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This version was translated from Italian by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence. In case of doubt, the original version prevails.

Connessioni · Body and health

Therapy in the repair shop, when people feel like machines. Reflections on the mind-body relationship, from a linear view to the complexity of living systems

Two men referred by the same general practitioner ask the psychotherapist to “fix their mind” so that their body will work better: Claudio, who has ulcerative colitis, and Remo, isolated by sweating and the fear of smelling. Roberta Sallustio starts from this request to question the linear causality that turns the body into a trivial machine, from Descartes to psychosomatics, and sets Bateson and Antonovsky’s salutogenesis against it. Two courses of therapy show what changes when one gives up curing in order to care.

Authors Roberta SallustioFirst published Connessioni, 1 July 2021Translation Complexe Systémique, unofficial translation

Unofficial English translation. This article is a translation of La terapia in officina, quando le persone si sentono macchine. Riflessioni sulla relazione mente-corpo da una visione lineare alla complessità dei sistemi viventi., by Roberta Sallustio, published in Connessioni (Centro Milanese di Terapia della Famiglia), new series, no. 9 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translated by Complexe Systémique in November 2026 with the help of artificial intelligence: the original Italian text has been translated into English and reformatted, which constitutes a modification of the work under the terms of the licence. Paragraphs and headings are those of the journal; quotations are translated from the Italian, except for the World Health Organization definition and Sontag’s first sentence, given in their original English; Latin and foreign words are in italics; a few typos have been silently corrected. This translation was made neither by the authors nor by the journal, who are not responsible for its content or for any errors. The original version prevails.

Considering the person in a non-linear way can in itself already be a perturbing act for the system.

Roberta Sallustio

The mind-body relationship, in psychotherapy too, hides traps that are easy to fall into when we look for an explanation of the physical symptom as the manifestation or consequence of some element, cause or effect, present or past, in people’s lives. This article sets out to show the ever close relationship between the comings and goings of physical health and people’s lives, and how a person’s life and their physical symptoms become context for one another, how they create meanings, how life can give meaning to a symptom and how a symptom gives meaning to what happens to people.

I believe that every request for help carries within it a desire for change towards a better quality of life. This is one of my first premises, and I think these premises have allowed me to welcome what I felt to be a legitimate request, but one that carried a goal that was hard to reach, or rather impossible: the request to intervene on the mind in order to correct what is not working in the body. A request that brought into play the need to make explicit and clearer, in myself as well as in the person I meet in session, the differences between care, therapy, healing, health and illness, and to understand what ideas and thoughts there were about the mind-body relationship.

Where does this very simple idea come from, that mind and body are causally connected? How have I tried to practise systemically even when meeting expectations steeped in conscious purpose? The expectations, questions and stories of Mr Claudio and Mr Remo allowed me to ask myself and reflect on whether, and in what way, I managed to give up “every fantasy of care, healing, growth, self-improvement, awareness […] interpretations, mental health conceived a priori” (Telfener, 2012), and, in these specific cases, health conceived a priori, and the difference between curing and caring.

Reflections on the relations between person and environment have existed since the dawn of humanity. In ancient philosophy the mind-body relationship lays the foundations of the dualist position, but it is with Descartes that Western thought establishes a principle of separation between mind and body. Even though Descartes explains that the distinction between res cogitans and res extensa should be understood as a mutual interdependence of mind and body, “nature also teaches me that I am not merely present in my body as a pilot is present in his vessel, but that I am very closely joined to it and (so to speak) intermingled with it, so as to form a unit with it” (Gritti, 2019), it is his thinking of separation between spirit and matter, between the real, what can be measured, and the unreal, that seems to become the foundation of conceptions of the human organism. “Descartes was determined to consider nothing as true before he had established the evidence to ascertain it as such” (Lock & Scheper-Hughes, 2006), with the thinking essence as the only certainty. The rational mind is separated from nature; it becomes the element that allows a rigorous objective examination of nature itself, the presupposition of the Western natural and social sciences for centuries.

