AI-assisted translation

This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.

Connessioni · Training

Can a train of consciousness be transmitted? Wandering comments on the margins of the line “Don’t fall in love with your hypotheses”

How is a way of doing therapy passed on? Pietro Barbetta describes training at the Centro Milanese di Terapia Familiare as a nomadic experience, in which teachers learn from their trainees as much as the other way round. Moving from Shakespeare and von Foerster to the Loman family of Death of a Salesman, he ends with a critique of “colonial” supervision, drawing on stories from Brazil and Mexico.

Author Pietro BarbettaFirst published Connessioni, 25 June 2022Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of È possibile trasmettere un treno di coscienza? Commenti erranti ai margini del verso “Non innamorarti delle tue ipotesi”, by Pietro Barbetta, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 11 (2022), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and headings are those of the journal; the three bold subheadings of the first part are set as secondary headings; the epigraph from Othello is given in indirect speech, with Shakespeare’s own line; the abstract, headed “Abstract” in the journal, is translated from the Italian; long quotations are set as block quotations; Freud’s sentence (in Strachey’s translation), the passage from Maturana and Varela and three short lines from Death of a Salesman are given in their published English wording, while the other quotations, including Charley’s speech and Bateson’s remark, which the author quotes in Italian, are translated from the Italian; Oswald de Andrade’s phrase is given in its original form, “Tupi or not tupi”; titles of works first published in English are given in English; an error about the character of Charley is flagged in square brackets; a few typographical errors, including Linda’s name spelled “Lisa,” have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

To grasp the nuances of our work, we have to face the fact that the unconscious system is not inside the individual but outside.

Pietro Barbetta

In Othello (Act 1, Scene 3), Brabantio is willing to let the Turks steal Cyprus, for “we lose it not, so long as we can smile.”

Abstract

In this text I present training as a nomadic experience. In the first part, I will develop some questions raised by Heinz von Foerster (1972) and by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1985), in particular their ideas on education and instruction, which ask whether the concept of information should be abandoned in favour of the term perturbation, setting a denotative-extensive approach to learning against a connotative-intensive one.

Next, I will analyse the Loman family (in Arthur Miller’s play Death of a Salesman), in order to give readers an idea of what I mean by intensive analysis. In the final part, I will write about nomadism in the usual context of training abroad, when trainers go off to teach new therapy techniques without any regard or respect for the ground they walk on, the historical context, the ways of living, and the skills they discover there; in other words, about colonialism.

Ex-Ducare, a provocation

The etymology of education derives from the Latin verb “ex-ducere”. The prefix ex- means to prime, or to draw, something out of something else, and the suffix -ducere, from which come Duce, or Doge, indicates a position of authority or command. To educate means to command from outside. The relation between being and otherness is conceived as an extraction governed by a Duce, a Master presumed to know the mysteries of a transcendent world. There is yet another reference for the root of educate. This second root usually refers to a second mode of education: being critical in one’s studies and developing one’s own ideas on the basis of the European Tradition. Yet in both cases, crudely or gently, education has the flavour of instruction, like the leaflet that comes with Ikea furniture to help you assemble it, or, in the second case, the instruction in how to criticise Ikea furniture for being so simple and so ill-suited to sit beside a traditional Rococo style. The important thing, here and there, is not to go off the road.

Modernity, at least since Erasmus and his Praise of Folly (2013), has called these two approaches into question. The shift from commentary to critique is typical of the modern age: the shift from functional parts (organs) that have to be combined, or assembled, to build the wardrobe (organism), to fragments scattered across the philosophical garden. Yet in education there must be a third element: the Master, or the Doge. The Doge is the one who guarantees the right road of knowledge – or of life – avoiding any secondary or marginal detour. At the opposite end from this view, probably following Erasmus’s tradition of dissent, lies the perspective Heinz von Foerster developed in 1972 in an essay for Instructional Science entitled “Perception of the Future and the Future of Perception.” Von Foerster was something of a heretic, to the point of considering any typical examination, from primary school to university, illegitimate.

