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Connessioni · Trauma

Pathogenic stories, counterfactual reasoning and the wider cultural context

Following “The woodworm of the mind”, Fabio Sbattella widens the lens: the counterfactual questions that gnaw at people after a bereavement or an accident do not arise only in their own heads. Italian law also reasons in terms of “what if”, the media multiply scenarios, and research, historiography and cinema make it a familiar way of thinking, whereas more fatalistic cultures largely do without it. The text ends with a story used in therapy, that of the soldier who did not shoot Hitler.

Authors Fabio SbattellaFirst published Connessioni, 27 December 2021Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Storie patogene, ragionamento controfattuale e contesto culturale allargato, by Fabio Sbattella, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 11 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; the link to the previous article points to its original version; quotations, including the one from the Italian Penal Code, are translated from the Italian; the Italian linguistic examples are kept in italics and followed by a translation; titles of novels and films are given in their original English versions; a few typographical errors have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

Such basic assumptions become devastating when they are internalized and people find themselves acting as the worst possible judges of themselves.

Fabio Sbattella

Personal suffering and shared mindsets

In a recent article we discussed a therapeutic protocol that has been tried successfully in a number of specific cases. These are situations disturbed by intrusive and confusing counterfactual thoughts, which absorb all mental energy in a desperate and futile attempt to rewrite a past that ended badly (Sbattella, 2021). In situations of bereavement and of serious, irreversible harm, upward counterfactual thoughts of the kind “if I had acted differently (or not acted at all), that person would still be alive today” prove particularly pathogenic. After discussing the many nuances of these thoughts (and their formulation as questions, which create vicious circles of obsessive ideation), we set out in that paper the reasons why they can undermine mental health, and described a possible path for “getting out of the quicksand”. Although that path was described in the form of individual psychotherapy, those pages already stressed that counterfactual thinking goes beyond the minds of individuals and takes the form of a collective thought pattern, especially in the aftermath of serious accidents, whether individual or collective. In the case discussed there, to which we refer the reader (Sbattella, 2021), it was also clear that the questions generated by the patient himself were being asked with authority by lawyers and insurers, in legal proceedings that ran in parallel with the patient’s own inner mental process. In these pages, then, we wish to take the discussion further, exploring the role and the success that counterfactual thinking enjoys in our culture and offering some critical remarks for its conscious use.

Counterfactuals and cultural context

Although counterfactual questions, assertions and thought processes are very widespread and have been studied for millennia, it should not be assumed that these phenomena are insensitive to different cultural contexts, at least in intensity and frequency. Many of the patients we have helped to free themselves from these mental traps thought that counterfactual questions were universal and inevitable, given that they seemed to arise “spontaneously” in their minds and resonated in a similar way among the people closest to them.

In the research we consulted, we found no data on differences in frequency across cultural contexts; we can nevertheless bring our international clinical experience in support of the hypothesis that some differences exist. With regard to exceptional and disastrous occurrences (fatal accidents and traumatic events), we have observed that in more “fatalistic” cultures, such as Tamil culture, “spontaneous” counterfactual questions are far rarer and in any case less compelling (Sbattella, 2020). In contexts where people believe they have less control over the antecedents of events, the sense of responsibility is weaker and feelings of guilt are less widespread. In other respects, this serenity goes hand in hand with an awareness that the course of events in a lifetime is only partly in human hands: God, nature, fate or chance play their part.

In Western culture this awareness has decidedly diminished, even though authoritative scientists keep reminding us that there is a large measure of unpredictability in life (Taleb, 2014) and that the “exact” sciences rest systematically on statistical probabilities, which are in turn founded on the assumption that chance exists and that causal processes therefore do not follow lines of deterministic necessity. It is not possible, however, to help people in Italy who are caught in the whirlpool of counterfactual thoughts without considering the role played by the cultural context in inducing and sustaining their suffering. To do so, we shall have to explore some issues in the legal field and in the mass media.

The questions asked by the direct and indirect victims of potentially traumatic events are very similar to those asked by judges and lawyers in court. With very different tools, timescales and emotions, counterfactual thoughts are developed in the legal context too, and this is no small matter if patients are also involved in some role in the legal proceedings. We might ask to what extent courtroom debates shape the priorities and reasoning styles of the people involved. In a circular way, we might also ask whether the justice system does no more than take up, and treat rigorously, counterfactual questions that belong to the human soul in certain dramatic contexts.

The fact remains that, in the Italian legal system, the use of counterfactual thinking is permitted and employed in order to attribute responsibility and, where relevant, intent or negligence. Knowing about these aspects, and about the limits that the philosophy of law itself acknowledges in these practices, is important, not least in order to support people who feel crushed by a complex and in some respects mysterious institutional machine.

