020 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 8 (2020); republished in 2020 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/la-memoria-corta-dellapproccio-sistemico-e-la-storia-rimossa-delle-psicoterapie-psicoanalitiche-brevi/)
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