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Connessioni · History of systemic therapy

Watzlawick’s epistemology: the beginnings of systemic family therapy

What remains of Paul Watzlawick? From the Pragmatics to Change and the constructivist books, Luca Casadio rereads the work of the Mental Research Institute’s best-known author and finds a frozen clinical model: the black box, paradoxical prescriptions, reframing, control held by the therapist. Drawing on Mara Selvini Palazzoli’s criticisms and returning to Bateson, he asks what systemic practice today still owes to this epistemology.

Author Luca CasadioFirst published Connessioni, 25 April 2024Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Epistemologia Watzlawick: l’esordio sistemico-familiare, by Luca Casadio, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), “Contributi” section (2024), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs and subheadings are those of the journal; a subheading that the journal’s page shows as a bold paragraph is rendered as a subheading; quotations are translated from the Italian, except for three passages given in their original English wording (the double bind example from Bateson, Jackson, Haley and Weakland, 1956, and, from Change, the two types of change and the definition of reframing); titles of works are given as the author cites them, in their Italian editions; a few slips (proper names, numbering of the points in the conclusion) have been silently corrected; an editor’s note points out a date that does not match the article’s bibliography. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

The link between the double bind and problem solving is not Bateson’s.

Luca Casadio

Introduction

This article sets out to offer an overall assessment of the ideas and work of Paul Watzlawick, one of the leading members of the Mental Research Institute (MRI) in Palo Alto, a centre that helped to develop the first systemic techniques, both in the treatment of individuals and in that of families. The aim is to provide a general and disenchanted view, given the time that has passed, of an author of undoubted importance. And even if the systemic metaphor now seems to have had its day, it still shapes the ideas and practice of a number of authors and clinicians who, even today, call themselves “systemic”. Assessing Paul Watzlawick’s ideas will thus allow us to grasp both the roots of that way of thinking and the legacy still at work today.

A minimal biography of Paul Watzlawick

Paul Watzlawick was born in Villach, Austria, in 1921, into a wealthy family. He studied philosophy in Venice and, after graduating, trained in 1954 at the Carl Jung Institute in Zurich as a Jungian therapist, although he never developed that expertise in depth. He then continued his studies in El Salvador until 1959, when he moved to the United States, to Palo Alto, California, where, thanks to Donald Jackson (who had already worked with Gregory Bateson on the studies of schizophrenia), he found a position at the MRI, where he would work for more than forty years.

Again briefly, let us recall that Don Jackson founded the MRI in 1959 “with the declared aim of studying and formalizing a method of family therapy” (Bertrando, Toffanetti 2000, p. 111) and so as not to lose the wealth of ideas of the Bateson group.

The institute’s first staff consisted of Don Jackson, Virginia Satir (who later left the group) and Jules Riskin. Watzlawick himself would join them.

The debt to Bateson’s theory of the double bind is obvious, though not to Bateson’s ideas in general, as we shall see. In this regard, it should be remembered that Bateson’s appointment at Palo Alto ended in 1962. From that date on, there were no further exchanges either with Watzlawick or with the centre’s other therapists, even though Bateson’s contribution on schizophrenia is often confused with the MRI, merging the two separate projects into a fanciful but entirely non-existent Palo Alto School.

At the MRI, Watzlawick followed in the footsteps of Jackson, Weakland and Haley, producing a number of writings (which we will consider here as a whole). He died in 2006, aged 85, of cardiac arrest. But to begin analysing the texts of the Austrian-born therapist, we need to anchor ourselves to a starting point. That starting point can be found in the double bind model, introduced by Bateson and his colleagues in the second half of the 1950s.

Gregory Bateson and the double bind: Verso una teoria della schizofrenia (1956)

This article, written by the so-called Bateson group (made up of Gregory Bateson, Don Jackson, Jay Haley and John Weakland), is a milestone of the systemic-relational perspective. It must be remembered, however, that Bateson, an anthropologist, an expert in biology and the father of systemic thinking, came to this point after a long project of research, observation and reflection on so-called mental illness (which also included play, humour, learning, etc.). The study was based on the analysis of communication and of relational patterns, both in ordinary situations and within families with a member diagnosed with schizophrenia (the so-called identified patients).

The group’s reference theories are Russell and Whitehead’s theory of logical types, the theory of social learning (and later of deutero-learning, introduced by the English anthropologist himself) and logical paradoxes. From the interaction among these different ideas, considered from a relational perspective and in line with systems theory (see Telfener, Casadio 2001), there emerged a series of insights useful for finding one’s way in the tangled world of the psychoses. Bateson and his colleagues identified a whole range of communicative contexts in which people have to manage a plurality of logical types. In this way, the identified patient shows an evident difficulty in understanding the messages (verbal and non-verbal) that he or she receives (especially from people with whom there are stable and significant relationships) and that he or she sends. Indeed, it can be said that, from the perspective opened by Bateson, the person with schizophrenia uses unlabeled metaphors (that is, metaphors without a shared context), which leads to confusing the metaphorical and the literal meaning. Hence the symptoms.

If these hypotheses make sense, the cause of psychosis is not to be sought in generic traumatic experiences lived through by the person, perhaps at an early age, but in “structures of characteristic sequences in which the subject is immersed”, which are learned (or deutero-learned) until they become habitual.

Having identified the basic features of psychotic thinking, the group goes on to describe the double bind (or double tie), a concept coined on precisely this occasion. For Bateson, the double bind represents the basic communicative pattern of schizophrenic families. Here is an example: “A young man who had fairly well recovered from an acute schizophrenic episode was visited in the hospital by his mother. He was glad to see her and impulsively put his arm around her shoulders, whereupon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and she asked, ‘Don’t you love me any more?’ He then blushed, and she said, ‘Dear, you must not be so easily embarrassed and afraid of your feelings.’ The patient was able to stay with her only a few minutes more and following her departure he assaulted an aide and was put in the tubs” (1956, p. 262).

This type of communication is made up of at least two injunctions (often one behavioural and highly emotional, the other verbal) that contradict each other, and of a third communication that prevents the person from metacommunicating (and thus from escaping the intrinsic contradiction between the terms) or from leaving the field. All this leads the person into an undecidable position. As Bateson and his colleagues add: “We put forward the hypothesis that, whenever an individual is in a double bind situation, his ability to discriminate between logical types collapses” (1956, p. 252), thus linking relational patterns and mental processes, or rather their impasse.