Legitimate questions, for von Foerster, are those asked when nobody knows the answer. What kind of education comes from such a strange approach to teaching? In this article I push von Foerster’s heresy a little further, to take one more step, from Heinz von Foerster to William Shakespeare. My provocation is this: education is a misleading question; it proceeds from a paranoid delusion. And I turn it around like this: you see your students using your experience and your knowledge. That is the moment when you are learning something. You learn from your trainees a dissident way of using your tools, an upside-down look at the world.

The thief as a chimerical figure

A thief comes into your home, you catch him in the very act of stealing your most precious things, and you say to him: “Please, go ahead, help yourself to as much as you like.” In fact, if you react like that, everyone thinks you are mad. This is indeed a counter-intuitive experience. What are you doing if you react to the thief like that? You are assuming the thief will make good use of the precious things he has stolen from you. The thief is freeing your money from its imprisonment in a safe (Bataille, 2000). But this is madness! You spend the years of your life putting money aside, coin by coin, euro by euro, like in the Scrooge McDuck stories, and the thief uses the money you have saved to throw a huge party with lots of people, a band, plenty of champagne, like a Romani feast or the final part of Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.

In a few hours, your savings are gone!

Yet when you say “help yourself,” at that very moment the thief is no longer violating you; you are the one who turns the thief into a person who needs you to indulge his boundless joy. The smile of your faciality creates the singularity of an event born of the interaction. Too much? I know, it is hard; meeting a thief in your home usually has the unsettling effect of fear and anguish, not joy.

The clown as performative identification

It is as hard as the art of clowning, another example of an upside-down look at the world. In clowning, you learn to make the audience laugh at the differences of your own body and at what appear to be difficulties in your movements and gestures. You have to present yourself as a not entirely normal person, and you must not pretend; you have to show the reality of your limits, your disabilities, in public. This is the workshop of anyone who attends a clowning school: your intimacy, whatever is meant by that word, has to become explicit, has to be expressed. As in performative identification (Butler, 2010; Barbetta, Nichterlein, 2010), you have to show yourself strange, bizarre, silly. That is the reason for the mirror image of the weeping eyes when the clown takes off the make-up. A dissident expression.

The crossing

The trainer’s workshop is the place where every tool is shared and belongs to anyone who comes there. It is a kind of utopia in the manner of Thomas More. The therapy training workshop is a communal experience down to the smallest details. Each of us is there to learn, including the Doge (to continue the Shakespearean allegory), who smiles when the Turk (the student) conquers Cyprus (the workshop) and uses it, sometimes better than the master usually does. In the tragedy of Othello, the scene does not refer only to the Turk’s conquest of Cyprus. The scene is also an allegory of something else: Brabantio must respect the wish of his daughter Desdemona to marry Othello, a Moorish captain. This too is an allegory of allegory: the allegory of hospitality. The hope of hybridisation.

Train, the vehicle

What do thieves, clowns, crossings and training have in common? Is training a kind of hybridisation? What kind of evidence can we show? I am writing about almost forty years of training at the Centro Milanese di Terapia Familiare, begun in the early 1980s by Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco Cecchin. This train has been running for a long time, since before the time of postmodernist ideas. What may look abstruse starts from Erasmus’s folly and reaches all the way to Gregory Bateson; we call it complexity. I remember often being puzzled by complexity: a road you take or leave, something that seeks not extensive coherence but intensive coordination.

Training has to do with the “train.” The train evokes travel, nomadism. There is a lovely image created by Sigmund Freud (1913/1975, p. 238) and quoted by Christopher Bollas (2009): a parallel between therapy and a train journey. Bollas tells us that:

Freud used the train journey as the model for his theory of free association: “Act as though, for instance, you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside” (p. 10).