The search for the “real” and for “truth” becomes the boundary within which Western epistemology develops, structuring a series of dichotomous separations of body, mind, nature, culture and society on the basis of the principle of linear causality, “in a core of founding truths on which to base choices and decisions” (Ceruti, 2018). Perhaps it is partly from this that we find a habit of thinking that if an event is not going in the desired direction, if a problem or a difficulty arises, when the things of life do not work as they “should”, then we look for a cause or causes in order to understand and act accordingly, in search of suitable solutions. A long chain of causes and effects, linked in an orderly way, becomes a reference according to which “every problem, however large, could therefore be broken down into smaller problems, which could in turn be analysed and solved rationally, one at a time” (Bert & Quadrino, 2002). Over time this principle also becomes the engine of scientific progress, which fragments, observes, records, explains and describes details that, with the support of technology, become ever more infinitesimal. Ceruti further argues that what emerged in science was “the ideal of rational objectivity, the expression of an external and disembodied observer”, with the paradox that, as technical and scientific knowledge progresses, we move further away from an overall, interconnected view of living systems in their contexts.

“Human becoming” thus risks being fragmented by an outlook that observes the linear interaction between cause and effect, input and output, so that the person, and in particular their body, is thought of and perceived as a “trivial machine” (von Foerster, 1987), analytically determinable, independent of history and predictable, in the expectation that every malfunction can be identified and, if possible, corrected.

In the medical disciplines the habit of regarding the body as a machine and pathology as a breakdown to be repaired is still present. Illnesses reside inside the individual, an individual who, sometimes for some unexplained reason, is malfunctioning and who is mostly observed as a separate entity, without taking account of their continual contact with the world. The fragmented and objectified body of science forgets that “the complex is not a combination of simple elements, that the organism is not a mosaic of physico-chemical facts but a totality” (Galimberti, 1983).

The same request, first from Remo and a few months later from Claudio, “fix my mind, because my body doesn’t work the way I would like”, struck in me the spark of what it means to take account of the causal relationship and linear thinking that arrive in the therapy room. The causal process “is well rooted in popular thinking” (Asen et al., 2004), and as psychotherapists this makes us run the risk of being credited with the technical, specialist ability to repair “the mind mechanism”, close to the popular professional stereotype of the “shrink” who squeezes out whatever is harmful.

Both people come to my private practice, referred by the same general practitioner who, following the perfect principle of delegation from one specialist to another, identifies me as the expert who will be able to fix their “mind mechanism” and so satisfy their request to have a body that works better.

Claudio is a 40-year-old person who was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis twenty years ago. An indoor and outdoor climbing instructor, he introduces himself by telling me: “I’ve taken a sabbatical year, because I need to work on myself, to take some time, because I want to resolve this illness, because I’m not doing the right things in life.” Ulcerative colitis is a chronic, relapsing disease of the bowel, of unknown aetiology on an autoimmune basis, in which acute phases alternate with phases of remission of the symptoms, which are characterised by severe abdominal pain and diarrhoea. Claudio expects that taking care of himself through psychotherapy will bring about the elimination of the symptoms.

Remo, on the other hand, is referred on the general practitioner’s assumption that a phobia or a psychosomatic illness is present, since no organic causes of his malaise can be found. He comes in shyly, with a quick, light handshake at the door of the consulting room; I understand shortly afterwards that this courtesy is already a first difficulty to be faced. He explains that “two things ruin my life”. The first is sweating all over his body, especially on his hands, and the second is his perception that he gives off a smell, that he has a sort of aerophagia, impalpable, uncontainable, which prevents him from being with people and which, little by little, leads to social withdrawal. Remo, forty-six, single, works as a night porter in a hotel and lives in his parents’ house; he says he feels ready to put right his malfunctioning body.

The theme of the referring doctor, common to both, allowed me to recognise immediately the power that the referrer has in defining the context of the work. I felt how important it was to keep in mind the premises and the conviction that, through him, had arrived at the first moment of the interview in the words of Claudio and Remo. Exasperated by an impossible search for solutions to both men’s need to see their physical symptoms come to an end, the doctor finds a solution by “sending” the person to therapy (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1988).

For patients, following the doctor’s advice means recognising that he is able and competent to find the right solution, but it immediately runs the risk of joining the linear causal model that biomedical thinking carries within it, including in a succession of delegations between health professionals. In the room, besides my premises and those of the person sitting in front of me, the referring doctor’s premises about what health and illness are, what care is and what therapy is were also very present: for a patient like Claudio with a chronic, and therefore incurable, illness, and for Remo, given the suspicion that the symptoms are basically invented, and therefore non-existent, and necessarily a mental health problem.

On healths and illnesses

The word health is used only in the singular; our language does not include the possibility of telling, discussing and reflecting on “healths”, which also seems to confirm that the use of language mirrors, and is determined by, the thinking and premises to which it is tied. The World Health Organization defines health “as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being”. While on the one hand the conception of health as the absence of illness is overcome, at the same time this definition expresses a static idea of health as a condition to be achieved and/or, utopianly, maintained. Health risks becoming an absence of signs and symptoms, an absence of illness, a reduction of positive symptoms, a reduction of swelling and heat or, at best, with good rehabilitation or a good prosthesis, the recovery of lost functions.

