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Connessioni · History of systemic therapy

Rewriting the history of systemic clinical practice

Pietro Barbetta, Director of the Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia, offers an “intimate” history of systemic clinical practice as seen from Milan. From Boscolo and Cecchin to Maturana and Varela, from Michael White to Foucault and Deleuze, he traces the shift from observing family games to observing therapy itself. And he argues for a bodily turn: stepping outside models to welcome the singularity of the event.

Author Pietro Barbetta (Director, Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia, Milan, Italy)First published Connessioni, 17 December 2017Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of Per riscrivere la storia della clinica sistemica, by Pietro Barbetta, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 2 (2017), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. The paragraphs are those of the journal, without subheadings; quotations are translated from the Italian, except for a few well-known English wordings by Bateson and von Foerster; titles of works are given as the author cites them, mostly in their Italian editions; a few misspelt proper names have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

The art of therapy lies in knowing how to step outside theoretical, diagnostic and clinical models in order to welcome, with tenderness, the singularity of the event.

Pietro Barbetta

When Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco Cecchin split from Mara Selvini, they begin to do training. Mara Selvini goes on doing research. In fact, by doing training, Boscolo and Cecchin change the way of doing research. They bring constructivist epistemology into research; they create the observer. So the object of research changes as well; or rather, there is a shift from the object to the subject of research.

Whereas in the period of Paradosso e controparadosso (2003) the four “expert” psychoanalysts observe the games within the family, in the following period, and it is still so today, it is the trainees who begin to ask questions of the experienced therapists. The questions concern the interactions between therapist and family, and they compel therapists to engage in a self-reflexive practice on their own work.

It is no longer a matter of defining what kind of game the family is playing, but of exploring the therapeutic process. In practice, the trainees become process observers and help therapists to change hypotheses, to dance with the family.

The medical methodology of diagnosis and cure is transformed into a systemic approach, in line with Bateson’s idea that conscious purpose is not ecological. We will later learn, in our work, that psychological diagnosis, unlike medical diagnosis, must always be agreed with the person in consultation, and that tests serve to do therapy within a joint, consensual assessment. This is what will distinguish psychotherapists from physicians, along with their social and transdisciplinary field of inquiry.

When I was admitted to the CMTF school, many years before today’s postgraduate schools of psychotherapy existed, I had an interview with Cecchin, who told me: you have to choose; here we no longer see family games, we see the games played, here and now, between therapist and family; we do not deal with pathology, we deal with therapeutic conversation, but we have tools that help us not to fall too much in love with the hypotheses we formulate. In practice: if you come here to learn reassuring tools, perfect recipes, you had better leave right away. You come here to learn a methodology, an approach; you learn to take on your responsibilities, to act as a subject. And also: here we do science, because conjectures are refuted; we practise falsificationism. Yet we are not Popperians; we do not hold the myth of making language perfect.

More than thirty years ago a book written by four hands came out: Boscolo and Cecchin are interviewed and engage in dialogue with two psychotherapists from the Ackerman Institute in New York, Lynn Hoffman and Peggy Penn. In those years the Ackerman Institute was promoting a team inspired by the Milan Approach, made up of the two authors and Olga Silverstein. The title of that volume is Milan Systemic Family Therapy (1984), a book ignored in Italy until 2004. Today, thanks to Paolo Bertrando, it is published under the title La clinica sistemica.

Two important epistemologists influence systemic clinical practice: Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. At that time, people read an essay by the two with a difficult title: Autopoiesi e cognizione. Just imagine the contents. One racks one’s brains trying to understand the key words that define the conceptual horizon of these two thinkers. Maturana and Varela (1985), Varela above all, have an important philosophical reference in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a leading figure of phenomenological research on the body, who was in turn indebted, in his philosophical studies, to the neurologist Kurt Goldstein.

Varela and Maturana take a radically critical stance towards the notion of “information”, which seems to act as a hinge between the natural and the social sciences in a sort of reductionism. Information theory is close to mathematical, physical and cybernetic studies. It is a matter of considering, or rather calculating, the entropic quantity of information during a process of communication. Starting from a given unit of information, it is possible to compute the entropy and determine a redundancy, or negentropy, that makes it possible to transmit the whole unit of information from sender to receiver. In short, negative entropy is part of a conscious project to keep disorder under control.