This statement holds not only for the patient on the Freudian psychoanalyst’s couch; it also holds for the relationship between trainees and trainers. Bollas calls the patient/therapist pair the “Freudian pair”: the very moment when the therapist’s unconscious meets the client’s unconscious, the transference. We should think of the multiple relationships in a training workshop as a place where everyone, trainers and trainees, resonates together: resonance, “Elkaïm’s multitude” (Elkaïm, 1992). It is like a Baroque concerto, where different dissonances create the chord. From Baroque music to jazz, dissonance is contained within the performance; this is modernity, there is no need for postmodernity – in fact, better to avoid it.

Nomadism

At present, the family therapists of the Centro Milanese di Terapia Familiare meet families living in poverty, European and migrant families, post-Covid-19 people devastated by what is happening in the world, relatives who have lost friends and family. It is a matrix within which to address the social issues that produce pathology: not just families, but families within a social context, an unavowable community (Blanchot, 2002). To give another practical example: when we cross the ocean, we work with groups of elderly “schizophrenic” people in Santiago de Chile, each of whom has had to deal with the dictatorship. We often carry out ethno-clinical interventions with Igbo Ogbanje asylum seekers; these are just a few of our examples. For many years, therapists from all over the world have come to see the Milan work. No numbers, no brains – or brains producing neurotransmitters in relation to the social issue they face in their daily lives of oppression in multiple forms. Not “fixed” subjects, but changing facial expressions that perform different identities; different kinds of subjectivation.

Trainees and trainers have to travel, be curious about everything they encounter on their journeys, read nomadic authors, go to the theatre, the cinema, museums, temporary exhibitions, and also create patterns that connect the mathematical theory of numbers with sixteenth-century women’s poetry, global warming with the Guaraní people, anorexic women with African children. Is this abstruse?

Apparently so; it comes from chaos theory, where a butterfly’s flight in Tokyo spreads a hurricane in Arizona. Is a visit to the Jewish Museum in Berlin, for example, or to the Museo de la Memoria y de los Derechos Humanos in Santiago de Chile, important for a systemic therapist? Should we make a connection between the elderly “schizophrenic” people I met in Santiago and the images and sounds of the exhibition at the Museum of Memory? These are all experiences of singularity, heterotopias: different places for connective experiences.

The problem is how to bring this heterotopia, this whole real world coming from outside, into the therapeutic process. How to make ourselves, as therapists, able to speak about this reality, not to avoid speaking about racism, religion, colonialism, the oppression of women, discrimination, homophobia. Trainers and trainees should be able to make temporary hypotheses within the interaction between therapists and the people who attend therapy, crossing other people’s affects with their own.

Circular and reflexive questions are the tools for creating resonance around the therapy room. What is needed is curiosity, tenderness and telaesthesia, which means the capacity to feel – in Greek aisthesis, feeling or perception – at a distance (telos). In other words, therapy must be thought of as an aesthetic transmission, a social singularity that strays from the main road. Through the family, therapy encounters prehistory, history, wars, migrations, religions, races, continents, multiple worlds.

Information versus perturbation: the case of the Loman family

The theoretical legacy of the Milan School is constructivism. For us, constructivism derives from the observation made by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1985) in Autopoiesis and Cognition. They propose the word “perturbation” – instead of “information” – to describe what happens when living beings of any kind connect with one another:

When it is recognized that language is connotative and not denotative, and that its function is to orient the orientee within his cognitive domain without regard for the cognitive domain of the orienter, it becomes apparent that there is no transmission of information through language (Maturana, Varela, 1985, p. 32).

Maturana and Varela’s statement emphasises the intensive expression of connotation (Deleuze, 1975). Rather than dwell on an explanation of what I have understood from this statement, let us take an example from Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman – the Loman family going into therapy – for the following practical exercise.

An exercise on the Loman family

Prima facie, we draw the family genogram (denotative, extended, linear information). Father, Willy, about 65; mother, Linda, 63; and two sons: the elder, Biff, about 30; the younger, Happy, 28. The Loman family looks like an ordinary “minimal family”: no divorce, no declared extramarital affairs, a couple who did not quarrel too much, made up of a breadwinner and a housewife (Dizard, Gadlin, 1992). On the surface, the only thing that might trouble the therapist is the age of the two boys. They are still at home, a little too far past the age. Yet Happy works and has “no problem with women”; he is just deciding which of the “girls” he meets is the one to marry. Biff, the first son, has come home temporarily after a long spell working as a horse and cattle rancher in the American countryside, the job he has always considered his favourite, his dream.

