This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.
Connessioni · Trauma
Aldo, a professional driver, can no longer sleep: his nephew is on trial for pulling out from under an SUV’s wheels a cyclist who then died of internal bleeding, and one question gnaws at him: what would have happened if he had not stepped in? Starting from this case, Fabio Sbattella shows how counterfactual questions, which negate facts that have already occurred, lock the mind into loops that admit no answer. The article proposes guidelines for getting out of them, followed up on about thirty cases.
Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Il tarlo della mente: effetti patogeni del ragionamento controfattuale, by Fabio Sbattella, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 10 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; Table 1 is presented as a list; quotations and reported questions are translated from the Italian; a few typographical errors have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.
The main problem lies not in missing answers but in ill-posed questions.
Fabio Sbattella
Aldo, a professional driver in his fifties, sought psychotherapeutic help because of a persistent and deep distress that disturbed his sleep and also interfered with his daily activities. A recurrent, persistent thought had been obsessing him since a road accident in which his nephew had been involved. This is his account of the dramatic event: “My nephew, a good lad of twenty, was walking along the pavement near his home when he heard a sudden noise and a loud scream. A woman driving an SUV with two children on board had hit a cyclist and knocked him to the ground. In a panic, amid her children’s screams, the driver had put the car into reverse, but had run over the fallen man with her wheels again. My nephew then rushed to help the poor man, stopping the traffic, shouting at the woman to stay still and pulling the cyclist out from under the wheels. The emergency services were called, but the cyclist later died of internal bleeding.” What now haunted the uncle was not so much the vivid memory of that horrific scene (which, in any case, he had not witnessed) as the unexpected legal turn the affair had taken. To avoid the penalties attached to a charge of vehicular homicide, the woman’s defence lawyers had put forward the hypothesis that the internal bleeding had been caused by the rescuer’s careless moving of the injured man, and so the young man, unexpectedly, found himself charged with manslaughter. Court-appointed and party-appointed technical experts were preparing to argue over what would have happened to the cyclist if the young man had not done what he did. The uncle, too, had been caught in the trap of this counterfactual reasoning, and the question “what would have happened if he hadn’t…” was for him an intrusive, unwanted woodworm gnawing at his mind. Of the therapist, too, Aldo asked first and foremost for an answer to this question. He wanted an opinion, an authoritative view or a definitive answer to the dilemma over which the experts were getting ready to do battle.
In Aldo’s case, as we often find in clinical practice, the main problem lies not in missing answers but in ill-posed questions. One of the most frequent causes of existential disorientation and psychological suffering is, in fact, questions that are badly formulated linguistically, senseless logically, misleading pragmatically, or absurd because they demand impossible answers. In Aldo’s case too, it was immediately clear that the knot to work on was not the answer to the question that tormented him day and night, but the question itself, insidiously formulated and structurally unanswerable. As a counterfactual question (developing, across alternative scenarios, unfalsifiable hypotheses, because they centred on events that had already happened), it was a pathogenic question, capable of generating cognitive loops able to absorb all mental energy. Whatever the experts’ verdict, this question was bound to remain forever open in Aldo’s mind, as often happens to those who live through such complex court proceedings. It was therefore necessary for Aldo to find better questions because, as primary-school mathematics teachers also teach, a problem is already solved if the question is correctly posed. Which questions, then, could have freed Aldo from the endless whirlpool that kept invading his mind? And why should such a penetrating question, asked even by lawyers and insurers, be considered harmful to his mental health, as well as incorrect? In the following pages we will try to provide elements for answering this question, widening our view with further questions.