One of Maturana’s key concepts is “structural drift”. I just could not get my head around it, until, after meeting the author several times, I find the courage to ask him to explain it to me: “Imagine you are in a little boat with no oars, in the middle of the sea, but you have an instrument to locate your position. You call the lighthouse, and it sends a rescue ship to the position you transmitted. When the ship arrives, you are already somewhere else.” Something is always missing; the destination can never be reached, at least as long as we are alive.

Heinz von Foerster (1987), on the contrary, realizes that order comes from chaos, and Ilya Prigogine, with Isabelle Stengers (Prigogine, Stengers, 1979), demonstrates it in physical chemistry by producing systems far from equilibrium, also called dissipative structures. Indeed, in literature, this is the style James Joyce used to compose his works: the portmanteau word chaosmos, made up of chaos (disorder) and cosmos (order).

With Maturana and Varela, people begin to speak of second-order cybernetics. In second-order cybernetics, disorder produces unpredictable ordered forms beyond human control. The term “information”, defined by a given quantity, independent of the meaning of the unit of information, is replaced by the term “perturbation”. There are no instructive relations, only perturbations. But a therapist must know how to produce “perturbation”.

Alongside these theoretical considerations, systemic clinical practice moves more and more towards non-instructive and anti-strategic approaches. In Milan, circular questions are asked to observe relationships, and reflexive questions so as not to influence the participants in therapy directly, giving them the chance to describe themselves together with the others. This creates the possibility that the individual members of the family group recount, in the presence of the others who are watching, the family dynamics in a projective form, as if the others were witnessing a story about themselves, but told by one of them. Strategic questions, on the other hand, which stem from the therapist’s conscious intention to influence the family, are avoided (Tomm, 1987).

A Norwegian therapist, Tom Andersen (1991), experiments with a new therapeutic methodology: the Reflecting Team. Family therapy involves a one-way mirror separating the therapy room from the observation room. The discussion behind the mirror, although held while the family is right there, does not involve it. With the Reflecting Team the mirror shatters, and the setting provides for everyone to hear everything, a sort of mutual analysis.

Quite apart from any awareness of it, the return to psychoanalysis is very clear: perturbante (“perturbing”), the key term of Maturana and Varela, is the Italian translation of Unheimlich (Freud, 1989). The univocity of the unit of information, quantitatively defined, gives way to the equivocity of signification, the sense of the interaction. An idea of Bateson’s develops: what is a meaning? It is “a difference that makes a difference”. In the same years, quite independently, there is a philosopher in France who writes a difficult and important text entitled Differenza e ripetizione; his name is Gilles Deleuze (1997), and for a long time he remains unknown to most family therapists.

In the early nineties, edited by Umberta Telfener, a collection of writings by Michael White (1992) is published in Italy under the title La terapia come narrazione. In Milan, at Boscolo and Cecchin’s school, a few English-language publications from the Dulwich Centre in Adelaide, Australia, signed by Michael White and David Epston (1989), are circulating. During the Centre’s seminars and meetings, Luigi Boscolo speaks enthusiastically about White’s clinical ideas. He describes how White conducts family sessions with encopretic children, externalizing the symptom. In the conversation with the family, White creates a ghost that roams the house: Mr Sneaky Poo. The importance of White’s clinical experience lies in making the ghosts present, as in the Kleinian tradition, and in connecting these presentifications with the cultural matrices of Aboriginal reality. Sneaky Poo (il signor Subdola Pupù in the Italian translation) is a sort of Sandman who has the Power to bend the child to his will, to make the child feel ashamed in front of everyone; he must be defeated through an alliance for the liberation of the child as subject, a sort of family revolution, which often has the effect of calling into question the roles and dynamics of the relationships between family members.

In those years, many systemic therapists are interested in White and Epston’s Australian clinical experiences because they come from another world. Moreover, Epston and White introduce a new way of doing clinical work through writing. For example, the child, with the help of the family, defeats Sneaky Poo and receives a written acknowledgement that records these deeds and names the child as the one who freed the house from the ghost. The work edited by Telfener, however, holds something even more interesting: Michael White introduces Foucault, alongside Bateson, as a point of reference for systemic clinical practice.

Between the deafening confusion of systemic and strategic therapies and the ultra-modern race of “postmodern” therapies to invent ever newer models for sale on the free market of opinions, the real novelty comes from Australia. I believe that Boscolo admired White’s proposal above all because its “novelty” is rooted in the past and in tradition.