According to Foucault (1963), medicine includes knowledge of the healthy human being, that is, the experience of the person without illness, so as to give both a definition and a model of it; which, in defining the conditions of health, the conditions of normality, outlines a norm. In its claim to objectivity, illness itself can be observed through a gaze that is normed and at the same time norming, because it decides and defines the boundaries of normality. Is mental health, in its “health” component, conceived in common thinking with the same characteristics as physical health? To what extent is it possible, in the relationship with the patient who comes to a session, to consider and reframe the idea of health as the absence of symptoms and not as the conditio sine qua non of well-being? Moreover, if “to norm, to normalise, means imposing a requirement on an existence” (Canguilhem, 1996), within the deterministic frame of the mind-body relationship the principle of causality of a physical or existential difficulty becomes the implicit prerequisite of care relationships. There is a norm, the exclusive property of professional expertise, that sets out the purpose of the “treatment” in the direction of that previously defined health.

Care thus risks becoming exclusively a synonym for therapy, the latter understood as an external pharmacological, technical or instrumental agent designed to “heal” or restore. This seems to favour a principle of delegation based on the fact that whoever asks for care is fairly certain that those who practise care possess knowledge capable of finding an explanation and of producing, with techniques and instruments, the desired change aimed at achieving well-being.

The search for meaning, that is, the understanding of one’s own “state of health”, lies on a different plane, far from the search for causes. This might explain the proliferation and success of alternative forms of care, especially those that draw on non-Western traditions of therapy, in search of a less relentlessly deterministic view. Damasio (1994) argues, and his remark still seems relevant, that “the favour that alternative medicines currently enjoy is a sign of widespread dissatisfaction with the inability of traditional medicine to consider the human individual as a whole”, and it is by grasping wholeness and interdependence, and not by separating the parts, that the dimension of health and well-being can be explored in depth.

Returning to the WHO definition, at what moments can we really describe ourselves as healthy, with physical, mental and social well-being? Is it possible, in common sense, in public discourse, in implicit premises, in the culture in which we are immersed, for each of us and for the people who turn to a health professional, to consider ourselves healthy even when illness is present?

The Sanskrit term salvas has a meaning equivalent to what in Italian we call sano, healthy, whole, and also “is the root, the origin of two words that in Italian describe two fundamental and decisive worlds of modern Western culture […] Salute and Salvezza” (health and salvation) (Di Lernia, 2008). These terms refer to an origin in which the whole, the healthy, is united, complete, total, encompassing everything, mind and body, spirit and matter, nature. It is with modernity that the two dimensions separate into two distant views of the world: science and faith.

Are science and faith, doctors and priests, also appointed to answer the question “why”? How can we be healed and saved from suffering?

But if the question carries a search for meaning and the answer explains a cause, we run the risk of superimposing illness and guilt. The causal explanation can become a blaming approach that carries within it a moral connotation of the idea of care, “a tight, necessary link between health and moral behaviour” (Di Lernia, ibid.).

The theme of the moralisation of illness is also expressed through language. Metaphors are inherent and embodied in us and, as personal, relational and social representations, Sontag (1977) warns us against the deceptive power of metaphors applied to illness, stating that “nothing is more punitive than to give a disease a meaning—that meaning being invariably a moralistic one”. This can lead people to believe that if illness is the just outcome of wrong behaviour, individual responsibility becomes that of introducing new behaviours, whose outcome will be the remission of the illness. Illness becomes the phenomenon through which one’s guilt is expressed in the body, health the expression of valiant action. Illnesses are in some way seen as forms of incapacity, of insufficient will and, as Sontag again argues, “of self-condemnation, of self-betrayal [where] the mind betrays the body”, where care towards healing becomes a challenge, a necessary deployment of all the weapons available.

The military metaphor through which health and the “battle” against illness are most often narrated depicts, and at the same time defines, the boundaries of the possible representation of care pathways. As in war, one may fire one’s shots well to defeat the enemy, hoping to save one’s skin and perhaps become a hero. After all, it is heroes who are awarded the medal for valour; but if I have an illness, can I still consider myself a person of value?