First of all, we may ask: is it possible for a single question to have such devastating effects on the human mind? A long tradition of scientific research provides grounds for answering yes. Since the first reflections on the ideogenetic origin of psychic trauma (Sbattella, 2020), it has been pointed out that there are cognitive elements harmful to mental health. These are ideas and thoughts capable of disorienting behaviour, inhibiting relationships, confusing communication processes, blocking rationality, arousing intense emotions in the person and raising doubts that cause suffering (Nardone and De Santis, 2011). Cecchin and Apolloni (2003), for example, studied “perfect ideas”, which sustain much mental suffering and prevent change. The tradition of cognitive studies, too, has highlighted the malign power of certain thought patterns and cognitive distortions (Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979; Semerari, 2000). Some mental categories, specific to one’s culture, make one blind and deaf to evident realities; many judgements about oneself and the world are significant obstacles to personal and interpersonal well-being (Cecchin, Lane and Ray, 1997). Clinical experience makes clear, however, that the cognitive processes contributing to mental and existential suffering do not act alone. They are heightened by the emotional and affective dimensions with which they are inextricably intertwined. In Aldo’s case, for example, the counterfactual question was particularly compelling because his emotional bond with this family member was deep and the emotions aroused by processes of identification were very intense. Aldo was a professional driver, exposed every day to the stress of traffic. Although he had never been directly involved in traumatic accidents, he was perfectly able to identify with the perceptions, gestures and emotions of the woman at the wheel, as well as with those of the rescuer and the cyclist. His questioning was accompanied by a vivid imagination that reconstructed the traumatic scene, simulating it visually, now from the rescuer’s point of view, now from the driver’s. At times Aldo also identified with the young man’s father (his brother) and with the anger felt by someone called upon to defend against unbelievable accusations a son raised to be socially engaged. Asking himself about the many possible consequences of the various conceivable actions or omissions, he would then lose himself in a maze of imaginary scenarios that opened up new doubts and unanswerable questions. Thoughts, moreover, incapable of changing the irreversible reality of what had happened. Aldo was thus a vicarious victim of a traumatic situation.
Returning to the role of pathogenic cognitive processes, it should be stressed that questions play a particular role in this respect. By their nature, questions are communicative and cognitive acts that open up possibilities and set the mind in motion. For this reason, questions are especially powerful for the human mind. They are so in a pathogenic direction but, fortunately, also in a therapeutic one. The finest moments in our psychotherapies are those in which patients smile and exclaim: “Good question!” or “I’d never asked myself that!” or: “Nobody has ever asked me that before.” For this reason, a key step in the training of systemic psychotherapists involves the in-depth study of various types of questions. Hypothetical questions and circular questions; questions centred on facts, contexts, emotions, implicit dimensions, differences (Tomm, 1988; Viaro and Leonardi, 1990; Selvini, Boscolo, Cecchin and Prata, 1980): a good therapist knows how to recognize various types of questions and use them ad hoc, aware that even a simple case history or an assessment can instil iatrogenic doubts or have therapeutic effects (Finn, 2009). As psychotherapists, then, we cannot fail to know the specific features and pathogenic potential of counterfactual questions as well.
As the term that defines them clearly says, counterfactual questions start from an intrinsically problematic act: the negation of facts, that is, of events that have occurred. It is an imaginative operation, which takes historically irreversible reality as its starting point and then negates it in fantasy. What, then, is a “counterfactual”? For formal logic it is a conditional statement whose antecedent is the negation of a state of affairs (and is therefore contrary to the facts) (Lewis, 1973; Menzies et al., 2019). For example: I would not have been attacked in the street (conditional statement) if I had listened to my grandmother (antecedent negating what I did). Such statements generate a technically unrealistic hypothesis, one that runs counter to reality testing. Instead of the logical scheme underlying ordinary hypotheses (if A then B), the scheme used is if not A then B, C, D or…? Yet not A cannot exist, since A has already happened. Through counterfactual thinking, then, people imagine mentally altering the chain of facts that preceded an event and then mentally observe the hypothetical consequences that might have ensued. A person may thus fantasize about how an outcome could have been different if the antecedents leading to that event had been different. Once the facts that actually occurred have been bracketed, hundreds of possible scenarios can be generated for each causal chain. In our example, one might ask what would have happened if the cyclist had not screamed, if the woman had not reversed, if another rescuer had stepped in, if the woman had been driving her small car instead of her husband’s SUV, if the cyclist had passed by five minutes earlier, and so on. Each question would then open up infinite possible universes. There are, however, two basic ways of developing counterfactual thoughts, always negating the events that actually occurred: either by mentally pretending that they did not take place (in our example, by asking: if the rescuer had not intervened, what would have happened?) or by imagining the intervention of positive events that did not in fact occur (in our example: if the rescuer had immobilized the injured man according to the procedures known to professionals, what would have happened?). Scientific research on counterfactual thinking regards these questions as representative, respectively, of subtractive counterfactual thinking (which inserts an omission among the antecedents) and additive counterfactual thinking (which introduces or changes an action in the antecedents of what happened) (Milesi, 2003). The distinction between additive and subtractive counterfactual questions is not the only nuance one needs to know in order to master this cognitive and linguistic tool professionally. Other distinctions drawn by researchers show that counterfactual thinking sometimes raises questions about the actions that could have produced better outcomes (upward thinking). At other times it asks about the conditions that prevented events from turning out worse than they did (downward thinking). An additive upward counterfactual question thus asks: “If I had done more, would I have got a better outcome?” The subtractive upward counterfactual question instead asks: “If I hadn’t done what I did, would things have gone better?” Conversely, an additive downward scenario raises this doubt: “If I had done more, would it have gone even worse than it did?”, while a subtractive downward scenario would be: “If I hadn’t done what I did, would it have gone even worse than it did?”