After White, some of us set about studying Foucault (1971, 2013) as clinicians, in the light of Gregory Bateson. In my case, having always been slow and not very intuitive, it took me many years. In 2004 I gave a paper entitled “Bateson and Foucault between power and degeneration” at the Conference for the Centenary of Gregory Bateson’s birth (Barbetta, 2009), organized by the Associazione Episteme in Turin.

Meanwhile, among Michel Foucault’s other works, I come across a text entitled Theatrum Philosophicum. The title strikes me because, as a student, I had to try to understand Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for an exam. I believe Foucault chose the title of his text to show a difference: Theatrum instead of Tractatus. That must mean something.

The story goes that Wittgenstein admired an Italian economist who, like him, taught at Cambridge. Wittgenstein asks this economist, whose name was Piero Sraffa, to read his Tractatus and then asks for his opinion. Sraffa asks Wittgenstein whether his philosophical system accounts for a gesture that Sraffa performs: he brushes the back of his hand under his chin, a typically Neapolitan gesture expressing a couldn’t-care-less attitude. According to the anecdote, Wittgenstein is taken aback and radically changes his philosophy. Sraffa makes a theatrical gesture.

But if philosophy leaves abstract theories behind and turns to the theatre, this means that it has to deal with the body, the repository of expression and gesture; it can no longer start from abstract concepts, it has to invent them, construct them in a radical way.

Foucault’s Theatrum Philosophicum is devoted to Gilles Deleuze: “I must speak of two books that seem to me great among the great: Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense. Perhaps so great that it is difficult to speak of them, and few have done so… But one day, perhaps, the century will be Deleuzian.”

What is new in Deleuze’s philosophical work (1997, 2014)? The starting point. For the first time, philosophy starts from Difference rather than from Being, from the accident rather than the essence, from the gesture, from everything that lies outside the coded, categorized Genus. The same intuition Bateson had in anthropology a few years before Deleuze. Deleuze is the only French philosopher who knows Bateson, who has read him. Philosophy becomes clinic and literature, and clinical practice frees itself from the imperative of having to respect diagnostic categories, so as to enter into life. It is a matter of changing language, of leaving in the background psychiatric, psychodiagnostic and psychoanalytic categorizations, abstract theories, including Oedipus, the Name-of-the-Father, the perverse triangle.

Among the contemporaries Deleuze admired most are Donald Winnicott, Henry Miller and Gregory Bateson. Bateson is cited in Deleuze’s lectures on Spinoza because, like Spinoza, he places relationship at the origin of all reflection; above all, however, Bateson appears in some of the most important works Deleuze wrote with Félix Guattari: L’anti-Edipo and Mille piani (Deleuze, Guattari, 1973, 2017).

Meanwhile, in Milan, people never stop reading and rereading Gregory Bateson. Personally, I find Bateson’s anthropological turn between Naven (1988) and Balinese Character, written with Margaret Mead in 1942, interesting. It is the shift from the idea of “schismogenesis”, cumulative interaction in escalation, to that of a continuing plateau of intensity.

This brief history of systemic clinical practice is not “the history” of systemic clinical practice, not even a “Eurocentric” or “Milan-centric” history of systemic clinical practice; no, it is truly my own. Perhaps it is “ego-centric”. I would call it “intimate”, closely dependent on my memories and on the memories of what excited our experiences in Milan in the eighties, after the anti-psychiatric immersion of the seventies, and afterwards, up to the present day.

If I write about Michael White, I do not mean Michael White himself; I mean the enthusiasm his ideas aroused in Milan. If, as I have done in other essays (Barbetta, 2005), I speak of the Bateson/Haley rift, I am referring first and foremost to the reading, in those years, of the book edited by Carlos Sluzki and Donald Ransom (1978) on the double bind, which reveals a disagreement about “power” that had been kept quiet for years. Basically, Bateson’s objection resembles Foucault’s analysis of power/knowledge: in modern society, knowledge creates the illusion of power.

Bateson is an outsider; he rejects Haley’s idea of power, just as Antigone rebels against the power of Creon, who orders that the corpses of enemies be left unburied, and gives her brother funeral honours. When Creon calls her to account for this, she answers: “for me, this is not a law of Zeus”.

Well, I stand on this side; it is impossible for me to be “objective”; my clinical practice has led me to try to withdraw from a position of power. Some will say that this is a paradox. True, I have learnt that clinical practice consists in the following paradox: the process by which therapists withdraw from their own power/knowledge. Faithful to Freud’s idea, “Where it was, I shall become”, Heinz von Foerster’s clinical imperative, “Act always so as to increase the number of choices”, means to me that therapy is a process of liberation, which ends with its final act: liberation from the therapist.