It should therefore be recalled that Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Italian Penal Code states that “a person cannot be held guilty of an offence if the harmful or dangerous event on which the existence of the offence depends is not the consequence of their action or omission”. A person therefore cannot be held responsible for events that they did not cause through their actions or omissions, or that it was not in their power to prevent.

Frequently, then, the analysis of causation in law rests on counterfactual reasoning, which seeks to establish the kind of causal link connecting personal actions and events (Santoro, 2015). An initial narrative reconstruction of how the facts unfolded makes it possible to put forward hypotheses about different lines of linear causal chains and then to develop a range of different plausible hypotheses to be compared. Finally, an attempt is made to understand whether the event caused was an intended, or at least foreseeable, consequence of the conduct of the people involved.

Classically, a causal link is established if the conduct engaged in was a necessary condition, without which the harmful event would not have occurred. This is obviously a counterfactual criterion. The criterion of necessary causation sets a very strict standard for such judgements and is applied through a process of elimination: “an action is a necessary condition for an event if it cannot be mentally subtracted without the event ceasing to exist” (Santoro, 2015).

Reaching a verdict is not so simple, however, and it is no accident that it requires the integration of many analyses and points of view: the outcome of a trial is always the result of a gradual and mutual adjustment between different narratives, multiple causal explanations and differing attributions of responsibility. Legal scholars, too, recognize some limits to this way of reasoning. A broader criterion, that of necessary and sufficient causation, should be able to justify the attribution of responsibility even in cases where unintended consequences of actions are found. Examples are cases of negligent homicide, in which culpability does not depend on malicious intent (Wright, 1991). These are cases resulting from negligent, reckless or unskilful conduct. Cases of negligence and recklessness are typical situations in which this kind of reasoning is used. In such cases, the question is not so much which causal element would have made the difference had things gone otherwise. Nor is it asked whether the perpetrator had a motive for acting as they did, but rather whether the agent understood what happened as something that was in their power to prevent, and whether they were able to conceive of a reason for not carrying out that act.

In this respect, a recent ruling of the Court of Cassation is illuminating. It overturned a verdict handed down against two doctors accused of failing to make a diagnosis that might have saved a patient’s life. The expert witnesses had established that a correct diagnosis would have had a probability of more than 59% of preventing the patient’s death. The two doctors’ lawyers disputed that such a probability was enough to rule out reasonable doubt that death would have occurred anyway, given that there was at least a 41% probability of death. The Court of Cassation agreed that the existence of a causal link between the omission and the patient’s death could not be asserted with certainty. It took the opportunity to specify that, in order to make a counterfactual judgement, it is necessary to reconstruct precisely the factual sequence that led to the event and then to ask whether, assuming the required conduct had been carried out, the harmful event would or would not have been avoided. The interference of alternative intervening factors must also be ruled out. Moreover, confirmation that a causal link exists cannot be deduced from a probability estimate.

It can thus be understood that, in the legal field too, counterfactual thinking has above all a heuristic function, in the search for causes, and does not exhaust the dynamics of assessing facts and responsibilities.

These precautions in the use of the delicate counterfactual tool are generally, and deliberately, ignored by the mass media, which rarely have any qualms about raising and spreading myriad repetitive counterfactual questions. In the face of accidents, disasters and catastrophes, it is easy to engage the public by imagining counterfactual scenarios and doubts in inordinate quantities. Many trials and attributions of blame thus now take place before and outside the courtroom, without the same guarantees of fairness and logical rigour. The pattern of counterfactual reasoning is very much in fashion in these contexts, for a variety of reasons. Since its conclusions cannot be falsified, it is hard to be accused of falsehood: these are, after all, only flights of conjecture. Secondly, by denying the facts and opening up thousands of possible narratives, a broad and prolonged engagement of the public’s imagination is achieved.

Aggressive reactions towards whoever is assumed to be responsible for actions or omissions are, however, easily elicited, by encouraging the belief that every tragic event is always the result of personal intent or fault and that all human behaviour is always vigilant, conscious, informed, competent and controllable. Such basic assumptions become devastating when they are internalized and people find themselves acting as the worst possible judges of themselves.

Counterfactual questions and scientific research

To broaden the picture of the role counterfactual thinking plays in our culture, it should not be forgotten that it is also used in science and literature. Counterfactual methodologies are used, for example, to simulate organizational processes and social, economic and ecological interventions, though only after complex models of causal interdependence between the variables at play have been developed (Martini, 2006). A Nobel Prize was even awarded in 2019 to economists (Duflo and Banerjee of MIT, Kremer of Harvard) who proposed the counterfactual method as an experimental strategy for evaluating the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. In fact, the methodology used in this work involves the random assignment of comparable subjects to groups that will or will not be exposed to development aid interventions (randomized controlled trial). The results achieved by the non-exposed groups are then used (at the end of the intervention) as reference indices (benchmarks) against which to compare the results achieved by the exposed groups (Duflo, Banerjee, 2017).