Repeated exposure to double bind situations ends up producing helplessness, fear, exasperation and rage. Because: “If an individual does not know what kind of message a message is, he may defend himself with attitudes that have been described as paranoid, hebephrenic or catatonic” (1956, p. 256).

Psychosis thus comes to be seen not as a lack or a distortion, but as a type of communication and also as an adaptation to a context, the family context, which is dysfunctional and paradoxical.

Verso una teoria della schizofrenia had an enormous impact in psychology and psychiatry and in effect opened the door to family-based intervention even in cases of psychosis: an intervention able to deal with the paradoxical communication typical of these families and the invalidations it entails. It must be added, however, that Bateson did not look kindly on the idea of introducing a new form of therapy (at least not at that stage of the research), still less a therapy based on the concept of power, and that the decision to move onto the clinical level, taken by the other members of the group (Don Jackson in primis), sealed a break that led him to distance himself from the world of psychotherapy and treatment (though not from reflection on these themes). Despite this painful divorce, the systemic approach to psychosis did not stop there; quite the contrary. It should also be remembered that Bateson’s work does not end with this contribution: his ideas range across many fields of human communication and relationships. These are studies and explorations that Watzlawick and the other MRI authors did not, in fact, pursue. But let us now turn to the writings of Paul Watzlawick, which, as you will see, are based on the concept of the double bind.

Paul Watzlawick’s contributions: La pragmatica della comunicazione umana (1967)

In 1967, Paul Watzlawick, Don Jackson and Janet Beavin (of the MRI) published La pragmatica della comunicazione umana, a book that acts as a veritable collector of ideas. This is because the volume sets out to systematize the knowledge acquired until then about communication and information, in order to transfer it to the field of psychotherapy.

It is no accident that the book opens with some reflections on “context”, a central concept in the systemic perspective, which, according to the authors, explains many human behaviours. Thus, in keeping with von Bertalanffy’s observations, if you isolate the subject, you study his or her “nature” (often ineffable); if instead you place the subject in context, you study his or her interactions, the communication with the other elements of that context.

The heart of these arguments, as the title itself says, concerns the pragmatics of human communication and “pathological” behaviour. By pragmatics is meant the assessment of how “communication affects behaviour” (Watzlawick, Beavin, Jackson 1967, p. 15). From this point of view, communication and behaviour become practically synonymous. The aim is to bring psychology, still “monadic” in those years (consider Freud’s theory and his concept of “psychic energy”), into the ranks of the systemic disciplines. And to do this, a new point of view has to be opened up, moving from energy to communication: a point of view in which the concept of “feedback” becomes central, since it makes it possible to go beyond linear cause-and-effect logic and investigate the reciprocal effects of interacting subjects. This introduces a “circular logic”.

To put it in a nutshell: “negative” feedback leads the system to a steady state, homeostasis, while “positive” feedback brings about change or the loss of that equilibrium.

“Redundancy” and “metacommunication”, as well as “equifinality”, are further key concepts of the systemic perspective, to be applied to psychopathology.

But at this point the first standpoint the authors adopt is the one that equates the mind with a “black box”. This is not a neutral move. It is a concept that Watzlawick would never again abandon throughout his career.

According to the authors, this concept has evident advantages, since “we do not need to resort to any intrapsychic hypothesis (which is fundamentally unverifiable) and can limit ourselves to observing input-output relations, that is, communication” (1967, p. 37).

On reflection, however, we can say that instead of offering a way beyond certain “monadic” models, the text ends up creating an opposition: interactions versus individual ideas (cognitions, emotions, expectations). And the use of the “black box” (born in an engineering context and later used in behaviourism) does not allow the authors to understand people’s ideas as the product of an exchange between different systems in an environment (that is, from a “systemic” perspective). These aspects are simply excluded from any further reasoning: a veritable amputation.

And once the ideas, emotions and expectations of the people themselves have been discarded, all that remains is behaviour, as an observable event.

As it goes on, the book sets out a long list, that of the axioms of communication, such as the impossibility of not communicating, certainly the most famous of all. But let us also recall the distinction between content and relationship levels, the punctuation of the sequence of events (that is, how a person segments these circular chains into cause-and-effect parts, often triads), digital and analogic communication and, finally, complementary and symmetrical interactions, taken directly from the work of Gregory Bateson (1972).

This mass of concepts and models is then poured into “pathological communication”. In this way, the Pragmatica constitutes a kind of “systemic grammar” of the time, used as the basic theory for approaching families with “identified patients”, above all patients with schizophrenia. A grammar that returns to paradox (as Bateson had already done) both as a source of relational impasse (and hence of pathology) and as a source of cure, following the motto similia similibus curantur.

All this makes it possible to define schizophrenia as the outcome of a relational pattern, which in effect creates a communicative paradox from which the members of the family cannot escape (or on which they cannot metacommunicate).

And here is a first interesting clinical consideration: according to the authors, therapists must play the role of outsider (“outside the family rules”, p. 232), a point of view that Watzlawick would maintain in his later work as well. Only in this way, in fact, does the author believe it possible to break the family rules and transform the communication taking place.

From this perspective, paradox represents the nerve centre of clinical intervention: an intervention that is an alternative both to the gaining of awareness (insight) of psychoanalysis and to certain linear forms (which promote direct, informative change), aimed at the family’s acquisition of predetermined skills or at the achievement of particular behaviours.

But to be effective, the therapeutic paradox must appear different from the family’s communications. So the intervention of choice will be to prescribe the symptom itself (playing on whether or not the behaviour is spontaneous), placing the family members inside another paradox, this time a therapeutic one. Indeed, “If the madman is taught how to enact his symptom and if, in the act of enacting it, the patient discovers that he can free himself of it, then in our view the result is practically equivalent to the insight of classical psychoanalysis, even though it may seem that no insight has been gained. But in real life the ever-present phenomenon of change is very rarely accompanied by insight; most of the time people change without knowing why” (1967, p. 235).

The volume closes with examples of paradoxical techniques, although this paradoxical therapy ends up appearing mechanical and repetitive, as well as hardly participatory. Because it in fact avoids understanding the patients’ behaviour and ends up being exhausted in changing the ways (of the individual or of the family) of facing their difficulties. It is an intervention that can ensure short treatments (ten sessions at most) and, at times, surprising results.