First hypothesis (denotative extensive). The therapist has to understand how to help the family, or even whether this family needs therapy. The first idea of a classic, “well-trained” family therapist might be to help the children leave the nest. The first hypothesis is that of a depressed mother who “swallows” the two children and displays her pain. This fairly simple hypothesis comes from a manual of Lacanian psychoanalysis: the crocodile mother.

During the session, the father, Willy, presents himself as a man who has worked hard all his life as a sales agent, declares that he is proud of himself and his family, that he needs no therapy, and that everything is, and always has been, going very well. Willy goes on: we are a very special family, I am Willy Loman, a self-made man everybody likes, and Biff is my hero, a fantastic boy. Yet behind his back Biff wears a discontented expression. Biff looks angry and in strong disagreement with what his father says.

Second hypothesis (denotative extensive). The father is a “mythomaniac,” the (in)famous diagnosis. At that point Biff starts accusing Willy of being a mythomaniac: “We are not what you say! We are not special! We are like everybody else out there! I’ve lost all my jobs because I can’t deal with men!” says Biff.

This intervention triggers a third hypothesis (denotative extensive): the hypothesis concerning Biff’s “borderline symptoms,” another diagnosis. Yet beyond the extensive diagnostic picture of the individual family members, beyond the relational diagnosis concerning everyone’s symptoms in interconnection with one another (some systemic family therapists meet symptoms, not people – is this the “relational diagnosis”?), there is the intensity of a drama, the therapist’s effort to set off the singularity of a story as particular as that of the Loman family, part of the history of the United States of America.

A more complex system of hypotheses (connotative intensity).

Suddenly the therapist asks a circular question of Happy, who until now seems to have been offstage: “What happens when Willy and Biff fight like this?” Happy creates a scene about what happened the night before; the therapist’s imagination creates a series of sequences of the episode Happy recounts, as if it were a theatre scene:

First sequence. Happy describes a typical argument that has been going on since Biff came home. During the last argument the two had, Biff was setting out to Willy the sense of inferiority he feels, accusing his father of being a mythomaniac. He says: “I am not a leader of men, Willy, and neither are you.” Happy describes Biff’s vehemence, his gesture: the finger pointed at his father in accusation. Then Willy’s reply, aimed at Biff: “You vengeful, spiteful mutt!”

Second sequence. Happy’s very brief account opens the door to a wide range of hypotheses about the relationship between Willy and Biff, but also about the kind of involvement Happy has as “bookkeeper” of the dynamics of the sequence.

What about Linda, who until now has been “offstage”? The second sequence involves including the mother as an observer of the ongoing process. Linda adds that after the scene Happy described, Biff cried, and when Willy asked why Biff was crying, she said: “He loves you, Willy!”

So far we are within the usual scope of Milan Systemic Family Therapy. This is one of the practical exercises supervisors do with trainees when there is no actual family therapy in the school. We go back over a theatre scene together, then we all challenge one another, trainers and trainees, to create circular questions able to trigger an imaginary series of sequences, like the sequences reported above.

Hypotheses as intensive processes

Later, in a second phase, we try to create an aesthetic complexity around the scene. Denotative information (that is, the genogram) turns into connotative perturbation (the entanglement of bodies within a drama). Extension turns into intensity. Here imagination becomes essential.

Invisibility. What is happening to the Loman family? Within the setting, invisibility appears: in the Lomans’ case, the sudden intrusion of the ghost, Ben, at the end of the scene becomes the invisible and intense part of the drama. The hypothesis is that Ben can be brought into the conversation only by Willy. This is the delusional part of the scene.