Sontag’s work has become “an obligatory reference” (Lingiardi, 2018) for reflection on health, not so much because a de-metaphorisation of representations of the world is really feasible, but in order to bring out and take account of the premises, the implicit, the limits and, consequently, the possibilities with which people might arrive in session.

There are two images that represent the first session with Claudio and with Remo; they were the elements observed during the analysis of the request, which I consider to be an initial act that respects consent and in itself already promotes the person in session taking on responsibility, and which strongly conveys a principle of equity between therapist and client.

The image present at the end of the first interview was that Claudio felt similar to Kafka when, writing about the diagnosis he had just received, he says: “secretly I don’t believe this illness to be tuberculosis, or at least not primarily tuberculosis, but a sign of my general failure”. The decision to take care of himself in order to “defeat” that illness seems to be nothing other than the epiphenomenon of his lack of worth.

Remo, on the other hand, I imagined feeling like a chess player in a situation of zugzwang, in which, when it is his turn to play, he is in extreme difficulty because whatever piece he chooses to move, he will be checkmated. For Remo, then, withdrawing from the world, staying still while feeling unable to go on, seems to be his only possible move.

Other views, sometimes with the same gaze

The causal relationship between mind and body remains decisive even in approaches that explicitly observe their relationship, psychosomatics being one example. Stress becomes a pathogenic agent, defined as a cause capable of exerting on the organism, through its prolonged action, a harmful stimulus, thereby provoking its reaction. Lowen (2001) states that “psychosomatic illnesses are so called because there is no specific aetiological agent that is exclusively responsible for them”, as if, where medical science does not recognise an objectively identifiable determinant, psychosomatics manages to build new representations and explanations, which are nonetheless causally determined.

However extremely interesting this contribution may be, and its openness to considering the person as something other than a trivial machine, in this approach the linear perspective seems to remain unchanged; it also preserves the same moralising gaze on illness, widening its domains of observation while keeping its blaming character.

Psychosomatics, taken as an example, does not go beyond the limit of the biomedical approach either; it is still an intervention aimed at modifying, reducing, expelling, correcting poorly functioning portions of the system, without freeing the person from the guilt of having fallen ill, from an insufficient will to heal because of stress. The body isolated from the world of relationships and interactions becomes an object; mechanism, moreover, becomes the “thinking that objectifies the body, directs its behaviour towards a desired effect, determines the experience of failure in bringing about, through will and practice, the remission of the physical symptoms” (Galimberti, op. cit.).

It is in Bateson’s thought, retracing a few moments and a few details, that the relational systemic approach to mind-body, and to any dualism whatsoever, is expressed. It is impossible to conceive of a separation between “physical body” and “mental world”, or of the separation of the person from their environment. Every living system is a mental system, and vice versa. “Every organism produces itself in a self-reflexive recognition; this recognition is interwoven with the organism’s context of life in a continuous constructive spiral, a ‘dance of interacting parts’” (Bateson, 1972), which prevents the parts from being separated and, unlike mechanism, proposes distinguishing in order to connect. There is no life without flexibility and no life without environment, so much so that no unit can be considered separately and rigidly: “along with a flexible organism, we must also consider a flexible environment […] The unit of survival is the flexible complex organism-in-its-environment” (Bateson, ibid.).

In Bateson’s view it is not possible to refer to an inner mental world and an outer physical world; the interconnection between mind-body and environment is continuous and recursive, and much of the information that the mental system receives and processes lies outside the boundary of the body.

A further element that problematises the causal relationship, including that between mind and body, is conscious purpose, which for Bateson is the attitude that excludes complexity in order to pursue the desired result, seeking the shortest and simplest path. If we lose sight of the individual as connected to and interrelated with the context, the purpose of solving the problem risks becoming the only one that emerges. For Bateson (1972), “the body [must be seen] as a self-corrective system organised cybernetically and systemically”; otherwise, referring precisely to medicine, he considers that only partial interventions are carried out to eliminate a problem, a disorder, an illness.

Thinking of people as living organisms means considering them as unique and each different from the other, in an inseparable connection with their environment, rather than classifying them in homogeneous groups and considering relations with the external environment as having little or no influence. Moreover, if the person is also an autonomous entity that evolves dynamically over time, they cannot be observed and thought of as a static object that obeys commands.

If people are no longer objectifiable entities, each different from the other, if the environment has influence, if the reality we try to know is always partial, if the effects of relationships are unpredictable and indeterminable, how can this perspective be reconciled without reducing complexity? How, then, can this relational systemic perspective and complexity be connected with practice, and especially with clinical practice, and how can we think of ourselves as non-trivial machines?