Change (1974)

The next volume, by Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch, sets out to present the ideas and techniques of the MRI as well as of one of its offshoots, the Brief Therapy Center, founded in 1967.

It is a veritable manifesto: the manifesto of how problems are formed and resolved. It is no accident that the volume is devoted to “change and persistence […] in human affairs in general” (1974, p. 12), and more precisely to change that is “unexpected and irrational”.

The main interest is in processes rather than contents, in the here and now of the relationship rather than in the past or in the causes that brought about the problem. As Watzlawick writes: “communication is seen not only as the vehicle, not only as the manifestation, but as a more complete concept of what is often vaguely summed up by the idea of interaction” (in Watzlawick, ed. Nardone and Ray, 2007, p. 107).

The debt to Milton Erickson (as well as to Bateson), the famous American hypnotist (who wrote the preface), and to his techniques of active manipulation is evident.

In this regard it may be useful to recall the 1982 article Il contributo di Erickson alla prospettiva interazionale della psicoterapia (in Watzlawick 2007, ed. Nardone and Ray), on paradoxical injunctions and prescriptions. These prescriptions follow the idea that “action precedes understanding” (2007, p. 194).

Thus, to reach a different understanding of their problem, patients have to be led to try out new attempts. The authors themselves describe this practice as manipulative, expressly devoted to overcoming symptoms. They thus propose a “behaviour therapy” that takes no interest whatsoever in the ideas, inclinations, history and emotions experienced by the individual or the family. The authors are not interested in the world of their patients; their sole interest is in the impasse these patients are experiencing, following the motto: “The problem is the attempted solution.”

There are two theoretical references: Evariste Galois’s theory of groups and Whitehead and Russell’s theory of logical types, which we have already mentioned. Both theories are expressly cited in metaphorical terms. And the combination of the two theories also brings out, according to the authors, two types of change: “one that occurs within a given system which itself remains unchanged, and one whose occurrence changes the system itself” (1974, p. 27), the latter being a type of change that involves paradoxes, logical breaks and epistemological leaps.

First-order change thus risks not really changing the situation, proving homeostatic in Ashby’s or Cannon’s sense, without modifying the broader relational game. Only the second type of change, at a higher logical level, is what the authors are after, precisely because it can bring about significant variations in the person and in his or her way of experiencing relationships with others.

The authors further hypothesize that paradoxical communication concerns not only schizophrenia but all disturbed communication, characterized by illogicality and paradox, thereby extending Bateson’s reflections to the whole of psychopathology. The end result is a pragmatic volume built on very brief examples, often just two lines long. After all, what interests clinicians is changing the type of solutions attempted. Nothing more.

The use of the one-way mirror and the intercom (no longer in use today) emerged precisely in this period, marking control over the patient as well as over the team itself. It was a practice that characterized an entire era of systemic family therapy. In short, the whole volume advances one thesis: the classical psychotherapies, and psychoanalysis in particular, are based on the search for the why of a particular behaviour, dealing with the patient’s past. In so doing, for Watzlawick, one tries to explain the disorder rather than modify it. Taking an interest in the how, on the other hand, can reveal the person’s attempts to solve his or her difficulties and to create, when these attempts fail in turn, the problem. A position Watzlawick would hold throughout his life.

In this volume, Watzlawick also takes up the concept of the black box once again: an approach based on how and not on why problems have been defined. Although, looking more closely, one could say that by using the concept of the black box, factors internal to the system itself (expectations, emotions, ideas, etc.) are in fact not considered, importance being given only to the system’s output. A purely behaviourist outlook.

Moreover, this approach rests explicitly on the patients’ trust in the clinicians. Total trust. This is because the basic technique is reframing. The most immediate example is that of the travelling salesman who stammers and suffers from this impediment. By way of response, the authors claim that this defect actually gives him a great advantage, because everyone listens to him and everyone respects his efforts. Once the problem has been reframed in this way, the intervention is over.

Thus, “To reframe, then, means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally well or even better, and thereby changes its entire meaning” (Watzlawick, Nardone, eds., 1997, p. 114, taken from Change).

It is curious that this definition rests on precisely those aspects that, with the concept of the black box, are never taken into account, which reveals an evident epistemological confusion. In any case, the intervention is always conceived as problem solving: a solution worked out and communicated by the therapist as a practical instruction to be carried out, a behavioural prescription (the original feature of this model).

In this way everything is in the therapist’s hands, and the therapist must always keep control over the patients. The patients, in fact, are not told the reasons for these prescriptions (indeed, it is better that they “remain obscure”), thus avoiding working together with them. The therapist simply knows what to do, and the patient’s only task is to put the given prescriptions into practice.

But if this is the basic idea, we might ask: where is the relationship? The very relationship the authors themselves describe as central. Where is understanding? Empathy? Where is the joint creation of meaning?

All these elements are in fact bypassed by the MRI authors, in favour of a change directed from outside, which always remains, no matter what, under the clinician’s control. To conclude: one clearly perceives Watzlawick’s enthusiasm for the new ideas of cybernetics and perhaps, who knows, his good faith as well, even though the intervention proposed remains uncritical and fideistic towards ideas that have yet to be verified clinically.

Il linguaggio del cambiamento (1977)

The next contribution ideally sets out to fill a gap: the one left by the lack of a clinical theory able to guide the intervention itself. An intervention that, after all, was always proposed in the same way, “manipulative and strategic”, even twenty years after Bateson’s famous article on the double bind.

The book deals with two different forms of language: one abstract, the other metaphorical. The author’s intention seems to be to define “a grammar of the right hemisphere” (1977, p. 53).

This idea has immediate clinical implications. Indeed, “the existence of these two ‘languages’ suggests that they must correspond to two fundamentally different images of the world, since it is well known that a language does not mirror reality but rather creates a reality” (1977, p. 24).

Two different languages, but also two different codes, the digital and the analogic, as Bateson had already pointed out (1972). Indeed, in the (laboratory) cases reported in the text, in which the right hemisphere could inhibit the activity of the left, responses appeared that were “archaic, metaphorical, impulsive, illogical, in a word: psychotic” (1977, p. 43).

Conversely, dominance of the left hemisphere can lead to inhibited, cold, hyper-rational behaviour, which Watzlawick himself links to neurotic behaviour and to the process of “dissociation” described in the early 1900s by Pierre Janet.