Who is Ben? Ben is Willy’s supposed brother; at the same time, Ben is a ghost. Did he ever exist? Is he Willy’s real brother, who went to Africa and made his fortune? Or is he just a character in Willy’s delusion? A phantasmatic projection? Is Willy his alter ego?

Ben suddenly becomes part of the conversation. During the supposed conversation, when the sons are going to bed and only Linda and Willy are left in the kitchen. The only one who sees and hears Ben is Willy; yet Linda watches Willy, who is talking with Ben; Linda thinks Willy is going mad, but keeps it to herself.

From which follows:

Another series of hypotheses (increasingly intense social processes).

Ben is Willy’s mythological projection onto Biff. Ben went to Africa, the dark continent, and worked his way up; Biff went to the American countryside to raise horses and made a mess of it. So the only two members of the family who can reveal this whole hidden pattern are Happy, the invisible son, as invisible as Ben though materially present, and Linda, the woman who has devoted her life to Willy. Ben also stands for the failure of Willy’s life and the dream of keeping up a glorious narrative despite the collapse. Before Ben’s intrusion, Biff shows a rubber hose he has taken from the cellar; it stands for Willy’s repeated attempts to kill himself with the gas from the car engine. Linda knows everything, yet her self-denial towards Willy drives her to cover up this whole hidden story: the work of the unconscious emerging from the description of the family’s intense interaction – Africa, the illusion, the brother who made his fortune, the caricature of the American male, Happy’s “girls,” Biff’s failures, and so on.

In “The Cybernetics of ‘Self’,” Gregory Bateson (Bateson, 1972) shows the caricature of the self-made man, the alcoholic subject. In Arthur Miller’s play, Willy is the Self of the modern American regime of mortgages and instalments; he is finishing paying off all the debts incurred to buy the house. The hero he pretends to be coincides with the collapse of the family and suicide. Faced with this story, imagining that it could be a story born of therapy, the therapist has to learn to weep and to repeat the words of Charley, Linda’s brother [in the play, Charley is Willy’s neighbour and friend]:

Don’t slander this man. You didn’t understand: Willy was a salesman. And if you are a salesman, you don’t live on the ground. You’re not the kind who tightens a bolt or reads me the articles of the law or writes me a prescription. You work like that, up in the air, hanging on to a smile or the shine on your shoes. And when nobody smiles at you any more, it’s the end of the world. From then on you start spilling things down your suit and goodbye, you’re finished. Don’t slander this man. A salesman has got to dream. Dreams are part of the job. (Death of a Salesman, pp. 105-109)

What does the Loman family teach us in training? What does it transmit? Passion? Intensity? Affection? All these things stir the therapist’s passion, a kind of Sherlock Holmes who knows that the culprit can never be found, because the plot is not about individual subjects but about social systems, collective subjects. The therapist takes a position, assumes closeness and tenderness; that position is always alongside the people who attend therapy. All these things together, and probably many more, are bound up with wandering during training. It is time to leave behind the sterility of familism. The tiny denotative Oedipal triangle of mummy-daddy-child is definitively over; it is framed in a handbook of clichés about the lower and middle bourgeoisie. To grasp the nuances of our work, we have to face the fact that the unconscious system is not inside the individual but outside. It concerns Continents, Religions, Races, Worlds, Genders, Wars.

Conclusion: nomadism and decolonising training

In this conclusion I give some examples drawn from nomadic therapeutic experiences around the world, one of the most important practices of the Milan Approach.

In general, when a senior therapist travels around the world, it is for “supervision.” This means, more or less, that the therapist supervises local therapists, sometimes in the presence of the clients, sometimes not, and at the same time passes on the Word to junior therapists. Junior therapists are supposed to be young people in training, and local people who do not know the new trends, usually discovered in Europe or North America. The senior therapist, the supervisor, travels from New York, Milan, London, Paris, Heidelberg, etc., and arrives in Bogotá, Santiago de Chile, Mexico City, Brasília.