The salutogenic perspective

One possible answer to this question is given by the salutogenic perspective. This approach was conceptualised by Aaron Antonovsky, who after the war had been commissioned by the Israeli government to assess the state of health of older people in Israel. He set out to measure health from the physical and psychological points of view, specifically adaptation to menopause in women of different ethnic groups, including women who had survived the concentration camps. He found that a large number of them were in good psychophysical health and had good adaptive capacities, that is, they were able to rebuild their lives despite that traumatic experience.

Reversing the perspective, he began to investigate what the factors and processes that generate health might be, rather than looking for the causes of illnesses, seeking answers to new questions about how some people, under the same adverse conditions, stay healthy while others fall ill. Regarding the uncertainty and unpredictability of life events as naturally present elements, as are stress factors, he recognised the capacity of living beings to cope with, adapt to and survive such factors. For Antonovsky the health of the individual becomes a relative concept, according to a model of a continuum between health and illness that places each person, at a given moment, at a point on this line. The flexibility of the model opens up the possibility of changing the description over time, looking for which elements help to move the person’s point on the continuum towards the health pole, in a search for the “causes” of health. A gaze that changes the point of observation, seeking the individual biological, material, psychological, relational, social and spiritual factors that promote the person’s health over time, and that considers health as a dynamic process in which individuals can always describe areas of health independently of illness. My interest in this model is also due to the fact that it moves completely away from the linear perspective; indeed, according to Antonovsky, “working with a pathogenic orientation, one is pushed to forget complexity. […] Those who provide care must indeed be very empathic and sensitive to the pressure to forget the human being who has the disease. The health promoter, regardless of personal inclination, is pushed to be concerned with the person.” (Antonovsky, 1996).

This describes how the linear outlook of the biomedical approach prevents us from recognising and observing the complexity of unique and contextual human becoming. The new view of health presupposes that every person is more or less healthy and more or less ill, with the aim of recognising and identifying how the person can, on the health-illness continuum, become healthier. With a further assumption that, wherever on the continuum the person is, they will have opportunities and resources to move towards the health pole.

The person is seen as an active subject, embedded in a relational and social context, who always has the possibility of improving their state of health, in a relationship that is dynamic and not statically defined a priori. Over time the person can access individual and relational resources that are useful for a new positioning. Health becomes an individual experience and narrative that takes account of the person’s history and can change over time; no longer the reduction or elimination of a symptom or disorder, but a process of searching.

From this point of view “health becomes a lifelong learning experience that leads us to compare ourselves and our own history with the events of life […] each of us the bearer of a health story, which requires flexible trajectories, never defined a priori, in order to learn the ability to keep one’s balance among the various experiences of life” (Garista, 2017). This is therefore a complex process that considers the person as interconnected with their environment, in which, moreover, “giving shape to one’s life means taking care of oneself” (Mortari, 2012).

If, then, we wish to describe a complex model, it will be necessary to take into consideration the many levels of complexity. Different aspects are interrelated: the person, their environment, the physical body, illness and the “healths”, which have to do with self-care and with individual, relational and social potential, with the internal and external resources of the human system, each system interconnected. The salutogenic approach presents itself as a paradigm shift that goes beyond the linear model, one that looks for the connected elements, personal and in dialogue with the environment, historical and cultural, that over time promote and determine a condition of well-being.

Antonovsky’s position is also important for its fluid view of existence. Events happen, some of them against our will, and the possibility of managing to overcome even the crises that arise does not lie solely within the person but always in relation to the context.

Observing the person in their environment makes it possible to extend reflection on health. Moreover, the salutogenic approach makes it possible to consider the development of human becoming and “necessarily involves recourse to the principles of complexity” (Antonovsky, 1987). It takes account of the principle of self-organisation of complex systems, in which a biological system is an autopoietic system (Maturana & Varela, 1980), that is, endowed with an organisation capable of maintaining and regenerating over time its own individuality and autonomy in the face of continual environmental variations. The property of self-organising and regenerating within the context explains how the trajectory towards the health pole can be considered as a dynamic search for an equilibrium in the making, rather than a search for a pre-existing state.

In this, the salutogenic approach adopts a recursive principle in which effects feed back on causes. Salutogenic factors, or pathogenic ones, act on health, and the state of health feeds back on the determinants of health. All this in a spatio-temporal context defined also by the relational dimension between past, present and future. With a further level of articulation that presupposes that all this also happens between internal and external resources, in a recursive action and feedback between them. If human becoming unfolds in an unpredictable and uncertain context, health all the more becomes a relational process with infinite possibilities, in which every change in salutogenic resources, factors and determinants will have an effect on the whole system, even if it is not possible to know which.