The link with psychopathology is clear. In short, the whole of psychopathology is seen in the light of cerebral dominance. The main problem, however, is that this theory in fact follows practice, which for Watzlawick is exactly that of the Pragmatica and of Change, made up of paradoxes, the overcoming of symptoms, prescriptions and reframing. Nothing is changed.

The activities of the right and left hemispheres allow Watzlawick to set aside, for the moment, the sterile concept of the black box and to attempt a description of mental processes (a step into cognitivism).

This was a change of course made mostly in response to certain criticisms. And perhaps also in response to the publication of Bateson’s 1976 book, which dealt precisely with the relationship between analogic and digital codes. Indeed, as Watzlawick writes: “Many researchers and clinicians who otherwise regarded the Pragmatica della comunicazione very favourably were somewhat bothered by the fact that it apparently remained ‘on the surface’, since it regarded the psyche as a black box whose inner workings were not immediately known, but which could be studied only on the basis of so-called input and output relations” (1977, p. 43).

So, albeit in a not particularly convincing way, and perhaps even reluctantly, Il linguaggio del cambiamento seems to be looking for an alternative to the black box (too meagre for a systemic theory). It is no accident that in those same years the Socrates of systems, Heinz von Foerster, was also calling for “a theory of the observer” (1977, p. 50), as Watzlawick himself reports in the text.

Watzlawick gets out of this impasse in a simple way: “learning the language of the right hemisphere” or, in the therapeutic dialogue, bringing about “the blocking of the left hemisphere”, as Milton Erickson had already done years before, thus returning to the starting point.

In this way, the patient (or the family) is given paradoxical prescriptions capable of inhibiting precisely the rational part. A solution that certainly does not resolve the theoretical aporias. Not least because the attempt to provide a cerebral theory would remain a unicum. The volume thus ends up highlighting the author’s own difficulties with the relationship between theory and practice. But it does so, as usual, by shifting the reader’s interest to the methods of intervention, to the techniques used. What is missing is precisely a creative relationship between theory and practice. A relationship that, in Watzlawick, seems instead to be blocked, with techniques defined a priori and never modified, and theoretical models that thus end up becoming mere labels.

Watzlawick and constructivist therapy: La realtà della realtà (1976), La realtà inventata (1981), Il codino del Barone di Munchhausen (1988), Terapia breve strategica (1997)

We have grouped these different texts in a single section because they all deal with the same theme: constructivism, and how the constructivist point of view can transform psychotherapy.

But before going into detail, the very concept of constructivism needs clarifying. And to do this, we have to spell out what can be meant by the term “reality”.

One way of thinking might regard “reality” as given, and thus merely to be “discovered”, and human beings (the observer, the scientist, the ordinary person), with all the technologies at their disposal, as capable of grasping that “reality”. This point of view can be called “realism”.

At the opposite end, one can think that perception (with every possible aid) fails to grasp any general pattern, and that what we call “reality” is in fact “constructed” (or “invented”) by the subject (or by the scientific community) through its own actions. This point of view can be called “constructivism”.

And it is precisely this point of view that Watzlawick defends in all these volumes, written at different historical moments and with different structures (single works or collections of articles). The author’s effort concerns how a person, or a family, constructs its own “reality”. This happens through punctuation (already described in the Pragmatica), always within the more complex process of communication between people or social groups.

And it is precisely from this constructed “reality” that difficulties arise, which, through the attempts to overcome these obstacles, in fact create “the problems”, the ones the therapist finds in the consulting room.

This “epistemological revolution”, however, does not alter the proposed clinical approach one iota. From Change, in 1974, to Terapia breve strategica (edited by Watzlawick and Nardone), in 1997, by way of the Codino or La realtà inventata, the same recipe is always worked out: a pinch of “constructivism” (or, if preferred, of “hemispheric dominance”), a bed of paradoxes (increasingly in the background), Erickson’s inevitable hypnotherapeutic contribution and, finally, reframing (paradoxical, ideally).

What is astonishing is that in forty years of career Watzlawick’s clinical contribution never moved one iota, always proposing the same techniques. In this way, the ideas he promotes amount to an interesting reflection on “reality”, but they are then used as “a crowbar” (the author’s term) to prise open the classical theories (both of linear reality and of so-called “ordinary science”).

Having closed the parenthesis on constructivism and on “constructivist” therapy, all that remains is to read between the lines of these volumes. In La realtà inventata, for example, one chapter strikes us: Le profezie che si autodeterminano, written by Watzlawick himself. It is a central concept, particularly relevant also in building the ethos of the “systemic” therapist.

Let us briefly recall that the self-fulfilling prophecy is an idea introduced into sociology by Robert Merton in 1948, defined as “a supposition or prophecy that, simply by having been uttered, brings about the presumed, expected or predicted event, thus confirming its own truthfulness” (in Watzlawick, ed., 1981, but also Watzlawick, Nardone, eds., 1997, p. 13).

The most immediate example concerns a “real” event that occurred in 1979, when some Californian newspapers began to spread information about a possible reduction in petrol supplies, starting from the hypothesis of an Arab oil embargo on the part of the US government. In short, following these articles, Californians stormed the petrol stations, which helped to exhaust the available fuel resources, in effect causing the very shortage that had been mentioned.

According to Watzlawick, this prediction had the power to “unhinge normal causal thinking”. Indeed: “The shortage would never have occurred if the mass media had not predicted it” (1981, ed. Watzlawick, p. 88). Although he provides no evidence for this.

Moreover, it must be said that the example itself is described by the author with an evident causal chain (newspaper predictions → behaviour of Californians → fuel crisis). Certainly, the final result was not foreseeable… but by whom? By public opinion? By the newspapers? By the Californians themselves? By Watzlawick and the MRI?

What is certain is that the prediction, together with other factors (let us not forget), would have caused a “real” crisis. This, if we think about it, would undermine linear causality only if we consider the whole affair at an abstract logical level. That is: can a “false” assertion (or one not, for the moment, supported by evidence) create “real” repercussions? Or, as Watzlawick says, “the solution gives rise to the problem”, reversing the cause-and-effect relationship (1981, ed. Watzlawick, p. 89).

Read in other ways, however, this conclusion is not at all surprising: it is a perfectly ordinary causal chain. Something might run short and everybody rushes to stock up on it. Nothing strange or revolutionary. So we might ask: what would the self-fulfilling prophecy demonstrate?