In historiography too, there has been debate about whether to use counterfactual thinking as a method of historical analysis. Black and MacRaild (2007), for example, proposed developing conjectures about what did not happen, or what might have happened in certain historical periods, in order to better understand what actually happened. The counterfactual historical method seeks to explore historical accidents by identifying a timeline in which certain key historical events did not take place or had an outcome different from the one that actually occurred. Some historians consider this methodology inappropriate and unhistorical, because it starts from a denial of the facts (Tucker, 2004). Others point out that imaginative work makes it possible to create models capable of simulating dynamics and thus to gain knowledge useful for similar processes in the future (Ferguson, 2008). This approach comes close to the literary genre of speculative or hypothetical history (based on the question “What if?”), well known from the history of science fiction. On the hypothesis that world history followed paths other than the real one, the authors of these novels create fantastical narratives known as uchronias. Examples include Squire’s collection (1931), republished in Italy in 2002, and the novels The Man in the High Castle (Philip K. Dick, 1962) and The Years of Rice and Salt (Stanley Robinson, 2002). Or again, many films such as Fatherland (Menaul, 1994), 2009: Lost Memories (Si-myung, 2002) and Timequest (Dyke, 2002). The latter extend to historical events the counterfactual plots also used, for example, in Sliding Doors (Howitt, 1997) and Mr. Nobody (Dormael, 2009).

Literature and cinema are thus further sources that enrich individuals’ habit of, and capacity for, immersing themselves in the fantasies and meanders of counterfactual thinking. A conscious and critical stance towards the cultural positions that influence individuals’ ways of thinking may therefore be useful, if only to move beyond the idea that this is the only way to reason about some of life’s crucial challenges.

Psychology and counterfactual thinking

In psychology too, counterfactual thinking has been the subject of a great deal of experimental research since the 1980s. This research has sought to understand which variables influence its activation and, subsequently, what functions it performs in the dynamics of the psyche. As regards the first strand of research, light has been shed on the role played by the exceptionality or normality of events and by their controllability or uncontrollability; on the difference between counterfactual hypotheses based on antecedents of omission or of action; and on the role of temporal dimensions (Rim, Summerville, 2014). It has thus been understood, for example, that the frequency of counterfactual thoughts and the number of hypothetical scenarios generated are greater if the antecedents are more easily changeable and if the person thinks they would have had the skills to change them. Moreover, the more unexpected the event, the stronger the emotional reaction it arouses. Often, too, people question themselves more about rare and extreme events than about events of everyday life (Kahneman, Tversky, 1982), more about actions than about omissions, and more about the most recent antecedents of the event than about earlier ones in a causal chain. People tend to develop counterfactual thoughts when exceptional circumstances led to the critical event and when those circumstances could normally have been avoided. Counterfactual questions concerning one’s own behaviour seem to be more widespread than those focused on what other people could have done or not done (Milesi, 2003). Social psychologists have also studied the role of counterfactual questions and arguments in collective social contexts. In dialectics, counterfactual thinking is known as an often effective rhetorical argument, used to good effect in politics as well (Catellani, Milesi, 2011).

To complete the picture of the psychological functions of counterfactual thinking, it should be said that research has also highlighted its positive potential: as an expression of imagination, it can sometimes support creative processes and the regulation of behaviour. This happens, for example, in the case of failures in events that can be repeated, such as university exams or sports competitions. In such cases, upward counterfactual thinking can put forward hypotheses about the behaviours that could have been deployed to obtain less disappointing results. If the hypothetical scenarios are formulated additively (that is, by imagining which actions could have led to better performance), it is possible, for example, to increase the motivation to study or train harder after a defeat (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, McMullen, 1993). For this reason, counterfactual analysis is also proposed as a tool for developing learning: by imagining actions different from those that produced failures in the past, one can try to generate innovative strategies for action.

Linguistics has also made some clarifications: counterfactual thinking is expressed in sentences classified as third-type conditionals, that is, conditionals of unreality. In Italian, they are characterized by the use of the pluperfect subjunctive followed by the present conditional, se in passato avessi (o non avessi) fatto, ora sarei (o non sarei) (“if in the past I had (or had not) done, now I would (or would not) be”), or by the past conditional, se in passato avessi (o non avessi) saputo, in seguito non avrei fatto (o non fatto) (“if in the past I had (or had not) known, afterwards I would not have done (or not done)”). Implicit counterfactual thoughts also often underlie the use of adverbs such as quasi and per poco (“almost”, “nearly”), for example in statements such as “I only just managed to get in”, “I was almost within reach of success”, “I very nearly fell”.