Beyond the symptom: two stories

Claudio shows himself and describes himself as a determined person who, in life and also in the work he does, sets goals to be reached which, step by step, in a slow process, lead him to the summit. Redefining the request and outlining the work process was, for me, essential to avoid colluding with the implicit request that his psychotherapy should be one of many handholds for reaching the goal of being healed of his symptoms. As the sessions went on, one of my greatest struggles in the interviews with Claudio was to open up descriptions different from those already present, perhaps already described, crystallised in linear explanations. At times it was even difficult to get answers to circular questions and to reformulate and, at least in part, restructure the narratives.

In the account of the family’s relational patterns and in his work experience, Claudio’s perception emerges that he mostly felt disqualified by his father, who was strongly critical of him and also judged his passions negatively. Besides his passion for the mountains, over time he cultivated photography and writing in particular, producing books for climbers and selling nature videos and photographs to advertising agencies. His creative streak, too, was never appreciated by his father; on the contrary, it was devalued as a waste of time. His mother does not belittle Claudio’s creative side, but she does not show any interest in it either.

His descriptions seem to show intra-family relationships characterised by disqualification and disconfirmation, and if “to be seen is to exist” (Cecchin, in Stübner, 2013), Claudio’s existence would seem to be characterised by being worth little. It is impossible to think that the ulcerative colitis is the cause or the effect of all this, but in Claudio’s convictions it seems to be representative of it, the concrete manifestation of his lack of worth.

Remo, on the other hand, presents himself as unable to identify goals for himself. Exploring relationships rather than searching for the causes of his malaise or for possible solutions to act on, an interesting element emerges when observing the genogram, which makes Remo reflect on the fact that he does not want to end up like one of his cousins, unmarried, who looked after first the grandmother and then her own mother until their deaths. There would seem to be an implicit family injunction, found in some peasant traditions, according to which the youngest child devotes themselves to caring for the parents, giving up a life of their own outside the family of origin. In therapy I ask Remo whether it is possible that his brother and sister think that he is the one who should look after their mother; he replies that he does not know whether they think so or not, but that in fact that is how it is. Remo thus seems to be a person stuck in a life he did not choose, faithful to the family injunctions to remain at the disposal first of his parents and then to be a substitute husband to his widowed mother. Unable to imagine being able to leave her alone, he worries that without his presence she might suffer to the point of letting herself drift towards a longed-for death.

In the sessions with Claudio there was always a sort of speed in the rhythm and the possibility of offering perturbing elements, which were in any case taken up; this allowed me to feel that we were moving forward, amplifying my ability to make connections and to propose other levels of observation and exploration. With Remo the rhythm was slower, and the number of sessions itself may have to do with a mutual need to proceed gradually, in a sort of caution that I felt take hold of me and that, at times, put me at an impasse, with a need to respect his pace and rhythms, careful to move with extreme tact, in the etymological sense of the use of a sense to “judge certain qualities of bodies, their solidity, fluidity, dryness, temperature”.

Taking the request for change as a further frame for the therapy, I think that perhaps the difference in the rhythm of the dance might have to do with what a change could have meant for each of them.

Changes in daily life, changing job, changing house, opening up to new acquaintances, may have been perceived by Remo as extremely dangerous. Both for himself, in a possible foreshadowing of failure, of being disappointed, of feeling unable to cope, and above all for his mum, for the effect such changes could have had on her. Claudio, on the other hand, would seem to have nothing to lose, open to renewing himself at work, uncertain in his relationship with his partner, increasingly distant from family pressures. I believe I came into contact with the caution of one and the boldness of the other, respecting both positions, which often made me, too, extremely cautious with Remo and, at times, with Claudio, surprised at myself for the intuitions or connections I was proposing.

All this seems to have to do with the dimensions of stability and change that characterise Claudio and Remo in different ways. The first seems to define the dimension of meaning of his life precisely by proceeding through continual changes, in searching, in challenges, in risk, in working on himself as the promoter of change. Remo, on the other hand, seems to find his dimension of meaning in staying put, in keeping the world still, in the status quo.