It shows that, at times, phenomena may occur that go beyond social expectations or that even seem entirely unpredictable a priori (provided that a series of social processes, both communicative and based on “real” exchanges, take hold). Nothing strange in this either. Moreover, several limitations must also be remembered. Indeed, as the author himself writes: “only a few prophecies are self-fulfilling [few], and the examples given can explain why. Only when a prophecy is believed, that is, when it is seen in the future as a fact that has, so to speak, already happened, can it have concrete effects on the present and thereby fulfil itself. Where the element of faith, or conviction, is missing, the effect is missing too” (1981, Watzlawick, ed., pp. 90-91).

But I would also add the exact opposite: one can put together the best of all possible expectations, the most credible, and yet the prophecy does not come true for all that. Making predictions, as we know, very often means getting them wrong.

But Watzlawick does not stop at defending this thesis; he ends up making a real promise. A promise, moreover, that is particularly ambitious. Because the conclusion he reaches, though I do not know how deliberately, itself ends up fulfilling a self-fulfilling prophecy, in a perfect vicious circle. As Watzlawick writes: “Rosenhan’s contribution in this volume [Essere sani in posti insani, ed.] brings to light the disturbing possibility that at least some of the so-called mental disorders are pure inventions [does it really bring this to light?] and that psychiatric institutions contribute to the conviction of those realities which at the time are supposed to be treated” (1981, Watzlawick, ed., p. 95, our brackets).

And then, in the conclusion, he projects these considerations into the future, quite rashly, I would say: “The examples seem sufficient: self-fulfilling prophecies are therefore phenomena that not only shake our individual conception of reality to its foundations [???], but can also call into question the worldview of science” (Watzlawick 1981, ed., p. 100, our brackets). Are we really sure about that?

Let us simply recall that all theories, more or less consciously, have always stressed the conviction that applying their precepts (or their new ideas) would revolutionize the world (of science, of care, of mental illness, etc.). One need only glance at the history of psychoanalysis, but also at that of behaviourism, etc. The same process also occurs in the field of “hard” science, as, for example, with the mapping of DNA.

The well-known biologist Richard Lewontin (1991) showed how, even before the mapping of DNA (an operation that cost more than the Shuttle programme as a whole), many authors assumed that, once this goal had been reached, a cure would be found for psychiatric illnesses, as well as for a great many neurological and neurodegenerative diseases.

In short, in the history of science, emerging theories tend to present themselves as self-fulfilling prophecies, helping to create a mythology around themselves, a positive aura. Ideas that, over time, can nevertheless be assessed more calmly. Because, let it be clear, optimism too has its limits.

The most curious thing, however, is that the self-fulfilling prophecy seems to have influenced not so much the scientific worldview as the attitude of “systemic” therapists. Indeed, even today it is easy to observe a host of therapists who display, like a tic, absolute optimism about the therapies they are conducting (while often maintaining in private that they do not work).

What is more, these therapists expressly ask their clients to be equally “positive”, even going so far as to “scold” them for their pessimism. This, indeed, is a violation of cause-and-effect logic, in effect pursuing a way of thinking that could not be more linear and consequential. From sometimes, and under certain circumstances, it can happen… one moves to it always happens (a right-hemisphere reading, I would say). No small logical leap.

In this way, the power of the strategic therapist, his or her charisma, the one-up position or positive connotation (which we will discuss further on), as theorized by Watzlawick, seem to have stuck to modern “systemic” therapists like a tattoo. To which must be added a total reluctance to take diagnostic labels into consideration (the only exception: Ugazio 1998), as Watzlawick’s example clearly shows.

The reflections we are putting forward, let it be clear, do not concern the theme of constructivism, which the present writer also shares, but rather the excessive faith of Watzlawick and his colleagues in a scientistic and reductionist approach. They seem, in fact, to take fragments from a complex theoretical framework and then turn them into clinical convictions that are never again called into question. In this way, the MRI proposal ends up being embodied exclusively in problem solving and in a scaffolding of behaviourist stamp (centred on the concept of the black box); in the (yet to be verified) power of reframing and of self-fulfilling prophecies.

Rather than relying on the possibility of constructing a “reality” (emotional, narrative, relational) together with the patient, Watzlawick relies on external influence, that of the outsider, which we have already discussed: on the clinician’s ability to “perturb” the system without actually being part of it (for fear of “parentifications”, of “resistances”).

Indeed, in Il codino del Barone di Munchhausen too, Watzlawick writes: “The task of effective therapy is to introduce such rules (rules for changing one’s own rules, ed.) into the system from outside” (1988, p. 30, our brackets).

In this view, the therapist does not take part in the communication but “introduces his own rules from outside” (ibidem). Here is the heart of Watzlawick’s model, his clinical epistemology. A model that is certainly coherent, monolithic, I would say, impervious to the theoretical changes of a good forty years.

Mara Selvini Palazzoli’s criticisms

Very important are the criticisms levelled at Watzlawick, and at the MRI, by other “systemic” authors, such as those put forward by Mara Selvini Palazzoli against the strategic outlook. For reasons of space, I will consider only the words of this author, but the examples could be very numerous.

In the book I giochi psicotici nella famiglia, published in 1988, after more than a decade in which the Milan team had used paradoxical techniques, Mara Selvini Palazzoli takes stock of her own path. It is a rigorous assessment, which we report here in very brief summary (we refer readers to the first chapters).

The first of these points concerns the relationship with systems theory. Mara Selvini stresses that “The failure of all attempts to colonize the human sciences with models drawn from the physical sciences is an accepted historical fact. And the biological-organismic analogies, by which I was so attracted in the past, also had misleading aspects” (1988, p. XV).

It is important to grasp the timing: already in 1988 (36 years ago), it was impossible for the Milanese therapist to define the MRI’s strategic approach as systemic. “An accepted historical fact.”

Mara Selvini’s need to move beyond cybernetic and systemic models is glaring. And, among other things, she seems to scale back both the multidisciplinary outlook and the inductive method proposed by Gregory Bateson.

In a nutshell, we might say that in the initial phase of a research path, analogies borrowed from the sciences, such as systemic ones, can certainly prove useful, if not necessary: they create analogies to reflect upon, fresh metaphors. But as the field of inquiry (or the clinical approach) deepens, these basic metaphors must of necessity be integrated with a body of knowledge proper to the discipline itself. If this does not happen, all that remains is colonization. And that is exactly what Mara Selvini denounces.