Reality exists; it is what oppresses, it belongs to the memory of those who suffer, of those who are oppressed, but it is also life. Positive connotation is not sugar-coating the pill, nor submitting to a ban on talking about the “problem”. Positive comes from the Latin positum; there is nothing optimistic or successful about the term: it means recognizing the other, reconstructing the past starting from the future. Not forgetting the past, but rather acknowledging it, tracing it as an experience to be remembered.

Indeed, from my point of observation, Gianfranco Cecchin’s position and Luigi Boscolo’s are not the same on several matters. This difference also marks a difference of style in conducting the therapeutic conversation. Boscolo’s psychoanalytic soul was always alight: he loved to read and reread family dynamics through the art of lenses. Besides the systemic lens, Boscolo loved the psychoanalytic lens.

Cecchin had developed, within a conversational approach, a paradoxical method that had not entirely abandoned strategies, although these were deconstructed and turned into micro-strategies. In this way Cecchin contributes to the postmodern idea, which criticizes meta-narratives and proposes only micro-narratives. Very soon, however, postmodernism in turn becomes a paradox: it presents itself as a “novelty”, copying the communication model typical of modernity: “this is new, it must be celebrated; it has grown old, it must be replaced” (Pearce, 2003). Rather than on the theoretical level, Cecchin’s art is to be sought in the way he conducted sessions with families, in his ability to introduce a respectful irony.

Boscolo, on the other hand, becomes passionate about the question of time. In a book written with Paolo Bertrando (1996), he develops a concept of time in each of its values: past, present, future; but also in its moods: indicative, subjunctive. For Boscolo, the positum consists in the existence of the past, the reality shared by family members, or else the profoundly different realities described by individual members during the session. Boscolo often said that therapy consists in the therapeutic relationship and that, if you do not enter the dimension of the past, you do not create the relationship. Subjunctive thinking, created through reflexive questions about the past, present and future, helps the subjects of therapy to explore possible and impossible worlds.

I then saw other colleagues doing therapy and consultation, each with a style that has to do with their own theories of reference, but also with a set of lived experiences and of cultural, religious and family traditions.

If Cecchin (1992) was a clinical deconstructionist, Boscolo’s soul, on the philosophical level, represents the encounter between a psychoanalytic phenomenology and the theory of possible worlds.

In Cecchin’s case, the emphasis falls on a drive towards change, whereas Boscolo’s psychoanalytic soul leads him to think about time; for him, what matters is the therapeutic relationship.

When I maintain that this brief history is my history, I do not mean an idiosyncratic history: I have had long and short interactions, companions and teachers who have been important for my training. In this sense, my history is the history of a collective subject, a witness.

Perhaps I have repeated myself, but I think the time has come to reflect more on the Milan Approach, to grasp its riches, which lie in its differences. Moreover, this essay should have been methodological, but I have not entirely succeeded.

According to Bateson, social rituals create over time an ethos, a dominant character, a system of habits, those behaviours and that set of relationships: veritable ontologies. Naven would be a ritual that, in ensuring the growth of the young man, or of the young woman, although Bateson studies only the first case, through practices of recognition, defines gendered identity positions and the bonds within family and community relationships.

In this book, Bateson observes two types of interaction among the Iatmul in relation to Naven: symmetrical relationships and complementary ones. The escalation of symmetrical interactions would lead to confrontation, that of complementary interactions to a condition of dominance/submission; Naven is a ritual that works, through irony, as an instrument for damping escalation. Bateson calls the escalation of interactions “schismogenesis” and describes them as a class of sequences of their own that inevitably lead to a climax. The ritual therefore serves to ensure that the climax is not destructive and devastating. In 1936 Bateson observes a society that “uses” ritual as an element of cohesion: an ontology of family and community relationships.

What is interesting in this research is that it starts from the particular, a specific ritual, in order to understand the general. In this way, theory does not present itself as a body of knowledge from which the particular is derived; on the contrary, it starts from the particular to build provisional, never definitive, hypotheses. It is much harder to embrace this way of thinking; it makes thought far less popular, and its hypnotic, jargon-laden potential is constantly deconstructed.

Indeed, only a few years later, Bateson is obliged to take part in research to be carried out in Bali. With Margaret Mead he will study the system of child rearing and upbringing in Balinese society, on the hypothesis that the character, or basic personality (what defines the existential ontology of “normality”), of the Balinese depends on the system of child rearing and education.