In working with both of them I keep in the background the questions about symptoms, behaviours, reactions or whatever else: “What does this say about this person’s story? What is all this for?” I feel them to be good questions for me, which avoid falling into interpretations or searches for solutions that people often ask for, and which allow me to keep my attention on the resources present. Most of the time I intend to turn my attention to the resources present in the same sense as positive connotation, that is, “with the intention of building a narrative frame that provides ways of salvation” (Giuliani, 2014). With Claudio more easily, given his aptitude for seeking new readings, for opening up and taking an interest in different points of view, with a positive idea of the world. With Remo, too, I propose a different view, even an opposite one, positively connoted, that encourages the re-narration of his struggles and difficulties as points of value, as generosity, as a positive attitude, as considerateness.

None of the decisions Remo made in the course of psychotherapy, for example about the house he owns, vacated by the tenant, which he decides to start furnishing as he begins to imagine being able to go and live there, or a job interview to test his ability to go through with it, were discussed in session or “prescribed” in any way by me. Cutting loose the ballast that kept him immobile, Remo’s “test flights” arrived in therapy already decided or already tried out, and each time I was surprised. In this slow but tireless pace, trying and experimenting were great spaces of new possibilities, as I felt the confirmation of “the need not to cure or solve problems so much as to be useful, innovative, to deconstruct the stories with which people present themselves” (Telfener, 2017).

From one point of view these were incomparable journeys, or rather it is always impossible to compare people, who are not pathologies or symptoms; every therapeutic process is unique; premises, models, convictions, family histories, life experiences are particular and original. In this work with Claudio and with Remo, which also had moments of overlap in time, the only invariable element was me; this allows me to recognise that therapy brings into play a co-responsibility, a dance that takes two, each with what they have available. Aware of my responsibility, in particular to take care of the therapeutic process, I have experienced that the development, the course and the eventual outcome belong, first and foremost, to the person.

Conclusions and learnings

Claudio, an experienced climber, taught me the difference between handholds and footholds: you place your feet on two stable points in order to look for new handholds to reach with your hands. The new handholds can become footholds; a new handhold becomes a new foothold for moving on towards the summit. So only by letting go of one of the two footholds will I be able to find a new position, different from the previous one, momentarily stable and ready to change again. Each handhold is connected to the climber’s capacity, their flexibility, muscle strength, experience and knowledge of the mountain. It seems to me that this is comparable to the way human beings proceed, and also to the way psychotherapy proceeds. Exploring and observing one’s own footholds, one’s premises, ideas, family myths, prejudices, relational patterns, in order to explore possible new handholds. New opportunities to change the present position into a different posture, in a continual becoming.

In the work with Remo I experienced trust in developmental processes and in the therapeutic relationship. Several times I had the impression that nothing was happening, that we were at an impasse, but the relationship between us remained present. Slowly, in his own time, Remo seized the possibility of accessing opportunities present in his life context, activating in him a capacity for decision and action that had long been blocked.

With both of them I sensed that the systemic approach relieved them of finding confirmation that they themselves had been the cause of their illness, that in some way they had wanted it or deserved it, involuntarily or perhaps precisely through lack of will. I was urged by both of them to provide answers, to propose solutions, to reassure “from the heights of my knowledge”, to prescribe something effective in response to the requests for healing from the illness or the symptoms or, in Claudio’s case, to develop awareness so that he could move forward on his path of personal growth. A strong pressure, present in many sessions, which diminished over time. I wonder whether my refusal to respond to this kind of pressure in some way served as a further frame in which Claudio could begin to consider the possibility of himself giving up the search for an impossible healing, or for the miracle of healing. This relational position of mine might have allowed Remo, on the other hand, to give up healing an illness that perhaps does not exist, in order to take care of the relational dimension of his life.

For both of them the symptom or the illness was the occasion or the epiphenomenon for widening the gaze in a broader search for meaning that would allow them to observe different, still unexplored connections, moving from the physical to the relational level and back, connecting mind and body in a non-linear process.

Claudio’s and Remo’s requests contained a question already present in me about what care and health are in the body-mind relationship. In the cases presented and throughout this paper, my reflections and premises on the mind-body relationship, on health-illness-well-being and on the difference between curing and caring are therefore inevitably and authentically present. This opens up to the story of the relational dance in therapy and also of the reciprocity of the exchange, while at the same time asking what one’s own premises are, and those of the system and systems one is meeting, in a mutual enrichment within the encounter.