As a second point, we might take up the theme of positive connotation, a strictly clinical theme. Again according to Mara Selvini: “The very idea of the positive connotation of the behaviour of all the members of the family arose above all as an instrument for controlling the therapy and as a defence for the therapist” (1988, p. 6).

No small observation. Indeed, as Mara Selvini writes a little further on: “Positive connotation […] arises in the first place from the need to avoid unpleasant and counterproductive clashes” (ibidem). This was its only aim.

Combining the theme of positive connotation with paradoxical interventions, we can add that, to the Milan team, the very interventions of Paradosso e controparadosso appeared to be “interpretations of why the patient developed symptoms. They are, as is well known, relational redefinitions of the symptom as protective/sacrificial behaviour on the part of the patient on behalf of other family members” (1988, p. 7).

These conclusions entirely transcend the antinomy proposed by Watzlawick, why versus how, proposing instead a systemic hypothesis (a note of meaning inside the family’s black box). From its very first approaches, then, the Milan team had no intention of stopping at the concept of the black box and at the here and now of the relationship, but showed an interest in a historical description of families (the couple’s problems and then the children’s entry into them, creating precisely the family “games”).

Unlike the MRI, for Mara Selvini and her colleagues even strategic interventions served to develop both historical and present-day hypotheses about the family itself. Without forbidding themselves, moreover, to work on the emotions of the various family members and also on their “unconscious” intentions. In short, a project far more complex than that of the MRI, which includes modelling the family and developing entirely new concepts and maps.

Obviously, to talk about the “unconscious” one needs a model of the unconscious (see Casadio 2018), especially after the criticisms levelled at the Freudian model. But the MRI outlook, perhaps out of consistency with the idea of not investigating the why or the history of a system, never proposed a model of emotions or of other mental processes, but only a series of examples and techniques (always the same ones). And in so doing it arrives at the paradox of talking about emotions without ever providing a model of emotions. Here too we glimpse a salient trait of “systemic” authors, allergic to creating models (as Bateson, by contrast, did quite comfortably). And so, even today, we see “conversations”, “dialogue” or even “emotions” flourishing, without these processes ever being defined. As if, unwittingly, modern “systemic” practitioners were still embracing the idea of the black box.

But Mara Selvini Palazzoli’s criticisms also touch on Watzlawick’s pragmatic approach. It is no accident that she writes: “The emphasis on pragmatic effects, however, led to a fall into systemic-holistic reductionism: from the exclusive interest in intra-individual causes […] there was in fact a shift to an exclusive interest in pragmatic effects, seen as indicators of supposed needs of the system (first and foremost the overused concept of homeostasis)” (1988, p. 9).

In short, always the same “error”. And regarding reframing, the technique par excellence according to Watzlawick, Mara Selvini asks whether it is a provocation or an interpretation. For the Milanese therapist: “Within the team it had been thought that paradoxical reframing worked for the identified patient as a provocation capable of driving him, in a surge of anger, to change. Yet for many years, because of the religious acceptance of the taboo of the black box, which forbade intrapsychic hypotheses, the team did not dare say so” (ibidem). This highlights the team’s “loyalty” to Watzlawick’s ideas, preferring to remain in doubt rather than break the taboo of the black box.

And so we come to the therapeutic results, the real strength of the model of Watzlawick and his colleagues, always praised as fast and effective. As Mara Selvini Palazzoli recalls, once some time had passed since the beginnings, therapeutic results became “far less comforting and short-lived”, with numerous relapses. This happened, according to the Milanese therapist, because of the stereotyped nature of the interpretation (that of sacrifice), which made every intervention routine and predictable. And, I would add, terribly boring for the clinicians themselves.

The logical conclusion was that “Selvini Palazzoli and Prata, after the split in the team, […] staked everything on experimenting with a prescriptive strategy, gradually abandoning the use of paradoxical reframings” (1988, p. 13).

The technique of therapeutic paradoxes is thus superseded in favour of a therapy more fully shared with the family (though still prescriptive), based on the search for and knowledge of the meanings of the family itself and of the different points of view of its members (the study of relational games).

With all these changes and clinical rethinkings, very little remains of the contribution of Watzlawick and his colleagues: a few techniques, lacking, however, any basic “culture” from which to develop new practices and new ideas. New ideas that would arise only once systemic colonization had been overcome, and necessarily by going beyond paradoxical outlooks.

Towards a broader idea of the double bind and of schizophrenic communication

Well, at this point we can ask whether the MRI model really constitutes the clinical translation of Gregory Bateson’s model of schizophrenia.

As we have already said, in Watzlawick’s clinical model Bateson’s ideas seem entirely subordinate to Milton Erickson’s hypnotic techniques. This is because they are in effect absorbed into a series of techniques based exclusively on solving problems. As if Watzlawick had taken Bateson’s theoretical premises but placed them in a clinical context of a hypnotherapeutic kind.

Several times in his work, in fact, Bateson stressed that paradoxical communications had been used by psychoanalysts or psychiatrists in the past in conversational contexts (and not in problem solving). Moreover, he concludes the famous 1956 article with a demonstration of a therapeutic double bind carried out by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, a cultural psychoanalyst.

The link between the double bind and problem solving is not Bateson’s.

And so it may be useful to turn to a small volume, also published by Bateson in 1956: a little book devoted to the theme of play, in which the English epistemologist describes some interesting interactions with patients with schizophrenia whom he himself met at the veterans’ hospital in Palo Alto. Let us look at one of them. According to a patient’s suppositions: “his story began in China, where he built the Great Wall. Then he crossed the Pacific in a rowing boat, landing in Seattle, and from there he walked to California, where he was ‘befriended’ by his professed parents, that is, ‘adopted’ or something of the sort” (Bateson 1956 II, p. 61).

That said, Bateson tries to talk about the patient’s childhood and his relationship with his “parents”. The answer is clear: “The Chinese Wall is terribly solid to break into pieces” (ibidem). Indeed, the English epistemologist comments: “If we start talking too literally, [the patient] raises the barrier again instead, as if to tell me why he raised it in the first place. The point is that the Chinese Wall is not only between him and his parents, but also between him and me, and the use of metaphor is an element of this barrier between us” (ibidem, our brackets).