Table 1. Four counterfactual questions
In the original, a two-way table: the antecedent in the columns (“if I had done what I didn’t do”, “if I hadn’t done what I did”), the subsequent event in the rows (“would it have gone better?”, “worse?”).
According to some studies, upward counterfactual questions are more likely to arouse negative moods such as rancour, resentment, guilt, disappointment, regret and nostalgia (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), while downward counterfactual questions arouse positive feelings such as relief and satisfaction (Kahneman and Miller, 1986).
Besides describing the forms and frequencies of counterfactual questions, researchers have asked what their function is. They have identified three different functions. First, counterfactual thinking plays an explanatory role at the cognitive level. Second, it is sometimes useful for motivating improvements in future actions. Finally, it is often activated as a tool for emotional regulation (Milesi, 2003). These three functions are linked to one another and sometimes produce pathogenic entanglements.
As for the explanatory function, counterfactual thinking has been studied in the field of causal attribution processes: people try to explain to themselves and to others the causes of social events, in order to predict and control the reality of those events. Counterfactual thinking is thought to work as a simulation heuristic but, unlike hypothetical questions about the future, it attempts to simulate possible worlds that are alternatives to events already concluded in the past.
Applied to small, repeatable events and from a downward perspective (see Table 1), this imaginative exercise can even prove stimulating, but it has dramatic effects when carried out from an upward perspective on serious, unrepeatable and irreversible events.
In other words, it is one thing to ask oneself: “If I hadn’t played that card, would I have scored fewer points in this card game?” and quite another to ask: “If I had acted differently, would the cyclist have survived?” The first question opens up the possibility of thinking: “This time it went well for me; I’ll try to make the right move in the next game too.” The second question, on the other hand, suggests the thought: “I am responsible for an action that had irreparable consequences, and I could have acted differently.” For if counterfactual simulation serves to understand causal chains and to attribute responsibility for controllable events, some questions inevitably trigger processes of self-blame when the outcomes are serious and irreversible, as in the case of a bereavement or of irreversible damage to bodily integrity (Archer, 1999). From the point of view of mental dynamics, counterfactual thinking seems to perform a protective and reassuring function, which soon turns out to be a trap. By retracing events backwards and imagining them unfolding differently, the person mentally simulates actions, decisions or events that would have produced different outcomes. In this way the person inwardly confirms having the skills to cope with environmental demands. If, in the simulation, the person assigns themselves a key role in the chain of events, their sense of control over life increases, but at the same time they take on responsibilities. This increases their guilt for the failed actions and their anxiety about all the actions they feel responsible for in the present and the future.
From the motivational point of view, awareness of one’s own mistakes could be a good spur to change, were it not that, in the specific case under examination, the serious harm appears irreversible. The imaginative work thus takes the form of a futile reparative fantasy that allows one to escape acknowledging reality only for as long as the mind is busy imagining possible alternatives.