It already becomes therapeutic to offer the person a view different from that motionless, passive and objectified image. To reconsider the flow of the person’s story in order to reappropriate, in the present of the session, the meaning of past events and so open up different future perspectives. With the epistemological premises of the Milan Approach, the therapeutic relationship thus itself becomes an opportunity to recognise and experience the human capacity to be an active agent in the relationship with one’s environment. By also rereading situations in the light of the relational patterns of the contexts in which one is embedded, observing what their constraints and possibilities are, it is possible to identify different occasions and opportunities to enact a possible change. This also makes it possible to increase the points of view and the possibilities of finding new meanings and narratives alongside those already known. No longer exhaustive explanations that immobilise the person, or effective prescriptions, but different stories that might also show unusual or unexpected endings.

In offering a relationship of this kind, in a system that perceives itself as stuck and passive, the recognition and development of the personal and contextual resources present also becomes a process of empowerment through which the person can also reclaim the possibility of self-determination.

Considering the person in a non-linear way can in itself already be a perturbing act for the system. It can, in fact, bring into play the possibility of creating a difference, including in the way of acting, producing a difference for oneself and in one’s own way of positioning oneself in interaction with the environment. A perturbation whose effects we cannot predict, just as it is impossible to control the effects of increasing levels of complexity.

So the mind-body relationship, the subject of this paper, resonates and recurs as an arc of the circuit of therapeutic practice and of the systemic stance, regardless of whether it is individual, couple, family or group therapy. In all these contexts and regardless of the request, we can find the premise of looking at human systems as if they were trivial machines; which happens every time we are asked for a solution, every time we act instructively, every time we expect a precise effect from our interventions, every time we interpret instead of hypothesising, every time we are sure we have understood or ask questions to which we know the answer.

The psychotherapeutic journeys presented make it possible to start from the close mind-body relationship and widen the reflection to what the premises are, contextual, personal and professional, epistemological, premises that meet in the therapy room and that concern the whole therapeutic system, about what health, illness, therapy and healing are, a complex reflection on what curing and caring are.

To search for and recognise the premises of the person, the cultural ones and those of the systems to which they belong, in a dance with our own personal, cultural and professional premises, in order to explore the greatest possible number of descriptions, in the certainty of uncertainty.

Complexe Systémique: key points

Roberta Sallustio puts her finger on a very everyday trap: the request to “fix the mind” so that the body will work, often relayed by whoever makes the referral. The article’s value lies less in its tour of ideas, from Descartes to Antonovsky, which is quick and at times allusive, than in the way it shows what linear causality does to the relationship: it turns illness into guilt and therapy into a repair shop. Salutogenesis offers a concrete alternative here: looking for what produces health, placing the person on a continuum rather than in a category. The two vignettes are valuable for clinical work: with Claudio, the fast pace and the temptation to make therapy one more “handhold” on the way to healing; with Remo, the slowness, the apparent impasse and decisions that arrive in session already made. One would like to know more about the work with the doctor and about how the symptoms evolved, which the text leaves open. But the lesson is clear: giving up healing in the person’s place can give back to them the possibility of taking care of their life. Read alongside the systemic perspective in psychosomatics, and the account of first- and second-order cybernetics, from puppeteer to dancer.

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Unofficial English translation of La terapia in officina, quando le persone si sentono macchine. Riflessioni sulla relazione mente-corpo da una visione lineare alla complessità dei sistemi viventi., by Roberta Sallustio, Connessioni, new series, no. 9 (2021), under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Translation (with the help of artificial intelligence) and layout: Complexe Systémique, November 2026 — the work has been modified under the terms of the licence. Neither the authors nor the journal are responsible for this translation; the original version prevails.

Unofficial English translation of “La terapia in officina, quando le persone si sentono macchine. Riflessioni sulla relazione mente-corpo da una visione lineare alla complessità dei sistemi viventi.”, published in Connessioni (2021) under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Made by Complexe Systémique with the help of artificial intelligence, it does not come from the authors or the journal, who are not responsible for its content; the original version prevails.

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How to cite this article

Sallustio, R. (2021). Therapy in the repair shop, when people feel like machines. Reflections on the mind-body relationship, from a linear view to the complexity of living systems (Complexe Systémique, Trans.). Complexe Systémique. https://app.complexe-systemique.com/en_GB/articles/therapy-in-the-repair-shop-when-people-feel-like-machines-reflections-on-the-mind-body (Original work published in 2021 in Connessioni, nuova serie, n. 9 (2021); republished in 2021 by Connessioni, https://connessioni.cmtf.it/la-terapia-in-officina-quando-le-persone-si-sentono-macchine-riflessioni-sulla-relazione-mente-corpo-da-una-visione-lineare-alla-complessita-dei-sistemi-viventi/)

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