In familism’s typical way of working in therapy, the father is the father, the mother is the mother, and so on. Whether someone is white or Black, poor or rich, a factory worker or a doctor, is of no interest, or, when it is, it is completely disconnected from the history or the social issues of the area where the supervisor is. Working in Buenos Aires with a family breakdown that occurred during the economic crisis of the early 2000s, in Mexico with a so-called “psychotic boy” who presents himself as Francisco Villa, or in a juvenile prison in Brasília with a Black adolescent devastated by crack, always comes down to teaching how good “we Europeans or North Americans” are at handling the question in family or institutional terms.

The therapist only has to show how well his tools work in therapy, how he can work miracles with his skills. Of course, I am using the masculine pronoun “he,” because this is usually a male game, whatever the therapist’s actual sex. If the supervisor goes to see the ruins of Chichén Itzá, the Christ in Rio de Janeiro, Québec City, it is only for fun. The real fact that, just as an example, there is strong tension in Québec City between French-speaking people and the wider surrounding English-speaking area is not relevant to therapy, and the simple fact that the statue of Christ in Rio signifies Portuguese colonisation is completely marginal to therapy.

Can the “senior supervisor” be humble enough to try to learn something that is apparently not relevant to “psychotherapy”? How can one reach the hidden parts of the ground the therapist is treading? The two examples I present here come from Brazil and Mexico.

Brazil

The example of Brazil is perhaps the most striking and paradigmatic (Ribeiro, 1995). The story begins several centuries ago, when English, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and French colonisers, mainly criminals, began kidnapping people from Africa to be enslaved by the colonisers. One of these stories concerns the Yoruba people, who, even today, are familiar to the African refugees I meet during ethno-clinical interventions. An oral history moving between Africa and Brazil, a hidden link. After colonisation, many Yoruba – the name of a Nigerian ethnic group, and also of a language shared among the Yoruba people – were deported from Nigeria to Brazil as slaves. A particular kind of Yoruba deity is called an Orisha. When, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Yoruba slaves were forced to convert to Christianity, the Orishas became saints. If you visit the church of Nossa Senhora da Lampadosa in Rio de Janeiro, you find a Black Madonna and a statue of the Black Franciscan São Benedito. Yoruba slaves shaped a large part of Brazilian culture, just as another part was shaped by the native peoples. Both (natives and slaves) underwent forced conversion to Christianity.

In one of his books, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2011) quotes the Sermon of the Holy Spirit by the Jesuit Antônio Vieira (1657, in Castro 2011). In this Sermon, Vieira contrasts Christian conversion in Europe, likened to marble statues, with the conversion of the “Indian” peoples, likened to statues of myrtle:

The marble statue is quite hard to make, because of the hardness and resistance of the material, but once it has been shaped, there is no further need to lay a hand on it. The myrtle statue is easier to shape, because the branches bend so easily, but it has to be reshaped again and again, and worked on continually, for it to stay the same. (Vieira, in Castro, 2011, pp. 1-2).

For the African slaves, it was a matter of syncretising Christianity with the Yoruba deities, saints and orishas; for the natives, by contrast, the synthesis consisted of an ever-new supplement of belief. Both sides, slaves and colonised, were deeply convinced that the Europeans had something to teach, but what they had to teach was wrong and had to be revealed in another form. The poet Oswald de Andrade called this Brazilian synthesis of the procedures of native, African and European culture Antropofagia. Brazil is an infinite set, containing infinite sets of being (ontologies). The poem is entitled Manifesto Antropófago (De Andrade, 1928/2007). The poem says that anthropophagy (Greenblatt, 1992; Todorov, 1984) is in fact an act of love. Again, as with the thief, the clown and the crossbreed above, a reversal takes place: Brazil swallows, all together, the knowledge of the Natives, that of the Slaves and that of the Europeans, and gives out a different assemblage of the way of living a life, a different ontology. “Tupi or not tupi,” a new Brazilian version of Hamlet’s “To be or not to be.” What does the Western “senior” therapist know about all this? Should he learn it? Is it just folklore, or is it important, during the consultation, to treat it as something he needs to learn?