What is particularly interesting in these examples is Bateson’s ability to “enter” certain metaphors, to share them with the patient, not by proposing counterparadoxes but by helping to reveal the meaning of the metaphors themselves, metaphors that lie at the root of the patients’ “delusions”.

The path is clear: from an obscure and impenetrable exchange one moves to a “game for two”, a shared game. As Bateson argues: “The use of this play on words has now become a different type of game from before. Between us, Manzanita [the basic metaphor of another patient] has become a statement that no longer means ‘I know how to fool you, Mr. Bateson’, but rather ‘this is something we both understand’. And so the situation has been turned upside down” (1956, p. 65, our brackets).

In this way Bateson proves to be far richer than the reductions carried out by Watzlawick and the MRI. Moreover, the English epistemologist proposed, in his reflections, several meanings of the double bind, which the Palo Alto therapists did not grasp at all. By following Bateson, the MRI authors could have proposed a setting not focused exclusively on manipulation and problem solving, but capable of fostering a creative exchange, a metaphorical and communicative game.

And one last observation: throughout his long and varied career Bateson always proposed models, theorizations concerning ideas (of the individual in a context), expectations, emotions, whether individual or collective. Once again, we can see how Watzlawick could have rejected “control” and “power” but did not do so, remaining bound (doubly) to a manipulative conception of the intervention itself. Something which, incidentally, cost him his “real” relationship with Gregory Bateson.

Conclusions: Watzlawick and the crisis of the systemic outlook

At the end of this long rereading of Paul Watzlawick’s texts, we can offer some conclusions, which, for the sake of brevity, I will set out point by point.

1) The systemic model and the “black box”: in his writings, Watzlawick repeatedly discusses the concept of the black box, always linking it to a clinical datum: investigating how the patient’s problem arose rather than why (as classical psychoanalysis would do instead). And yet Watzlawick’s own work extends well beyond the 1980s, well beyond, that is, the moment when the black box model ceases to be credible and the need arises instead to study the patients’ motivations, emotions and ideas.

But, more astonishing still, the concept of the black box is called into question, from the epistemological point of view, even by the authors whom Watzlawick himself cites in his volumes (Heinz von Foerster and Francisco Varela in primis). How could he not have noticed this?

Even more surprising is the fact that, in Watzlawick’s texts, the overcoming of the concept of the black box is discussed only by Martin Wainstein (in Watzlawick, Nardone, eds., 1997), and in a rather clumsy way. He argues that, as others did before him, once the black box conception has been left behind, one comes to envisage an exchange between equals in therapy. Thus necessarily returning to Bateson, but having lost many, many years.

However, even after this epistemological adjustment, Watzlawick’s text proposes exactly the same techniques described in the previous books. More than a theoretical reflection, it looks like an attempt to tame an irreversible change, accepting it only outwardly while in fact always bringing the discussion back to the same ground, that of Milton Erickson’s hypnotic techniques.

We find the same attitude in the volume by Boscolo and Bertrando (1996), which shows, albeit in a different way, the same resistance to change. And they do so by proposing the epigenetic principle to describe a body of knowledge, that of the “systemic” outlook, which arises from earlier theories (such as those of the MRI) without actually cancelling them out. In this contribution, Boscolo and Bertrando offer a rather odd idea of extremism: “By extremism we mean, in this case, the tendency to fall in love with ‘new’ ideas, erasing in their name everything that had been produced before” (1998, p. 38).

But is that not exactly what Watzlawick and the MRI proposed with regard to prior knowledge about psychotherapy? Were they not perhaps “extremists”? What, then: to protect the ideas of some extremists, one tries to tame the convictions of other possible extremists?

But the most curious thing is that Boscolo and Bertrando locate the heart of the “systemic” outlook precisely in the Pragmatica, in Haley’s books, in Paradosso e controparadosso… in short, in the good old days of the black box. The heart of that culture is, in fact, all there.

The epigenetic principle thus reveals the wish to safeguard continuity between strategic models and those based on meaning, continuing, for years to come, to call them all “systemic”. Every one of them. An escamotage that may have managed to avert a possible split, “uniting”, as the authors argue, “the inner world and the outer world of the patient and of the therapist”, and declaring their own work, at the same time, “strategic and non-strategic”. A political move aimed at softening differences that are hard to deny (especially at the end of the 1990s), to avoid the break-up of the “systemic front” into multiple schools (postmodernist, constructionist, post-structuralist, feminist, etc.). (Psycho)politics beats epistemology, but at the expense of the possibilities for growth.

2) The MRI model and the corrective emotional experience (CEE): on several occasions, Paul Watzlawick cited in his work the CEE as a clinical model on which he had drawn during his career. It is a technique introduced into psychoanalysis by Alexander and French in 1956 [editor’s note: the article’s bibliography dates the two works concerned to 1946], at the same time as the publication of Bateson’s first ideas on schizophrenia. These ideas were already present, at least in embryo, in early psychoanalysis, above all in the work of Sándor Ferenczi (and active in authors such as Sullivan and Searles, always cited by “systemic” writers). In a previous work (Casadio 2020) I drew a parallel, theoretical and clinical, precisely between the birth of systemic theories and the brief psychoanalytic therapies, to which I refer the reader.

But let us return to Watzlawick: in the Codino del barone di Munchhausen our author cited some clinical cases of Balint, a master of the CEE and of brief psychoanalytic therapy. Watzlawick also cited the CEE again in an article (Watzlawick 1997, in Nardone, Ray, eds., 2007) as well as in his last book, that of 1997. In short, the CEE seems close to the MRI technique, although it is never made explicit in what way. And yet it too rests on the “as if”, on emotional aspects, and also on the possibility of creating a clinical situation in which the identified patient can learn (or deutero-learn) other ways of behaving. A technique not based on insight.

I can only conclude by stating that, with regard to the CEE, Watzlawick produces a “double message”: as he repeatedly maintains, psychoanalysis is wrong in its methods of treatment. Even though he himself then takes pieces of psychoanalysis (such as the CEE) to create a different intervention.

Evidently psychoanalysis too, in those same years, was producing an interesting model based on the how, just like the MRI. And yet Watzlawick keeps up a head-on opposition to psychoanalysis, only to take shelter, moreover, under the umbrella of behaviourism. A real waste.