Knowing these linguistic markers can make it easier, when listening, to identify the counterfactual thoughts that develop in conversation.

A story to conclude

To illustrate how the knowledge summarized above can be useful in a therapeutic process, we would like to conclude these reflections with the example of a historical narrative, interwoven with counterfactual questions and other questions.

It is the narrative we often use during the third phase of the protocol developed for clinical interventions in this field (Sbattella, 2021). Its concreteness and emotional intensity help to anchor reference images firmly in memory, images that are useful for activating questions other than the disturbing counterfactual ones.

“Historians tell us that during the First World War a young, stateless and homeless man named Adolf tried in every way to get himself enlisted in the Bavarian army, burning with rage and destructive desires. The young man eventually managed to be accepted as a volunteer. Adolf Hitler thus took part in the First World War as a dispatch runner, as his biography clearly documents (Weber, 2010). On 28 September 1918, during the carnage of an assault on the trench at Marcoing, on the French front, Hitler unexpectedly found himself in a shell hole facing the levelled rifle of a soldier from the assault platoon of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment (English). The young Englishman did not fire, moved to pity by the insignificant German corporal, unarmed and wounded. Perhaps it was because of this trauma that Hitler developed further delusional ideas, believing himself immortal and displaying for years, in his Eagle’s Nest, a painting of that battle. Hitler may also have used this episode for propaganda, claiming that the English were the authors of their own misfortune: had they killed him when they had the chance, the bombing of London would never have happened. It is said, moreover, that Henry Tandey, the highly decorated soldier at the centre of the episode, was traced on the initiative of Chamberlain himself and later interviewed in 1940 by a journalist from the Sunday Graphic. After the devastating German bombing of Coventry, he was asked whether, faced with that destruction, he did not regret not having killed Hitler at the time. This is how he might have answered: ‘In the heart of that battle I did what is my duty as a soldier: I fired at whoever attacked me, but I did not take the life of a defenceless man, dazed, bleeding and unarmed. If the corporal failed to draw the right lesson from that ethical act, the responsibility is his. Just as the responsibility for attacking the defenceless civilian population in our cities now is his, and his alone.’”

These episodes, verified by authoritative historians (Johnson, 2014), are considered in part an urban legend. In the therapeutic narrative, the passages in italics are certainly not historically verified: they are our own original reinterpretation of the meaning of the story. The vivid narrative for therapeutic use then continues with a postscript, intended to anchor further in patients’ memory the invitation not to spend too much time with counterfactual thinking:

“Do you think, then, that the question ‘if someone had killed Hitler when he was young, would Germany not have unleashed such a cruel war?’ made sense? Many historians believe that even without Hitler, war would have been inevitable anyway, for many reasons. Moreover, if Hitler had not risen to power (thanks also to the SS, who in 1934 carried out the bloody purge known as the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, eliminating the leadership of the SA), in the years that followed, Ernst Julius Günther Röhm, colonel general of the SA, might have done even worse (perhaps…).

Serious historians stress, however, that history is not studied with ifs and buts, and that the ditches are full of hindsight.”

Complexe Systémique: key points

The text is more an essay than a piece of research: the hypothesis of cultural variation rests on clinical experience rather than data, and the overview of law, economics, historiography and cinema is brief. Its contribution to systemic practice is nonetheless clear. It refuses to treat counterfactual rumination as a purely individual disorder: it is sustained by contexts, the trial, expert evidence, the media, and by a culture that assumes every misfortune has someone to blame and that everything could have been controlled. Questioning these shared premises, with the person and sometimes with their relatives, is therefore part of the work. Two practical tools emerge: picking up by ear the linguistic markers of the counterfactual (“if I had…”, “almost”, “nearly”), and having a strong story at hand, such as Henry Tandey’s, that puts responsibility back where it lies. That story mixes history, legend and reinterpretation, as the text openly admits: it is to be used as a metaphor, not as a history lesson. Read alongside parental guilt after the death of a child, and an endless grief in Sri Lanka.

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Unofficial English translation of Storie patogene, ragionamento controfattuale e contesto culturale allargato, by Fabio Sbattella, Connessioni, new series, no. 11 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “Storie patogene, ragionamento controfattuale e contesto culturale allargato”, published in Connessioni (2021) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Sbattella, F. (2021). Pathogenic stories, counterfactual reasoning and the wider cultural context (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/pathogenic-stories-counterfactual-reasoning-and-the-wider-cultural-context (Original work published in 2021 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 11 (2021); republished in 2021 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/storie-patogene-ragionamento-controfattuale-e-contesto-culturale-allargato/)

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