Here Bateson develops a new vision of human relationships, far broader than the one he observed with regard to the Naven ritual among the Iatmul. The account of the research is published by Bateson and Margaret Mead in a book entitled Balinese Character. Bateson presents countless photographic sequences. Sequence 147 is entitled Stimulation and Frustration. It shows a sequence of nine pictures. Bateson writes (1977):

Often the mother starts a playful interaction with the child, titillating its penis or otherwise stimulating it to interpersonal activity; this will excite the child, and for a short time cumulative interaction will take place. Then, when the child, approaching a small climax, throws its arms around the mother’s neck, the mother’s attention wanders; at this point the child will usually start another cumulative interaction, beginning with a tantrum. The mother will either look on, amused by the child’s outbursts, or, if the child attacks her, will fend off the attack without showing any anger at all (p. 147).

To this description Bateson adds a hypothesis about how this creates a habitual chain leading to distrust of intense involvement. The mother, by suppressing emotional involvement, seems to find this kind of interaction irksome; the child would in turn learn a sort of distrust of excessive involvement. Far from being an attachment problem, as described in Western societies, this kind of interaction, more characteristic of Eastern societies, would form the premise for human relationships in which “a continuing plateau of intensity is substituted for climax”.

Later Bateson will work on schizophrenia and, on the basis of similar observations in Western society, will propose the double bind theory. This anthropological thread in Bateson’s research gave rise to a series of reflections. Among them, in the eighties, Bradford Keeney’s (1985) L’estetica del cambiamento, which for the Milan group became as revealing as Michael White’s work, but unfortunately had no follow-up. Nor can we forget the valuable work of Lynn Hoffman (2001), who took on the task of talent scout for the new trends in systemic clinical practice. In 1991 Harry Goolishian died; he had put forward the idea of the “problem-determined system” and a linguistic turn in clinical practice, with the idea of “human systems as linguistic systems” (Anderson, Goolishian, 1988).

From those same nineties onwards, Marcelo Pakman’s long theoretical and clinical reflection will lead to the proposal, which we have partly developed together, of a bodily turn in systemic clinical practice. My references to Elvio Fachinelli (1983) and Pakman’s (2014) references to authors such as Jean-Luc Nancy (2005, 2010) represent an attempt to bring to life a way of thinking about clinical practice that starts from a reflection on the body, on the materiality of sensory experience, on the investigation of hidden forms and ontologies. A body different from the psychoanalytic one, which lives on sexual drives, and from the medical one, which deals with the organism. In recent years, the Australian contributions of Maria Nichterlein (2017) have at last introduced the figure of Gilles Deleuze into systemic psychotherapy.

This return to the body, the body of the theatre, the body of expression, also presupposes a turn with respect to the narrative theme. Not everything is narrative; the body is also something that marks a difference between narrative and materiality, between meaning and sense, between head and gut. Something that disposes the therapist to observe and welcome the event. Because the art of therapy lies in knowing how to step outside theoretical, diagnostic and clinical models in order to welcome, with tenderness, the singularity of the event.

Complexe Systémique: key points

Barbetta himself warns that this is not “the history” of systemic clinical practice but his own: a testimony from inside the Milan school, moving from Maturana to Wittgenstein and from White to Deleuze, with connections that sometimes owe more to free association than to demonstration. Its value lies elsewhere. It reminds us that the Milan model is not a monolith: Cecchin, drawn to change and respectful irony, and Boscolo, attentive to time and to the relationship, did not conduct sessions in the same way, and the richness of the approach lies in these differences. Three ideas are worth keeping for practice: psychological diagnosis is built together with the person in consultation; positive connotation is not about embellishing but about acknowledging what has happened; therapy ends with liberation from the therapist. Finally, its call for a clinical practice of the body and of the event, one that does not reduce everything to narrative, remains relevant. Read alongside the same author’s memory of Gianfranco Cecchin, and the “systemic prejudices” set out by Cecchin.

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Unofficial English translation of Per riscrivere la storia della clinica sistemica, by Pietro Barbetta, Connessioni, new series, no. 2 (2017), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “Per riscrivere la storia della clinica sistemica”, published in Connessioni (2017) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Barbetta, P. (2017). Rewriting the history of systemic clinical practice (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/rewriting-the-history-of-systemic-clinical-practice (Original work published in 2017 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 2 (2017); republished in 2017 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/per-riscrivere-la-storia-della-clinica-sistemica/)

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