Mexico

Another example from Latin America that deserves our interest is Mexico. At present, Mexico is one of the most violent countries in the world. It is interesting from the point of view of stories, myths and narratives that have conflicting versions. There is a legacy of violence in Spanish and North American colonialism.

The story of the Llorona (the weeping woman) is an example of this violence. It is a female event, which took place during the Spanish invasion. In the colonial world, the tale of the Llorona is told as a variation on the Greek tragedy of Medea. A man of rank marries a woman who is his equal. But before that, this man had had sexual relations and shared love with another woman. These earlier relations produced children. Time passes and, as the man prepares to marry his new bride, Medea, out of jealousy and revenge (like the Llorona in the colonial version of the story), kills the children. In the colonial narrative the Llorona is the very portrait of the jealous woman. This story is a brutal fake, invented by the Spanish and then by the North Americans to discredit women and the noble native population, who were exterminated first by the Spanish and then by the North Americans.

Nevertheless, the native peoples know another, opposing oral history: Chiokani is the weeping woman, the Llorona, the name she has in Náhuatl. Before the massacre, Chiokani’s name was Nahui, sister of Prince Teotécpatl. She was a princess whom, in 1571, the Spanish captain Jeronimo Quijano raped during the massacre of the population of Xochimilco, the people to which she belonged as a princess.

Before the massacre, as the Spanish army was approaching Xochimilco, Náhui advised her brother Teotécpatl to welcome the stranger who was arriving. The Spanish army, received with honour, took advantage of it to massacre the whole people of Xochimilco. During the rape perpetrated by Quijano, Nahui became pregnant. This is what the true story says:

Perhaps loneliness, fury or unbridled sadness was the explosion that drove Náhui to sacrifice her newborn child to the Lords of the Underworld. It was so as not to forget, and to remain forever taking care of them, like Chuacóatl, the protective mother of the Xochimilca people. At that very moment, Nahui became Chokani, the weeping mother, a whisper in the wind, or a rustle, a memory that in Mexico there will never be forgiveness, or forgetting.

This second narrative overturns the European one, which is passed on in the United States, particularly in the territories the United States stole from Mexico: California, New Mexico, Texas, etc. If in the Western tale La Llorona is an evil spirit, in the native tale she is the witness of the massacres, of colonialism, of ethnic cleansing, of the cruelty of man and of rape.

What do these stories have in common with what we usually call “psychotherapy”? Psychotherapy is also a tool for countering the institutional process of eliminating the submerged, and dissident, connection between the social world and the psyche, the work of the unconscious. By listening to the two versions of the Llorona, the dominant colonial one and the dissident one, the therapist takes a stand for the dissident narrative and increases the number of possible therapeutic interventions.

Supervisors should have the courage to take one more step: to leave the main road. If along the main road the metaphor of the train, the Freudian pairs, must be the chosen hypotheses, in training we must derail the train and carry on along lines that have no tracks.

Brazil swallows, and rejects what has been swallowed in a different way, a new assemblage of organs inside different bodies, bodies we have to discover. Mexico is the reversal of the usual dominant narrative, so as to see what really happened. What really happens is not necessarily what is written or told. The place you are looking from makes a difference, sometimes a reversal. What do stories like those about Brazil and Mexico have to do with training in Systemic Psychotherapy?

As in Bateson’s statement: “The world is not like that at all, or, to be more polite, the world I live in is not like that at all, and where you want to live is your business” (quoted in Nora Bateson, 2011). This statement of Bateson’s has rarely been followed by family therapists, who are always afraid of having their knowledge, their power, stolen by the thieves in training.

God save the thief!