The radical pathogenic potential of counterfactual thinking is, after all, clear from its very name: it starts from the imaginative negation of reality. In Aldo’s case, the difficulty of accepting an accidental death, and also a possible unjust conviction, prompted the wish to rewind the film of events, trying to change some key frames. Unfortunately, the relief offered by this mental simulation is very short-lived, because once the imaginative escape is over, reality comes back each time in all its cruelty. The infinite universes that the negation of facts can generate, moreover, open the way to a mental maze in which it is easy to get lost or to take refuge. Furthermore, all the hypotheses formulated in the fantastical, alternative scenarios turn out to be unfalsifiable. If the young man had not intervened, would the cyclist not have died? Or would other cars perhaps have run him over? Perhaps yes, perhaps no: there is no way of knowing. Would the panic-stricken woman have crushed him again? And who can say that he would not have been pulled out from under the car in the same way by another passer-by, by the driver, by the elder son, or that the victim himself would not have tried to move on his own? If the young man had not moved him, would the cyclist have died anyway? Hard to establish, even for the experts in medical science, who, moreover, focus on the basis of probabilistic data on only one of the many possibilities. And who can guarantee that the complex surgery the injured man would have undergone would have succeeded? Unlike hypotheses generated about the future, hypotheses about the past can structurally never be falsified. This is why counterfactual thinking turns into a devastating loop: it activates the fruitless rumination that opens the door to anxiety disorders and also to depression, or becomes intertwined with the cognitive component of post-traumatic stress disorder.
From the point of view of emotional regulation, activating counterfactual thoughts can initially have a defensive function, presenting itself as an attempt to fight the fear and above all the anxiety associated with the situations in question. In our example, Aldo also wondered about the future, asking himself with anxiety and pain: Will my nephew be convicted? How much will he and his father (that is, my brother) suffer? And as for my own future, besides fearing cyclists on the road every day, will I now also have to fear my own inclination to help? Calming the anxiety linked to these worries means rebuilding the idea of a world that is sufficiently fair and predictable, one the person can cope with. In many cases this dynamic activates obsessive rituals that reassure the person about their ability to control reality (Mancini, 2016). This did not happen to Aldo, who did not associate compulsive behaviours with his obsessive thought, yet suffered from generalized anxiety.
While bearing in mind that counterfactual questions can sometimes be useful for learning from past events, how should we act when they turn into dramatic mental loops? As psychotherapists working with trauma related to road and industrial accidents and major disasters, we have come up against these situations many times and have developed some operational guidelines, which we try to share here with a view to wider testing of their clinical effectiveness.
First, we consider it important to listen carefully to the counterfactual questions that obsess the patient. Are they formulated in an additive or subtractive way? Upward or downward? Do they place at the centre of the problem actions or omissions, one’s own or other people’s? This attentiveness will make it possible to better understand the patient’s basic assumptions about causality, responsibility and the possibilities of acting or not acting with respect to events, and will thus make it possible to better direct subsequent interventions.
Second, we have decided, and we propose, not to enter into discussion of the hypotheses and doubts the patient has developed, so as not to collude with an impossible undertaking.
Instead (and this is the third guideline) it may be useful to express one’s own mistrust of counterfactual questions in these cases, explaining at length what research knows about their pathogenic power and their cultural relativity. Information on these aspects will be the subject of a forthcoming publication. It will make clear how widespread counterfactual thinking is in our cultural context, and not only in pathogenic ways. The mass media in particular make extensive use of it, drawing, though without the necessary logical rigour, on practices common in the legal and scientific spheres (Sbattella, 2021). Placing individual reasoning within the wider cultural context is essential, both to increase awareness of its relativity and to improve one’s mastery of it. At this stage of the therapeutic protocol we often introduce a story about Hitler’s biography, which roots in memory, vividly, reflections that might otherwise sound abstruse (Sbattella, 2021). The narrative approach is very effective in emotionally highly disturbed therapeutic contexts (Sbattella, 2016).