3) Strategic intervention and cybernetics: the changes proposed by Watzlawick and his colleagues are, in their view, in line with systems theory and cybernetics. But we have raised several doubts about this. These same authors define cybernetics, even in the 1980s, as “the principle of error control” (Watzlawick 1982, in Nardone and Ray, eds., 2007, p. 192), offering too limited a meaning, based exclusively on “control”.

All this reveals the epistemology of the Austrian therapist (more than cybernetic logic) and of the MRI authors, entirely in line with what Heinz von Foerster called first-order cybernetics (1982), based on a one-directional clinical relationship. In this regard, one example is illuminating. In Il linguaggio del cambiamento, Watzlawick asks how to behave if a patient refuses to accept a behavioural prescription or does not carry it out. According to the author: “it is advisable to take all the responsibility upon oneself, apologizing for having erred on the side of excessive optimism by overloading the patient” (Watzlawick 1977, p. 145). And then? Then nothing. One tries again with another key, another paradoxical prescription, “trying one key after another in the lock” (ibidem).

In practice, there is no alternative to the prescription, and to patients who protest, or who disagree with the methods proposed, the response is always paradoxical, pretending to listen without in fact taking their doubts into account. Today this would be considered very serious and, fortunately, would not be possible. And so Paul Watzlawick’s contribution ends up coming to a halt at the very point where his speculation begins, with hypnotherapeutic practice, certainly presenting some coherent ideas (in the pejorative sense), but artificially closing the theoretical-clinical circle precisely on these techniques, in effect stifling other hypotheses and other possible ideas.

4) Systemic thinking and emotions: Watzlawick’s epistemology seems to have shaped the attitude of many “systemic” therapists towards emotions. These therapists behave as if the “rational part” of the person (or of the family), identified with the left hemisphere, should simply be evaded, or bypassed, in order to achieve a “real” modification of the emotional part, that of the right hemisphere. This is a conception encysted in various therapeutic techniques, one that (as Watzlawick would say) “does not mark a matter of fact” but is merely the product of an implicit model, slavishly accepted by the author himself. And still put forward today by various authors in the field.

5) Clinical practice and manipulation: we have already discussed this point. I would only add that Watzlawick seems particularly skilled at suggestion, with patients as with the readers of his books. Even if he does not appear equally adept at offering a clear and fruitful theoretical reference, not least because this is always established “metaphorically”, and only through a very long list of examples, aimed more at convincing readers than at providing them with clear support.

The questions to be addressed would be very many: can we define the MRI model as a systemic model? Still today? Even when the reference science has changed drastically? When, that is, models, practices and basic assumptions have (as always) evolved and been transformed? Or, conversely, should we think that a synthesis is a bit like a diamond: forever?

Watzlawick certainly produced a synthesis of some of the scientific knowledge of the 1960s: the most useful “pieces” for the puzzle he was putting together. His limitation, however, is that he proposed a blocked clinical model, immune to any possible evolution. What Watzlawick has left us, then, is a set of techniques based on actively influencing the patient, modelled on hypnosis.

It seems legitimate, in fact, to ask which theoretical models are drawn upon by the authors who still call themselves “systemic” today. Theory, like practice, cannot help but be continually updated. But this, clinicians seem to ignore.

In conclusion, we can say that Watzlawick, in the second part of his career, worked to build an innovative model on the basis of Bateson’s first intuitions. Yet this operation seems to have succeeded only in part. Although trained as a Jungian, Watzlawick did not manage to integrate the different settings and the different models of the mind (such as the CEE) that he encountered along the way. Rather than proposing a “complex” model, he preferred to erase previous experiences entirely and start again from scratch, with a reference that, in his aspirations, would be inspired by nothing already known and would feed exclusively on scientific knowledge: “systemic” knowledge, precisely (a model that was nonetheless behaviourist in its form).

But, as we have already said, a clinical model cannot draw exclusively on scientific ideas. Because, when it comes down to it, it always rests on a particular setting and a particular idea of the relationship. To conclude, we can say that Watzlawick lacked a humanistic, relational reference, however paradoxical it may seem to say so, to which he could appeal. He remained stuck in the idea of the imposed, one-directional influence characteristic of hypnosis.

6) The legacy of Paul Watzlawick and the MRI: Watzlawick certainly had the courage to innovate in psychotherapy. And, together with the other MRI authors, he brought together various theoretical and clinical influences to give life to a new approach. Unfortunately, it is an approach that never evolved, and that failed to propose new ideas and applications over the years.

What remains, unfortunately, is a series of assumptions, some interesting references and techniques without a soul. It is not surprising that many therapists, even today, remain faithful to these assumptions, mistaking them for data of “reality”, for “systemic” points of view. These are suggestive outlooks, no doubt, and coherent too (in the worst sense of the term), capable of winning converts but not of creating a genuine reference “culture”: an evolving body of knowledge. The end product remains limited to a few ideas (which have become dogmas), unable to respond to the complexity of the “mind”, of care pathways and of human health.

Complexe Systémique: key points

This text is an indictment and should be read as one. Casadio reduces the MRI to Watzlawick, and Watzlawick to a handful of techniques; he leaves aside Weakland and Fisch, the clinical work actually done in Palo Alto and the outcome studies of brief therapy. Some charges rest on debatable readings, such as equating the black box with pure behaviourism. Yet the questions he raises remain useful for practice. Can a prescription whose reasons are hidden from the person in therapy remain respectful? What happens to the relationship when therapists see themselves as outsiders introducing rules “from outside”? Do reframing, positive connotation and displayed optimism sometimes protect the therapist rather than help the family? The rereading of Bateson, who enters the patient’s metaphor instead of countering it, and Mara Selvini Palazzoli’s critical assessment open two ways out of the choice between manipulation and passivity. Read alongside the interview in which Wendel Ray defends the legacy of Don Jackson and the MRI, and Godat and Czerny’s critique of Watzlawick’s axioms.

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Unofficial English translation of Epistemologia Watzlawick: l’esordio sistemico-familiare, by Luca Casadio, Connessioni, “Contributi” section (2024), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “Epistemologia Watzlawick: l’esordio sistemico-familiare”, published in Connessioni (2024) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Casadio, L. (2024). Watzlawick’s epistemology: the beginnings of systemic family therapy (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/watzlawicks-epistemology-the-beginnings-of-systemic-family-therapy (Original work published in 2024 in Connessioni, sezione «Contributi» (2024); republished in 2024 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/epistemologia-watzlawick-lesordio-sistemico-familiare/)

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