Complexe Systémique: key points

The text reads less as a demonstration than as a manifesto, and it has a manifesto’s excesses: familism is caricatured, and the critique of the “colonial” supervisor targets a figure more than it describes actual practices. Yet it raises two useful questions for systemic training. The first concerns transmission: if information does not pass, as Maturana and Varela argue, training is less about getting a model applied than about creating perturbations, and agreeing to learn from trainees. The exercise on the Loman family offers a concrete method: start from the genogram, then multiply hypotheses through circular questions until what the scene leaves unsaid comes into view. The second concerns context: a hypothesis that ignores colonial history, race, religion or migration misses part of the system. Cecchin’s advice not to fall in love with one’s hypotheses becomes here an ethics of travel: knowing where one speaks from before going to supervise elsewhere. Read alongside Cecchin’s account of “systemic prejudices”, and the possible decolonial pathways in family therapy.

References

Andrade, O., de (1928/2007), Manifesto Antropófago e Outros Textos, Penguin.

Barbetta, P., & Nichterlein, M. (2010), “(Re)Learning our alphabet: Reflecting on systemic thought using Deleuze and Bateson”, Human Systems: The Journal of Therapy, Consultation and Training, 21(3), 399-419.

Bataille, G. (2000), Il limite dell’utile, Adelphi.

Bateson, G. (1972), La cibernetica dell’Io: Una teoria dell’alcolismo, in Verso un’ecologia della mente, Adelphi, 357-388.

Bateson, N. (2011), An Ecology of Mind: A Daughter’s Portrait of Gregory Bateson, IMBdPro.

Blanchot, M. (2002), La comunità inconfessabile, SE.

Bollas, C. (2009), Il mondo dell’oggetto evocativo, Astrolabio.

Butler, J. (2010), Parole che provocano. Per una politica del performativo, Raffaello Cortina.

Castro, E. de (2011), The Inconstancy of the Indian soul. The encounter of Catholics and Cannibals in 16th Century Brazil, Prickly Paradigm.

Deleuze, G. (1975), Logica del senso, Feltrinelli.

Dizard, J. E.; Gadlin, H. (1992), The Minimal Family, Massachusetts University Press.

Elkaïm, M. (1992), “Se mi ami, non amarmi”. Orientamento sistemico e psicoterapia, Boringhieri.

Erasmo da Rotterdam (2013), Elogio della follia, Mondadori.

Foerster, H. von. (1972), “Perception of the future and the future of perception”, Instructional Science 1, 31–43.

Freud, S. (1913/1975), Inizio del trattamento, in Opere, vol. 7, Boringhieri.

Greenblatt, S. (1992), Marvelous possessions: The wonder of the new world, The University of Chicago Press.

Maturana, H.; Varela, F. (1985), Autopoiesi e cognizione, Marsilio.

Miller, A. (1997), Morte di un commesso viaggiatore, Einaudi.

Ribeiro, D. (1995), O povo brasileiro: A formação e o sentido do Brasil (Estudos de antropologia da civilização), Companhia das Letras.

Todorov, T. (1984), La conquista dell’America. Il problema dell’altro, Einaudi.

Unofficial English translation of È possibile trasmettere un treno di coscienza? Commenti erranti ai margini del verso “Non innamorarti delle tue ipotesi”, by Pietro Barbetta, Connessioni, new series, no. 11 (2022), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence (epigraph in indirect speech, long quotations set as block quotations). Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “È possibile trasmettere un treno di coscienza? Commenti erranti ai margini del verso “Non innamorarti delle tue ipotesi””, published in Connessioni (2022) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

Read the original article

How to cite this article

Barbetta, P. (2022). Can a train of consciousness be transmitted? Wandering comments on the margins of the line “Don’t fall in love with your hypotheses” (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/can-a-train-of-consciousness-be-transmitted-wandering-comments-on-the-margins-of-the-line (Original work published in 2022 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 11 (2022); republished in 2022 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/e-possibile-trasmettere-un-treno-di-coscienza-commenti-erranti-ai-margini-del-verso-non-innamorarti-delle-tue-ipotesi/)

Discussion

Comments 0

Log in to join the discussion. Log in

  1. No comment yet. Start the discussion.

Cart

Your cart is empty.