The fourth step consists in inviting people to ask themselves new questions, concerning the present and the future. In Aldo’s case, for example, it was useful for him to ask himself: “Who am I first and most deeply worried about, now?”, “What can I actually do to support my brother or my nephew, emotionally or practically?”, “Which aspects of this affair upset me most?”, “What could I do, starting now, to avoid running into similar situations in the future?” Focusing attention on present emotions, future expectations and the concrete actions one can personally carry out fosters a sense of self-efficacy and limits the harmful effects of automatic thoughts.
A further step (not necessarily in this order) consists in accompanying the person towards acknowledging inescapable realities, giving up the attempt to deny the facts. This is a very painful moment, which can only be handled within a positive and well-established therapeutic relationship. Accepting the idea that death can strike absurdly and suddenly, for example, is not easy, nor is thinking that human power over some events is, in any case, very limited. Awareness of the ultimate unpredictability of events and of the existence of chance can emerge and be discussed only in some cases (Scholl and Sassenberg, 2014). Further work could be done to support patients exposed to pressure from their own reference groups or from the legal context, which are often inclined to revive pathogenic counterfactual ideas. In some cases, helping patients understand the dynamics of the legal process means exploring with them the relative value, from an existential point of view, even of the judgements that society regards as most reliable.
From the follow-ups carried out so far, on about thirty cases, these guidelines appear to be very effective if used during the first months after the crisis: patients report having acquired strong tools that have often protected them from anxiety and mental confusion and have stopped the intrusiveness of counterfactual questions. These new mental arrangements have not prevented negative counterfactual thoughts from surfacing “spontaneously” in the mind from time to time, but they never stayed for long.
We cannot conclude this contribution by leaving the question open: how did the story of Aldo and his nephew end? Aldo’s nephew was acquitted of manslaughter. Not because it could be proved that he had not been unskilful, but because the experts were unable to establish with sufficient certainty how moving him along the ground had affected the final rupture of the blood vessels, already severely damaged by being crushed under the wheels of the SUV. This did not spare the young man costly legal fees or personal and relational suffering. The affair also brought some painful lessons: the young man swore publicly that he would never again engage in prosocial actions of any kind, let alone rescue, even though during the trial he had had the opportunity to learn in depth all the manoeuvres he “should and should not have done”. Aldo freed himself from the obsessive thought well before the trial ended, and referred his brother, and then other patients, to psychotherapy. In therapy he was able to ask himself new questions about reality, about the paradoxes of human justice, about the stress of his daily work, about the fragility of human life and about the relationships that really matter in life. Not at night, though, since he began to sleep soundly and found in the therapist a real interlocutor with whom to discuss them.
Complexe Systémique: key points
The text is short and clinical: one case, a set of guidelines, and a follow-up of about thirty cases whose method is not described, to be taken as a lead rather than as proof. Its interest for systemic practice is clear. It extends the legacy of Milan and of Karl Tomm: a question is never neutral; it can heal just as it can make ill. The counterfactual question, relayed by experts, defence lawyers and the media, cannot be answered because it concerns an irreversible past; trying to answer it means colluding with it. The work then consists in identifying its form (additive or subtractive, upward or downward), declining to debate it, explaining why it traps, and then shifting the questioning towards the present, the future and relationships: who am I worried about, what can I do now? Also worth noting are the weight of the legal context and of relatives, who keep the rumination going, and the social cost of the affair: a young man who swears never again to help anyone. Read alongside the inductive questioning dear to Guy Ausloos, and a therapy in which guilt becomes thinkable.
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Unofficial English translation of Il tarlo della mente: effetti patogeni del ragionamento controfattuale, by Fabio Sbattella, Connessioni, new series, no. 10 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence (table presented as a list). Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.
Unofficial English translation of “Il tarlo della mente: effetti patogeni del ragionamento controfattuale”, published in Connessioni (2021) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.
Read the original articleHow to cite this article
Sbattella, F. (2021). The woodworm of the mind: pathogenic effects of counterfactual reasoning (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/the-woodworm-of-the-mind-pathogenic-effects-of-counterfactual-reasoning (Original work published in 2021 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 10 (2021); republished in 2021 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/il-tarlo-della-mente-effetti-patogeni-del-ragionamento-controfattuale/)
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